Evaluatie embryowet - Rijksuniversiteit Groningen

ing complete and absolute compliance with the regulations concerning the provision of gametes and
embryos.
If, in order to obtain gametes, it is necessary for the person concerned to undergo an invasive intervention,
the Act requires the approval of the MEC (among other things). Parliament’s intention with
this extra safeguard, which is aimed at promoting the donor’s freedom to decide, was to look especially
carefully at proportionality, and to assess the donor’s motives whenever an invasive intervention
is performed for a purpose other than establishing a pregnancy in the donor. This will, if anything,
become even more important in the future if women are able to donate eggs in order to create
embryos for scientific research. Should this result in a shortage of eggs, women’s freedom to decide
may come under pressure.
The study findings indicate that this consent procedure raises various problems and that, in practice,
people opt for alternative interpretations as far as egg donation is concerned. The conclusion drawn is
that Parliament’s aim (i.e. extra protection) merits support, but that the statutory review procedure is
not conducive to the achievement of this objective. It would be advisable to remove the role of the
MEC from the Act and to arrive at an arrangement which ensures that donors as a rule receive support
when they are weighing up all of the interests at stake and making an informed decision about
donation. That support should be given by an independent, expert counsellor who is not involved in
the donation. This recommendation can be elaborated via self-regulation.
The findings indicate that questions arise in the course of scientific research with regard to the scope
of the donor’s consent in connection with the provision of embryos for scientific research. The question
to be answered is how specific this information – and therefore the consent – must be. In particular,
this problem arises in connection with the scientific use of stem cells harvested from surplus
embryos, which have a very long shelf-life. It is unclear whether these may later be used for new research
projects on the basis of the consent that was given previously. Nor is it clear whether, once
consent has been given, it covers the transportation of embryos or stem cells abroad, or whether the
donors need to have been informed about this in advance.
These questions concerning informed consent also arise in connection with use (or further use) of
other human tissues. Parliament should be well advised to formulate general rules concerning the
specificity of the consent that is given in connection with the provision of human tissues for scientific
use, and then to consider whether these general rules may also apply to embryos.
Scientific research with foetuses
The Act only allows scientific research with foetuses that may assist in the diagnosis, prevention or
treatment of serious disorders in a foetus and that cannot be deferred until after the birth. The evaluation
study indicates that these strict conditions have the effect of limiting therapeutic scientific research
with foetuses, even if the risk to the foetus is negligible or non-existent, while non-therapeutic
research with foetuses is rendered quite impossible. It also indicates that the limits of the Medical Research
Involving Human Subjects Act (WMO), which is applicable to scientific research involving
pregnant women, are unclear.
We believe that Parliament should reconsider the rules concerning scientific research with foetuses.
One possibility might be to broaden the conditions so that they are more akin to the provisions for
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