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SEC Follow Up Exhibits Part C SEC_OEA_FCIC_001760-2501

SEC Follow Up Exhibits Part C SEC_OEA_FCIC_001760-2501

SEC Follow Up Exhibits Part C SEC_OEA_FCIC_001760-2501

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To: Jim Overdahl<br />

From: Tim McCormick<br />

Date: October 16, 2008<br />

<strong>OEA</strong> DRAFT – INTERNAL<br />

OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS<br />

DRAFT MEMORANDUM<br />

Re: “Gaming” to Prevent Stocks from Appearing on the Threshold List<br />

This memo summarizes <strong>OEA</strong>’s analysis of potentially manipulative patterns in the closeout<br />

of fails in order to prevent a stock from appearing on the threshold list. In this memo,<br />

we specifically look at the 9 stocks that Mark Mitchell claimed experienced threshold list<br />

manipulation. We find no evidence supportive of his claims.<br />

We know from prior work that many fails tend to be short-lived. In fact, about 86.5% of<br />

fail positions are closed out within 4 days of occurring. The threshold list criteria of<br />

Regulation SHO attempts to identify securities with large fails that persist for longer than<br />

4 days. Under Rule 203, stocks with large fails that persist for longer than 4 days are<br />

deemed to have a problem with fails that require increased regulation. Therefore, it is<br />

certainly possible that persons could be involved in a pattern of fails and close-outs in<br />

order to avoid the increased regulatory requirements of the threshold list. On the other<br />

hand, it may be difficult for one clearing firm to manipulate the threshold list because<br />

they may be closing out their fails at the same time that another clearing firm creates a<br />

new fail. So, the aggregate fails at the NSCC are not readily controllable by a single<br />

clearing firm, except perhaps when a single clearing firm has a large and dominant fail<br />

position at the NSCC. Further, since clearing firms tend to clear for multiple broker<br />

dealers it would be difficult for one broker dealer or one trader to control the aggregate<br />

fails at the NSCC for a security.<br />

We note that the data we have on fails does not allow us to know intent. That is, a fails<br />

position that disappears after 4 straight days may simply be due to the normal course of<br />

business rather than any gaming strategy. In light of this constraint, the best approach we<br />

have is to attempt to detect a pattern of fails - above the threshold list criteria of 0.5% of<br />

shares outstanding for 4 days, then below 0.5% for a day or two, then above 0.5% for 4<br />

days, then below 0.5% for a day or two and so on. The more repeats of the above-belowabove-below<br />

pattern, the more confidence we have that the pattern of fails is not driven<br />

by normal close-out activity. Also, if someone was gaming the threshold list, they would<br />

want to take full advantage of the five consecutive day threshold criteria of 0.5%.<br />

1 3/5/2010

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