The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...

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knower through a mediating faculty of representation. 181 The final possible approach to this terminological dissonance is to accept that Kant used the terms interchangeably, and thus, attend most to the more general idea that he elucidates in those passages. While this terminological problem cannot be fully resolved and the second suggested approach can only be evaluated after the exposition of the entirety of the doctrine of self-positing, it can nonetheless be claimed that the above exposition of self- objectification is satisfactory. This is because the act of self-consciousness is, regardless of the term used, always qualified through expressions such as ―(merely) logical,‖ belonging to logic, involving only concepts, without manifold or determination, being analytic only, or only analyzable through the rule of identity. The exposition of the kind of object (―I‖) that arises out of the act of self-consciousness is one that does not contradict any of these qualifications, as it is shown to be merely thinking or unifying function and as such empty. This is the case even as self-consciousness is itself recognized as being that ―through which‖ the subject knower‘s making itself into an object is possible. i. c. Apperception and existence Another aspect of this first analytic level is Kant‘s introduction of the proof for the existence of the ―I.‖ The possibility of this proof is already well known from the KrV and the position in itself does not change in the Selbstsetzungslehre. From Kant‘s 181 Perhaps a clarifying note is called for with respect to the ―faculty of representation.‖ I take this faculty to be one that is broader than mere thinking; it appears as he way to address understanding, imagination, and intuition as conditions for the possibility of cognition. In this regard, it can be referred to as the faculty of cognition. 124
perspective, contained analytically within the ―I think‖ is the knowledge of the existence of an ―I.‖ This existential claim is, however, restricted as to its cognitive connotations. Knowing from the last section that the ―I‖ as an object of consciousness is empty with regards to any intuition, that which is now claimed to exist is also restricted to an existing that is qua thinking alone. As a result, such an existence is not yet determined as to its possibility beyond the mere positing of this ―I‖ out of an analysis of the proposition ―I think.‖ From this point of view, the existential claim that ―I am‖ remains ontologically neutral. In the doctrine of self-positing the claim ―I am‖ remains within the bounds of Kant‘s critical work in that the ―I‖ is still considered a mere fact and its truth value follows from the principle of identity and the nature of analytic judgments: the Cogito contains analytically sum. Here is a representative fragment from the Op, In the proposition: I am thinking, because it is completely identical, no progress, no synthetic judgment is given to me; for it is tautological and the alleged inference: I think, therefore I am, is no inference. 182 Kant is quite explicit that one finds the existence of one‘s ―I‖ (es wird mir) already embedded in the assertion that ―I am thinking‖ (ich bin denkend). In the KrV he had already claimed that there is no distinction between the propositions ―I think,‖ ―I am thinking‖ and ―I exist thinking;‖ as a result of this equivalency it becomes more apparent that ―I am‖ or sum is contained therein. 183 In addition to this analytic containment, any 182 Ak: 22:79. Förster, 187. Original: ―Es wird mir also in dem Satz ich bin denkend[,] weil er gantz identisch ist[,] gar kein Fortschritt kein synthetisches Urtheil gegeben[,] denn er ist tavtologisch und der vermeynte Schluß: Ich dencke darum bin ich ist kein Schluß.‖ 183 Allison, H. Kant‘s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense. New 125
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The Doctrine of Self-positing and R
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Abstract of the Dissertation The Do
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Contents Abbreviations vi Preface v
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Preface The interest in the Opus po
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Acknowledgments I am in the debt of
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Introduction The Selbstsetzungslehr
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of receptivity‖ reveals also the
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enables thinkers in the twenty firs
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form of ―principles of synthesis
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a transition that has its own ―sp
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the English language literature tha
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his account was circular. As Först
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fascicle written by Kant between 18
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the doctrine of self-positing attem
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preemptively with this retrospectiv
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meaning of its particular relations
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ii. a. Ontological Proof In its com
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ecause the only operative rule for
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In the context of the BDG, the natu
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3. It is unconditionally impossible
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. We know that a condition for inne
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Realerklährung - an explanation of
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ii. b. Setzung‘s Function as Posi
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Negation can also result from chang
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ii. Kritik der reinen Vernunft ii.
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foreclosed. This is precisely what
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none of this is particularly new. N
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elations of thoroughgoing determina
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that exhibits it must share in the
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of this ideal and its final personi
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it perceives only its effects. In a
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category causality in the second an
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Just as time functions as the form
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spontaneous nature. Or perhaps it r
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points to the fact that in the act
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latter (as for the other dynamical
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unity is expressed. In the second a
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Kant‘s new transcendental idealis
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idealize what can be claimed to be.
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The structure in the schematic of t
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critical model entails thus the sub
Page 83 and 84: continuous reiteration of the most
Page 85 and 86: [machen] of experience with the sou
Page 87 and 88: and not actuality. 103 These fields
Page 89 and 90: functions as ground to a universal
Page 91 and 92: appearance, phenomenon, and noumeno
Page 93 and 94: Handschrift, when he writes: The mi
Page 95 and 96: thought. While the spirit of the cr
Page 97 and 98: faculties of representation in ligh
Page 99 and 100: particularly in their presence, uni
Page 101 and 102: knower to thin an objective represe
Page 103 and 104: doctrine, the name is oftentimes qu
Page 105 and 106: to intuition. This status brings to
Page 107 and 108: Chapter Three: The Analytic Level 1
Page 109 and 110: ―Paralogisms‖ section. 136 Desp
Page 111 and 112: the Selbstsetzungslehre. In this re
Page 113 and 114: Not being able to be thought by the
Page 115 and 116: This connection between the single
Page 117 and 118: it concerns the possibility of the
Page 119 and 120: perspective of its relation to the
Page 121 and 122: apperception and b) the synthetic o
Page 123 and 124: and the section ―On the Paralogis
Page 125 and 126: synthetic determination of its intu
Page 127 and 128: on the possibility of attaching the
Page 129 and 130: distinguished from this ―I‖). 1
Page 131 and 132: object. 177 The consciousness of my
Page 133: doctrine. One finds, in fact, that
Page 137 and 138: an inference: [...] 186 The first s
Page 139 and 140: this follows from the fact that for
Page 141 and 142: feeling can be said to be a form of
Page 143 and 144: that of which we are conscious as o
Page 145 and 146: true, the nature of intuition concr
Page 147 and 148: This formulation of the ―I am‖
Page 149 and 150: Chapter Four: The Ontological Level
Page 151 and 152: of identity, the analytic containme
Page 153 and 154: there Kant nevertheless asks: ―An
Page 155 and 156: objectification and ―I am‖ as V
Page 157 and 158: The first synthetic act of consciou
Page 159 and 160: introducing a different field of de
Page 161 and 162: where the earlier indeterminate emp
Page 163 and 164: What is given first to the power of
Page 165 and 166: epresentation that was given prior
Page 167 and 168: outside itself, which it can then d
Page 169 and 170: ground that can accommodate the exp
Page 171 and 172: These passages by no means say the
Page 173 and 174: sensible‖ (as Deleuze would phras
Page 175 and 176: schematization. What that is like w
Page 177 and 178: from which the ―I think‖ gains
Page 179 and 180: The path taken to arrive at a basic
Page 181 and 182: As seen in chapter four, the relati
Page 183 and 184: In so far as the Selbstsetzungslehr
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MAN that, indeed, no science unders
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medical doctors, educators, and phy
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the grounding of the human sciences
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______ ―Metaphysical Foundations
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S. Harris. Revised Edition. Indiana
Page 195 and 196:
Critique of Pure Reason. Chicago, U
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