The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...

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iii. Historical and Facultative Tensions: The movement exhibited between the analytic and the ontological levels as well as the unfolding of the three ontological moments also make the Selbstsetzungslehre a fertile ground from which to also ask whether or not Kant finally addresses one of the most common critiques launched by his contemporaries: how is it possible that the two main cognitive sources of the subject accord with one another in the synthetic unity of apperception, considering the heterogeneity of their functions and forms of representation? 105 Lacking an account of how spontaneity and receptivity accord – rather than just providing the proof that their unity is necessary if experience is to be possible (per negationem opposite) – was also part and parcel related to other charges against Kant's KrV at the time. 106 The heterogeneity of the faculties and their respective forms of representation had also lead to a degree of ambiguity as to the meaning, status and ultimate cognitive value of what is designated as ―object‖ at the different systematic levels of Kant's position; in the KrV different senses of the concept of object appear: object of intuition, object of cognition, object in general, thing itself [Sache selbst], transcendental object, and of the thing in itself (in addition less direct references, such as 105 A clear statement of this problem is found in a letter Kant addressed to Herz, May 26, 1789, where he paraphrases Maimon's identification of it: ―How do I explain the possibility of agreement between a priori intuitions and my a priori concepts, if each has its specifically different origins, since this agreement is given as a fact but the legitimacy or the necessity of the agreement of two such heterogeneous manner of representation is incompatible‖ (Ak: 2:50. Zweig, 313). 106 We find that form of argument in § 16 of the ―Analytic‖ in the KrV. 80
appearance, phenomenon, and noumenon). 107 Thus, Kant's original introduction of receptivity as positively involved in making synthetic a priori judgments possible due to the unique representation it is capable of exhibiting – pure sensible intuition 108 – introduced a difference in kind (instead of the more traditional conception of degree of clarity and distinctness, operative for instance in Descartes' or Leibniz' positions) 109 in relation to the concepts that arise out of the spontaneity of thought. The Selbstsetzungslehre's genetic account of the making of experience as well as of subject formation indirectly addresses how to think of the relationships between these faculties and their respective forms as they play out at and between the different levels of the 107 For instance, Beck points out this problem in a letter to Kant, November 11, 1971: ―The Critique calls 'intuition' a representation that relates immediately to an object. But in fact, a representation does not become objective until it is subsumed under the categories. Since intuition similarly acquires its objective character only by means of the application of the categories to it, I am in favor of leaving out that definition of 'intuition' that refers to an object‖ (Ak: 2: 311. Zweig, 397). Beck repeats a request for clarification regarding the senses of ―intuition‖ and ―object‖ again in a letter dated May 31, 1792 (Ak: 2: 38-9. Zweig, 414). In a letter dated November 10 th of the same year he also expresses his regret that in the KrV Kant had mentioned the distinction between things in themselves and appearances to begin with (Ak: 2:382. Zweig, 438). 108 Baum, M. ―Kant on Pure Intuition,‖ in Minds, Ideas, and Objects: Essays on the Theory of Representation in Modern Philosophy, Vol. 2. North American Kant Society, ed. Phillip D Cummins and Guenter Zoeller. Atascadero California, Ridgview Publishing Co., 1992, 303. Baum cites the Prolegomena (henceforth Pro), where Kant explicitely acknowledgment of the originality of his discovery a ―pure sensible intuition.‖ See Ak: 4:375n. Hatfield, 162. 109 ―To posit sensibility merely in the indistinctness of representations, and intellectuality by comparison in the distinctness of representations, and thereby in a merely formal (logical) distinction of consciousness instead of a real (psychological) one, which concerns not merely the form but also the content of thought, was a great error in Leibniz-Wolffian school‖ (Ak: 7:141n. Louden, 251n). Original: Die Sinnlichkeit blos in der Undeutlichkeit der Vorstellungen, die Intellectualität dagegen in der Deutlichkeit zu setzen und hiemit einen blos formalen (logischen) Unterschied des Bewußtseins statt des realen (psychologischen), der nicht blos die Form, sondern auch den Inhalt des Denkens betrifft, zu setzen, war ein großer Fehler der Leibniz-Wolffischen Schule […]. 81
Page 1 and 2:
The Doctrine of Self-positing and R
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Abstract of the Dissertation The Do
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Contents Abbreviations vi Preface v
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Preface The interest in the Opus po
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Acknowledgments I am in the debt of
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Introduction The Selbstsetzungslehr
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of receptivity‖ reveals also the
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enables thinkers in the twenty firs
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form of ―principles of synthesis
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a transition that has its own ―sp
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the English language literature tha
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his account was circular. As Först
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fascicle written by Kant between 18
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the doctrine of self-positing attem
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preemptively with this retrospectiv
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meaning of its particular relations
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ii. a. Ontological Proof In its com
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ecause the only operative rule for
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In the context of the BDG, the natu
Page 39 and 40: 3. It is unconditionally impossible
Page 41 and 42: . We know that a condition for inne
Page 43 and 44: Realerklährung - an explanation of
Page 45 and 46: ii. b. Setzung‘s Function as Posi
Page 47 and 48: Negation can also result from chang
Page 49 and 50: ii. Kritik der reinen Vernunft ii.
Page 51 and 52: foreclosed. This is precisely what
Page 53 and 54: none of this is particularly new. N
Page 55 and 56: elations of thoroughgoing determina
Page 57 and 58: that exhibits it must share in the
Page 59 and 60: of this ideal and its final personi
Page 61 and 62: it perceives only its effects. In a
Page 63 and 64: category causality in the second an
Page 65 and 66: Just as time functions as the form
Page 67 and 68: spontaneous nature. Or perhaps it r
Page 69 and 70: points to the fact that in the act
Page 71 and 72: latter (as for the other dynamical
Page 73 and 74: unity is expressed. In the second a
Page 75 and 76: Kant‘s new transcendental idealis
Page 77 and 78: idealize what can be claimed to be.
Page 79 and 80: The structure in the schematic of t
Page 81 and 82: critical model entails thus the sub
Page 83 and 84: continuous reiteration of the most
Page 85 and 86: [machen] of experience with the sou
Page 87 and 88: and not actuality. 103 These fields
Page 89: functions as ground to a universal
Page 93 and 94: Handschrift, when he writes: The mi
Page 95 and 96: thought. While the spirit of the cr
Page 97 and 98: faculties of representation in ligh
Page 99 and 100: particularly in their presence, uni
Page 101 and 102: knower to thin an objective represe
Page 103 and 104: doctrine, the name is oftentimes qu
Page 105 and 106: to intuition. This status brings to
Page 107 and 108: Chapter Three: The Analytic Level 1
Page 109 and 110: ―Paralogisms‖ section. 136 Desp
Page 111 and 112: the Selbstsetzungslehre. In this re
Page 113 and 114: Not being able to be thought by the
Page 115 and 116: This connection between the single
Page 117 and 118: it concerns the possibility of the
Page 119 and 120: perspective of its relation to the
Page 121 and 122: apperception and b) the synthetic o
Page 123 and 124: and the section ―On the Paralogis
Page 125 and 126: synthetic determination of its intu
Page 127 and 128: on the possibility of attaching the
Page 129 and 130: distinguished from this ―I‖). 1
Page 131 and 132: object. 177 The consciousness of my
Page 133 and 134: doctrine. One finds, in fact, that
Page 135 and 136: perspective, contained analytically
Page 137 and 138: an inference: [...] 186 The first s
Page 139 and 140: this follows from the fact that for
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feeling can be said to be a form of
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that of which we are conscious as o
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true, the nature of intuition concr
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This formulation of the ―I am‖
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Chapter Four: The Ontological Level
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of identity, the analytic containme
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there Kant nevertheless asks: ―An
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objectification and ―I am‖ as V
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The first synthetic act of consciou
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introducing a different field of de
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where the earlier indeterminate emp
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What is given first to the power of
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epresentation that was given prior
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outside itself, which it can then d
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ground that can accommodate the exp
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These passages by no means say the
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sensible‖ (as Deleuze would phras
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schematization. What that is like w
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from which the ―I think‖ gains
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The path taken to arrive at a basic
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As seen in chapter four, the relati
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In so far as the Selbstsetzungslehr
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MAN that, indeed, no science unders
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medical doctors, educators, and phy
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the grounding of the human sciences
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______ ―Metaphysical Foundations
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S. Harris. Revised Edition. Indiana
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Critique of Pure Reason. Chicago, U
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