Editor's Foreword

104 ThE MiliTary BalancE 2010
successfully would require political stability. Hence,
NATO validated the view that any enlargement
should be in the Alliance’s interest and was not an
end in itself. Bosnia-Herzegovina’s application to join
NATO’s Membership Action Plan on 2 October 2009
highlighted the greater feasibility of further NATO
enlargement in the western Balkans.
The 2008 war between Russia and Georgia was
also a severe setback for NATO–Russia relations. In
response to the conflict, NATO suspended normal
cooperation through the NATO–Russia Council
(NRC), and Moscow responded by freezing military
exchanges. (In 2007, relations had suffered
as a result of Russia’s suspension of its participation
in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)
Treaty. One lesson from the conflict was that cooperation
between NATO and Russia – the NRC had,
for instance, created a network of meetings and
exchanges – had little influence on mutual perceptions
and interests. East European allies depicted this
as a strategic failure. Nonetheless, in light of the offer
of the US administration of President Barack Obama
to ‘reset’ US–Russian relations, NATO foreign ministers
decided on 5 March 2009 to resume formal NRC
meetings. A first meeting at ambassadorial level was
held on 27 May, and the atmosphere was reported as
constructive. Success in this effort will be determined
by progress toward defining a pragmatic agenda
for cooperation on such issues as Afghanistan, arms
control, terrorism and narcotics trafficking. In this
context, Rasmussen suggested that NATO and Russia
conduct a joint review of contemporary security challenges
so that a conception of common threats could
be developed and deepened.
France formally reintegrated into NATO’s military
structure at the anniversary summit, reversing
President Charles de Gaulle’s 1966 withdrawal.
President Nicolas Sarkozy’s decision was based on
the realisation that France could only wield influence
commensurate with its budgetary, operational
and political importance if it had a full seat at the
table. Even before the decision was made, a slow
process of de facto involvement of French officers
in the integrated structures had begun during the
1990s, leading to some 250 French officers serving in
various NATO commands by early 2009. Now France
needs to fill some 1,250 posts. The two most visible
appointments have been those of General Stéphane
Abrial to head Allied Command Transformation and
General Philippe Stoltz to head NATO’s Joint Forces
Command in Lisbon.
Practically speaking, the impact of France’s decision
will be moderate. It will have little effect, for
example, on France’s force structure or general
defence posture, since all important decisions in this
regard were set out in the 2008 White Paper (see The
Military Balance 2009, p. 104). And France had long
been a major contributor to NATO operations before
it decided to fully reintegrate into the Alliance’s
command structure. But the move was welcomed, not
least for its symbolic importance. France’s awkward
position in NATO had fostered suspicion that it
would seek to weaken the Alliance; Sarkozy’s decision
removes a major political irritant.
EUROPEAN UNION
Sweden took over the EU presidency from the Czech
Republic on 1 July 2009 and quickly defined an
ambitious agenda for the security and defence portfolio.
Harmonisation and transparency issues in the
European defence market, more flexibility in the use
of EU battlegroups, an interoperable civil–military
maritime-surveillance capability for the EU maritime
domain, and general civil–military capability development
for the European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP) were all singled out as priorities.
EU battlegroups in particular have received much
attention. Since 2005, the European Union has had
rapid-response battlegroups on standby for operations
under the EU flag and, from January 2007
onwards, two have been on call at all times. So far,
however, no battlegroup has actually been deployed
in an operation, even though EU member states have
invested significantly to build their capabilities and
in spite of calls for deployments in several instances,
such as the 2008 Darfur crisis, which caused security
problems in neighbouring Chad and Central African
Republic. Stockholm has launched an initiative aimed
at fostering conditions that would enable the EU to
make use of the tool it has created by seeking greater
flexibility in its application. The Swedish proposals
have generated much interest among EU members,
as well as concerns. Several members do not want to
dilute the idea of rapid response as the raison d’être
for battlegroups, even though they understand that
too dogmatic an interpretation will inevitably block
deployment. One possible solution is that states
contributing to a specific battlegroup should be
allowed to state their willingness to undertake certain
types of operations beyond the core concept. This
would delegate power to the governments involved