The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...

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upon Kant's earlier pre-critical and critical work, it is evident that the concept of setzen is already a distinctive mark within the latter. It is also very much part of other important technical terms in Kant's thought, the most obvious of which is ―zusammnesetzen‖ (to compose)—related precisely to that which is carried out by the application of concepts (understanding) over intuition (sensibility) in the cognition of an object. Because the fruitful intersecting points between Beck's interpretation of Kant's critical philosophy and the late Selbstsetzungslehre are multiple, the focus here will be only on methodology of exposition. In the third volume of his Erläuternder Auszug aus den Kritischen Schriften des Herrn Prof. Kant auf Anraten desselben, subtitled welcher den Standpunkt darstellt, aus welchem die Kritische Philosophie beurteilt werden muss, Beck argues for a standpoint from which it is best to understand Kant's KrV. This is Beck's response to the general confusion that had given rise to some of the criticisms against Kant, the origin of which he blamed on the method of exposition of the KrV. Instead of starting with the ―Aesthetics‖ section, he thought Kant's position would be best understood by starting directly with the ―Analytic‖ section. By reversing the order, Beck argued that it was possible to bring to the fore what he identified as the ―ürsprungliche Vorstellen‖ 129 of the categories and repair thus the apparent insurmountable gap between sensibility and understanding, or, systematically speaking, between the Aesthetics and the Analytic sections of the KrV. The advantage of starting any exposition of Kant's critical philosophy with the categories is that in their original activity of representing, they are always already related 129 One finds a reference to this Beckian concept of ―ursprüngliche Vorstellung‖ in fascicle vii of the Op. Ak: 22:88. 94
to intuition. This status brings to the fore that their uniqueness as categories, or pure concepts of the understanding, is that what they are is but functions or rules of synthesis of intuition (general or sensible); the Kantian idea that categories function as rules of synthesis simply makes no sense if they are thought of as being empty. From Beck's perspective, then, this starting point avoids what he saw as a common tendency to first think the nature of concepts on the one hand and then that of intuition on the other, to finally think the application of the former over the latter. Kant's first response to Beck's Standpunkt was negative, as he understood it as beginning with the categories as mere forms of thought that are missing any sense and significance when they lack intuitive content. He writes: Let me only remark on this point that when he [Beck] proposes to start out with the categories he is busying himself with the mere form of thinking, that is, concepts without objects, concepts that as yet are without any meaning. It is more natural to begin with the given, that is, with intuitions insofar as these are possible a priori, furnishing us with synthetic a priori propositions that disclose only the appearances of objects. For then the claim that objects are intuited only in accordance with the form in which the subject is affected by them is seen to be certain and necessary. 130 Ironically, the problem that Kant identified with Beck‘s approach (i.e., there is nowhere to go from empty concepts) is precisely what Beck attempted to avoid all together. Beck‘s intention becomes clearer when one understands that his methodological reversal did not mean a reversal that would start with a principle in which consciousness is reducible to an empty determining or function of all unity. On the contrary, what is necessary from methodological point of view is to begin with synthesis itself and, as Beck recommends, to ―transpose ourselves into the very original mode of 130 Ak: 13:463. Zweig, 527. 95
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The Doctrine of Self-positing and R
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Abstract of the Dissertation The Do
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Contents Abbreviations vi Preface v
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Preface The interest in the Opus po
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Acknowledgments I am in the debt of
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Introduction The Selbstsetzungslehr
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of receptivity‖ reveals also the
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enables thinkers in the twenty firs
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form of ―principles of synthesis
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a transition that has its own ―sp
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the English language literature tha
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his account was circular. As Först
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fascicle written by Kant between 18
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the doctrine of self-positing attem
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preemptively with this retrospectiv
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meaning of its particular relations
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ii. a. Ontological Proof In its com
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ecause the only operative rule for
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In the context of the BDG, the natu
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3. It is unconditionally impossible
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. We know that a condition for inne
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Realerklährung - an explanation of
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ii. b. Setzung‘s Function as Posi
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Negation can also result from chang
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ii. Kritik der reinen Vernunft ii.
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foreclosed. This is precisely what
Page 53 and 54: none of this is particularly new. N
Page 55 and 56: elations of thoroughgoing determina
Page 57 and 58: that exhibits it must share in the
Page 59 and 60: of this ideal and its final personi
Page 61 and 62: it perceives only its effects. In a
Page 63 and 64: category causality in the second an
Page 65 and 66: Just as time functions as the form
Page 67 and 68: spontaneous nature. Or perhaps it r
Page 69 and 70: points to the fact that in the act
Page 71 and 72: latter (as for the other dynamical
Page 73 and 74: unity is expressed. In the second a
Page 75 and 76: Kant‘s new transcendental idealis
Page 77 and 78: idealize what can be claimed to be.
Page 79 and 80: The structure in the schematic of t
Page 81 and 82: critical model entails thus the sub
Page 83 and 84: continuous reiteration of the most
Page 85 and 86: [machen] of experience with the sou
Page 87 and 88: and not actuality. 103 These fields
Page 89 and 90: functions as ground to a universal
Page 91 and 92: appearance, phenomenon, and noumeno
Page 93 and 94: Handschrift, when he writes: The mi
Page 95 and 96: thought. While the spirit of the cr
Page 97 and 98: faculties of representation in ligh
Page 99 and 100: particularly in their presence, uni
Page 101 and 102: knower to thin an objective represe
Page 103: doctrine, the name is oftentimes qu
Page 107 and 108: Chapter Three: The Analytic Level 1
Page 109 and 110: ―Paralogisms‖ section. 136 Desp
Page 111 and 112: the Selbstsetzungslehre. In this re
Page 113 and 114: Not being able to be thought by the
Page 115 and 116: This connection between the single
Page 117 and 118: it concerns the possibility of the
Page 119 and 120: perspective of its relation to the
Page 121 and 122: apperception and b) the synthetic o
Page 123 and 124: and the section ―On the Paralogis
Page 125 and 126: synthetic determination of its intu
Page 127 and 128: on the possibility of attaching the
Page 129 and 130: distinguished from this ―I‖). 1
Page 131 and 132: object. 177 The consciousness of my
Page 133 and 134: doctrine. One finds, in fact, that
Page 135 and 136: perspective, contained analytically
Page 137 and 138: an inference: [...] 186 The first s
Page 139 and 140: this follows from the fact that for
Page 141 and 142: feeling can be said to be a form of
Page 143 and 144: that of which we are conscious as o
Page 145 and 146: true, the nature of intuition concr
Page 147 and 148: This formulation of the ―I am‖
Page 149 and 150: Chapter Four: The Ontological Level
Page 151 and 152: of identity, the analytic containme
Page 153 and 154: there Kant nevertheless asks: ―An
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objectification and ―I am‖ as V
Page 157 and 158:
The first synthetic act of consciou
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introducing a different field of de
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where the earlier indeterminate emp
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What is given first to the power of
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epresentation that was given prior
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outside itself, which it can then d
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ground that can accommodate the exp
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These passages by no means say the
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sensible‖ (as Deleuze would phras
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schematization. What that is like w
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from which the ―I think‖ gains
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The path taken to arrive at a basic
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As seen in chapter four, the relati
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In so far as the Selbstsetzungslehr
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MAN that, indeed, no science unders
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medical doctors, educators, and phy
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the grounding of the human sciences
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______ ―Metaphysical Foundations
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S. Harris. Revised Edition. Indiana
Page 195 and 196:
Critique of Pure Reason. Chicago, U
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