The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...

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doctrine. In this way, it holds some answers to his contemporary critics. follows: In the KrV, Kant describes in broad terms the difference of the two faculties as Our cognition arises from two fundamental sources of the mind, the first of which is the reception of representations (the receptivity of impressions), the second the faculty for cognizing an object by means of these representations (spontaneity of concepts); through the former an object is given to us, through the later it is thought in relation to that representation (as a mere determination of the mind). Intuition and concepts therefore constitute the elements of all our cognition […]. 110 The contrast between these sources of representation is clear: the first refers to an undergoing [leiden] while the second to a doing [tun]. That these are the ―two fundamental sources of the mind‖ is, according to Kant, a fact about which nothing can be said as to their origin, but that can be proven to be necessary conditions to cognition. And, as shown in his discussion of intuition in the ―Aesthetic‖ section of the KrV, they exhibit a priori forms of representation that are significantly different in character. Because from Kant's subjectivist position any critique of pure reason establishes both their essential cognitive roles 111 as well as the different philosophical domains that arise from them, this dualism inevitably permeates Kant's entire system. One sees the significance of this duality extend far beyond the field of cognition alone; in the 110 KrV, B75. Original: Unsre Erkenntniß entspringt aus zwei Grundquellen des Gemüths, deren die erste ist, die Vorstellungen zu empfangen (die Receptivität der Eindrücke), die zweite das Vermögen, durch diese Vorstellungen einen Gegenstand zu erkennen (Spontaneität der Begriffe); durch die erstere wird uns ein Gegenstand gegeben, durch die zweite wird dieser im Verhältniß auf jene Vorstellung (als bloße Bestimmung des Gemüths) gedacht. Anschauung und Begriffe machen also die Elemente aller unserer Erkenntniß aus […]. 111 KrV, B74. Original: ―Anschauung und Begriffe machen also die Elemente aller unserer Erkenntniß aus, so daß weder Begriffe ohne ihnen auf einige Art correspondirende Anschauung, noch Anschauung ohne Begriffe ein Erkenntniß abgeben können.‖ 82
Handschrift, when he writes: The mind (animus) of the human being, as the sum total of all representations that have a place within it, has a domain (sphaera) which concerns three parts: the faculty of cognition, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and the faculty of desire. Each of these has two divisions, the field of sensibility and the field of intellectuality. (the field of sensible or intellectual cognition, pleasure or displeasure, and desire or abhorrence) 112 In other words, it affects the theoretical, practical, and reflective divisions that form part of Kant‘s philosophical position. And at the risk of stating the obvious to anybody minimally acquainted with Kant's work, but in order to bring further home the endemic nature of this cognitive dualism, here are just some of the places in which this dualism is manifest: understanding vs. sensibility (faculty); thought vs. intuition (representation); analytic vs. aesthetic (elements of the system); active vs. passive (character); discursive concept vs. sensible intuition (bounds of experience); categories vs. space and time (pure forms of representation); form vs. content (relational quality); extension/intention vs. limitation (determination); general vs. singular (unity); error in judgment vs. unfalsifiable sensibility (truth value); forms of thought vs. pure relations (necessity of each form); object of cognition vs. immediate representation of an object; unconditioned vs. unbounded (Totum); theoretical and practical (cognition, qua presence or absence of sensible intuition); theoretical vs. aesthetic judgment (presence/absence of a concept); determinative vs. teleological judgment (the absence of the applicability of anticipations of experience through categories); and so on and so forth. In light of this systematic picture as well as the fact that many of Kant's contemporaries found the heart of the problem in the potential irreconcilability of the faculties of receptivity and spontaneity, their criticism of critical philosophy puts into 112 Ak: 7:142. Louden, 254 83
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The Doctrine of Self-positing and R
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Abstract of the Dissertation The Do
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Contents Abbreviations vi Preface v
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Preface The interest in the Opus po
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Acknowledgments I am in the debt of
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Introduction The Selbstsetzungslehr
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of receptivity‖ reveals also the
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enables thinkers in the twenty firs
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form of ―principles of synthesis
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a transition that has its own ―sp
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the English language literature tha
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his account was circular. As Först
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fascicle written by Kant between 18
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the doctrine of self-positing attem
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preemptively with this retrospectiv
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meaning of its particular relations
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ii. a. Ontological Proof In its com
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ecause the only operative rule for
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In the context of the BDG, the natu
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3. It is unconditionally impossible
Page 41 and 42: . We know that a condition for inne
Page 43 and 44: Realerklährung - an explanation of
Page 45 and 46: ii. b. Setzung‘s Function as Posi
Page 47 and 48: Negation can also result from chang
Page 49 and 50: ii. Kritik der reinen Vernunft ii.
Page 51 and 52: foreclosed. This is precisely what
Page 53 and 54: none of this is particularly new. N
Page 55 and 56: elations of thoroughgoing determina
Page 57 and 58: that exhibits it must share in the
Page 59 and 60: of this ideal and its final personi
Page 61 and 62: it perceives only its effects. In a
Page 63 and 64: category causality in the second an
Page 65 and 66: Just as time functions as the form
Page 67 and 68: spontaneous nature. Or perhaps it r
Page 69 and 70: points to the fact that in the act
Page 71 and 72: latter (as for the other dynamical
Page 73 and 74: unity is expressed. In the second a
Page 75 and 76: Kant‘s new transcendental idealis
Page 77 and 78: idealize what can be claimed to be.
Page 79 and 80: The structure in the schematic of t
Page 81 and 82: critical model entails thus the sub
Page 83 and 84: continuous reiteration of the most
Page 85 and 86: [machen] of experience with the sou
Page 87 and 88: and not actuality. 103 These fields
Page 89 and 90: functions as ground to a universal
Page 91: appearance, phenomenon, and noumeno
Page 95 and 96: thought. While the spirit of the cr
Page 97 and 98: faculties of representation in ligh
Page 99 and 100: particularly in their presence, uni
Page 101 and 102: knower to thin an objective represe
Page 103 and 104: doctrine, the name is oftentimes qu
Page 105 and 106: to intuition. This status brings to
Page 107 and 108: Chapter Three: The Analytic Level 1
Page 109 and 110: ―Paralogisms‖ section. 136 Desp
Page 111 and 112: the Selbstsetzungslehre. In this re
Page 113 and 114: Not being able to be thought by the
Page 115 and 116: This connection between the single
Page 117 and 118: it concerns the possibility of the
Page 119 and 120: perspective of its relation to the
Page 121 and 122: apperception and b) the synthetic o
Page 123 and 124: and the section ―On the Paralogis
Page 125 and 126: synthetic determination of its intu
Page 127 and 128: on the possibility of attaching the
Page 129 and 130: distinguished from this ―I‖). 1
Page 131 and 132: object. 177 The consciousness of my
Page 133 and 134: doctrine. One finds, in fact, that
Page 135 and 136: perspective, contained analytically
Page 137 and 138: an inference: [...] 186 The first s
Page 139 and 140: this follows from the fact that for
Page 141 and 142: feeling can be said to be a form of
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that of which we are conscious as o
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true, the nature of intuition concr
Page 147 and 148:
This formulation of the ―I am‖
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Chapter Four: The Ontological Level
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of identity, the analytic containme
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there Kant nevertheless asks: ―An
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objectification and ―I am‖ as V
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The first synthetic act of consciou
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introducing a different field of de
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where the earlier indeterminate emp
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What is given first to the power of
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epresentation that was given prior
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outside itself, which it can then d
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ground that can accommodate the exp
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These passages by no means say the
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sensible‖ (as Deleuze would phras
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schematization. What that is like w
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from which the ―I think‖ gains
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The path taken to arrive at a basic
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As seen in chapter four, the relati
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In so far as the Selbstsetzungslehr
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MAN that, indeed, no science unders
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medical doctors, educators, and phy
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the grounding of the human sciences
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______ ―Metaphysical Foundations
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S. Harris. Revised Edition. Indiana
Page 195 and 196:
Critique of Pure Reason. Chicago, U
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187
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