The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...

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now that there needs to be some given intuitive content for the above discussed synthesis to take place. 151 Pointing out this necessity provides one possible interpretative axis from which to address the reason why in these quoted passages from the Op Kant qualifies apperception as the first act that grounds all representations with the expression ―blos logischer‖ or ―merely logical.‖ This lies in the difference that Kant makes between an intuitive understanding and a discursive understanding; where the first refers to the kind of thought that can be speculatively attributed to a divine being and the latter to the kind of thought present in finite rational beings. 152 In the case of an intuitive understanding there is no distinction between intuition and concept when it comes to cognition. 153 And, in so far as these are collapsed, what is being thought is immediately present and at the same time always already a whole that can be said to be, at least in Leibnizian terms, infinitely determined by thought. 154 Contrary to this, a discursive understanding is essentially distinguished from intuition and its content; in the case of human beings, this intuition must be thought of, from the 151 This qualification is a sign of the possible methodological problem that the doctrine of self-positing presents when contrasted with the KrV. That is to say, the question of the spatio-temporal nature of human intuition is suspended here because the first level of discussion is limited to thought and not sensibility. Contrary to this, Kant starts in the KrV with an exposition of the forms of our sensibility. This dissonance within Kant‘s critical position that arises from the Op is discussed below, once entire doctrine is elucidated. 152 KrV, A68/B93. I say that it is one of the possible reasons or part of the reason because there are other angles from which this articulation can be unpacked. Another such angle will be articulated below, in the next section, when the main source for the explanation of this first level of the doctrine is Kant's discussion of the paralogisms of pure reason. 153 Cf., KU §77; KrV, §2.3 & §4.4 and §16n, from the ―Transcendental Aesthetic.‖ 154 Reich, K. The Completeness of Kant‘s Table of Judgments Trans. Jane Kneller and Michael Losonsky. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1992, 37. 108
perspective of its relation to the thinking ―I,‖ as given. 155 Whether it is a priori or in experience, the understanding is limited to the use of mere concepts in its capacity for cognition. As such, they are mere tools to make intuition intelligible to the knower, or ―I.‖ Concepts for Kant are also general in nature and thus refer to their corresponding objects ―mediately by means of a mark which can be common to several things.‖ 156 Thus, within this Kantian paradigm, the subject knower's discursive understanding is conditioned in its cognition of objects by what is given in intuition as well as by a conceptual form of thought that is restricted to the general. Because of this inherent limitation to the subject knower's understanding, it can be said that apperception as the ground of all representations is merely logical and not intuitive, even in the case of the possibility of attaching the ―I think‖ to an objective representation. 157 The understanding of finite rational beings suffers from an essential poverty of resources. 158 Despite the fact that human thought is merely discursive, there is nonetheless still a productive aspect with respect to it. At this level it is ―merely logical,‖ but nonetheless 155 KrV, B 72. Cf. Allison, H. Kant‘s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense. New Haven, Yale University Press, Revised Edition 2004, 77. 156 KrV, A320/B377. 157 This is a reason why Kant calls the schematism of the dynamic categories of the understanding ―analogies‖ of experience, where thought provides only the rules of synthesis. 158 As is well known, this position challenges past philosophical positions that have ultimately appealed in some way to such divine mode of thought/cognition to ground their systems despite the inherent inability to access or know it (such as Descartes, Mendelssohn, and Leibniz). The idea of a being that could exercise such kind of thought remains for Kant an ―unattainable problematic concept.‖ KU, §76. Ak: 5:402. Pluhar, 285. 109
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The Doctrine of Self-positing and R
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Abstract of the Dissertation The Do
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Contents Abbreviations vi Preface v
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Preface The interest in the Opus po
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Acknowledgments I am in the debt of
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Introduction The Selbstsetzungslehr
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of receptivity‖ reveals also the
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enables thinkers in the twenty firs
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form of ―principles of synthesis
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a transition that has its own ―sp
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the English language literature tha
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his account was circular. As Först
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fascicle written by Kant between 18
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the doctrine of self-positing attem
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preemptively with this retrospectiv
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meaning of its particular relations
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ii. a. Ontological Proof In its com
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ecause the only operative rule for
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In the context of the BDG, the natu
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3. It is unconditionally impossible
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. We know that a condition for inne
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Realerklährung - an explanation of
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ii. b. Setzung‘s Function as Posi
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Negation can also result from chang
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ii. Kritik der reinen Vernunft ii.
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foreclosed. This is precisely what
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none of this is particularly new. N
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elations of thoroughgoing determina
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that exhibits it must share in the
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of this ideal and its final personi
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it perceives only its effects. In a
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category causality in the second an
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Just as time functions as the form
Page 67 and 68: spontaneous nature. Or perhaps it r
Page 69 and 70: points to the fact that in the act
Page 71 and 72: latter (as for the other dynamical
Page 73 and 74: unity is expressed. In the second a
Page 75 and 76: Kant‘s new transcendental idealis
Page 77 and 78: idealize what can be claimed to be.
Page 79 and 80: The structure in the schematic of t
Page 81 and 82: critical model entails thus the sub
Page 83 and 84: continuous reiteration of the most
Page 85 and 86: [machen] of experience with the sou
Page 87 and 88: and not actuality. 103 These fields
Page 89 and 90: functions as ground to a universal
Page 91 and 92: appearance, phenomenon, and noumeno
Page 93 and 94: Handschrift, when he writes: The mi
Page 95 and 96: thought. While the spirit of the cr
Page 97 and 98: faculties of representation in ligh
Page 99 and 100: particularly in their presence, uni
Page 101 and 102: knower to thin an objective represe
Page 103 and 104: doctrine, the name is oftentimes qu
Page 105 and 106: to intuition. This status brings to
Page 107 and 108: Chapter Three: The Analytic Level 1
Page 109 and 110: ―Paralogisms‖ section. 136 Desp
Page 111 and 112: the Selbstsetzungslehre. In this re
Page 113 and 114: Not being able to be thought by the
Page 115 and 116: This connection between the single
Page 117: it concerns the possibility of the
Page 121 and 122: apperception and b) the synthetic o
Page 123 and 124: and the section ―On the Paralogis
Page 125 and 126: synthetic determination of its intu
Page 127 and 128: on the possibility of attaching the
Page 129 and 130: distinguished from this ―I‖). 1
Page 131 and 132: object. 177 The consciousness of my
Page 133 and 134: doctrine. One finds, in fact, that
Page 135 and 136: perspective, contained analytically
Page 137 and 138: an inference: [...] 186 The first s
Page 139 and 140: this follows from the fact that for
Page 141 and 142: feeling can be said to be a form of
Page 143 and 144: that of which we are conscious as o
Page 145 and 146: true, the nature of intuition concr
Page 147 and 148: This formulation of the ―I am‖
Page 149 and 150: Chapter Four: The Ontological Level
Page 151 and 152: of identity, the analytic containme
Page 153 and 154: there Kant nevertheless asks: ―An
Page 155 and 156: objectification and ―I am‖ as V
Page 157 and 158: The first synthetic act of consciou
Page 159 and 160: introducing a different field of de
Page 161 and 162: where the earlier indeterminate emp
Page 163 and 164: What is given first to the power of
Page 165 and 166: epresentation that was given prior
Page 167 and 168: outside itself, which it can then d
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ground that can accommodate the exp
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These passages by no means say the
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sensible‖ (as Deleuze would phras
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schematization. What that is like w
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from which the ―I think‖ gains
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The path taken to arrive at a basic
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As seen in chapter four, the relati
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In so far as the Selbstsetzungslehr
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MAN that, indeed, no science unders
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medical doctors, educators, and phy
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the grounding of the human sciences
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______ ―Metaphysical Foundations
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S. Harris. Revised Edition. Indiana
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Critique of Pure Reason. Chicago, U
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