The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...

providing a framework in which both reason and the imagination are the contours to the
apparatus by which the subject constructs itself and its fields of determinability. The
understanding and judgment remain conspicuously absent in that their function in the
Selbstsetzungslehre do not change. Sensibility is brought into an active domain of its
own, in which the imagination finally reveals in a much more robust way the extent to
which it can be conceived as a faculty of sensibility in the construction of experience.
Ultimately, Kant‘s position according to the doctrine is that, one the one hand, the
subject affects itself in anticipation of experience for the purpose of being able to be
affected by the given. On the other hand, this self-affection is only that, a self-affection
that still requires that what is now capable of being given to the subject actually be given.
It is only through the arousal produced by that which comes to the encounter of the
subject that the act of spontaneity takes place at all. As in the KrV, its ground is the
sensible.
following:
Thus, taking a step back to look at the doctrine of self-positing, one finds the
-The ―I‖ together with space and time, and the ―real‖ all remain incapable of
being known directly. They are, paraphrasing Duque, the ungrounded
unlocalizable ground.
-The ―I‖ had already been described by Kant as virtual; it has no particular
location qua soul, nor can it be experienced.
-Space and time as pure intuitions cannot be intuited or represented on
from within sensibility itself.
-From the perspective of the ―I think‖ as an empirical proposition, the acts by
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