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SEC Follow Up Exhibits Part C SEC_OEA_FCIC_001760-2501

SEC Follow Up Exhibits Part C SEC_OEA_FCIC_001760-2501

SEC Follow Up Exhibits Part C SEC_OEA_FCIC_001760-2501

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Reg SHO Pilot Report 2/12/2007<br />

lower volatility for stocks with higher market capitalization, and higher volatility for<br />

stocks with lower market capitalization.<br />

• Based on the price reaction to the initiation of the pilot, we find limited evidence that<br />

the tick test distorts stock prices—on the day the pilot went into effect, Listed Stocks<br />

in the pilot sample underperformed Listed Stocks in the control sample by<br />

approximately 24 basis points. However, the pilot and control stocks had similar<br />

returns over the first six months of the pilot.<br />

• We find no evidence of “bear raids” associated with the pilot. More specifically, we<br />

test for evidence of bear raids in three ways:<br />

o We test whether the pilot has affected the relative frequency of large negative<br />

vs. large positive stock returns, as reflected in the skewness of the returns<br />

distribution. There is no difference in skewness between control and pilot<br />

stocks<br />

o A bear raid may be associated with a large negative return that is very quickly<br />

reversed, or a “negative price spike.” Although we do find a higher incidence<br />

of negative price spikes in the pilot sample at some horizons, the same thing is<br />

observed for positive price spikes.<br />

o We also measure directly the tendency for price movements to be reversed in<br />

subsequent periods. Again, we find that the pilot is associated with a slightly<br />

greater tendency for price changes to be reversed, but this effect is observed<br />

equally for positive and negative returns.<br />

In summary, having examined the impact of the Regulation SHO Pilot on a wide array of<br />

market characteristics, we conclude that price restrictions constitute an economically relevant<br />

constraint on short selling. Our evidence suggests that removing price restrictions for the pilot<br />

stocks has had an effect on the mechanics of short selling, order routing decisions, displayed<br />

depth, and intraday volatility, but on balance has not had a deleterious impact on market quality<br />

or liquidity. In various dimensions, our evidence confirms that the tick test of Rule 10a-1 acts as<br />

a more binding constraint than the bid test of former NASD Rule 3350. On most dimensions, the<br />

effects of the pilot do not appear to be systematically related to market capitalization or trading<br />

volume, suggesting that our results give a reasonable picture of what we might expect to see if<br />

price restrictions were removed for all stocks, including smaller stocks and stocks less actively<br />

Prepared by the Office of Economic Analysis 56

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