Editor's Foreword

training and deployments. Naval elements participate
in the Maritime Security Task Force alongside the
Police Coast Guard, Customs, the Immigration and
Checkpoint Authority and other agencies, with the aim
of protecting Singapore’s maritime approaches from
piracy, terrorism, illegal immigration and other lowintensity
challenges. The army’s largely reservist �nd
People’s Defence Force Command (� PDF) provides
the Island Defence Headquarters, which includes a
full-time infantry ba�alion trained for a ‘protection
of installations’ role and the SAF’s CBRE (Chemical,
Biological, Radiological and Explosive) Group. In
June ����, more than �� CBRE Group personnel travelled
to China’s Guangzhou Province to participate in
the SAF’s first joint exercise with the PLA, following
a bilateral agreement on military cooperation in ����.
While trained for the conventional military defence of
the island, � PDF is additionally tasked with cooperating
closely with the police and other civil agencies
in the event of terrorist or other non-military threats.
The main wartime role of the SAF’s special forces
remains strategic operations in enemy territory, but
they also have an important peacetime role: in July
����, the annual Operation Northstar counter-terrorism
exercise saw troops from the newly formed Special
Operations Task Force (SOTF), which brings together
the SAF’s active and reservist parachute-trained
Commando regiments, Special Operations Force
and Naval Diving Unit in a single formation, mount
a raid on a hotel on Sentosa Island using helicopters
and fast boats to free ‘hostages’ seized in a scenario
derived from the ���� Mumbai a�ack. Supporting
Singapore’s participation in the US-led Proliferation
Security Initiative will be among the SOTF’s roles.
Though its operational experience remains limited,
the SAF has increasingly deployed units abroad. In
February ����, it announced that it would send a
landing-ship tank (LST) with ��� personnel and two
Super Puma helicopters to Combined Task Force ���
in the Gulf of Aden to protect international shipping.
The LST returned to Singapore in July, but a
Singapore naval officer will command CTF-��� from
January–March ����. In June, the defence ministry
revealed that later in the year a Singapore artillerylocating
radar unit would deploy to Uruzgan province
in central Afghanistan for �–�� months. The role
would be to help protect ISAF troops from Taliban
rocket a�acks. In addition, Singapore’s air force
is expected to deploy KC-��� and UAV assets in
support of Afghan operations. Meanwhile, overseas
training remains as important as ever to Singapore,
East Asia and Australasia
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where domestic exercise areas and airspace are
extremely limited. At the IISS Shangri-la Dialogue in
June ����, Singapore’s Defence Ministry signed an
agreement with Australia extending the SAF’s use
of the Shoalwater Bay Training Area in Queensland
– site for the large-scale annual unilateral combinedarms
manoeuvres – Exercise Wallaby until ����. The
same event saw Singapore also reach an agreement
on defence cooperation with New Zealand. Before
the end of ����, a new agreement with the US on airforce
training is expected to allow not just the continuing
long-term deployment of a squadron of F-��C
fighters to Luke Air Force Base in Arizona, but also
the use of leased USAF F-��s at an Air National Guard
base in Ohio. According to the US Defense Security
Cooperation Agency’s notification to Congress in
September ���� regarding the proposed arrangement,
it would not only boost Singapore’s capability
to defend itself but also ‘ensure interoperability with
US forces for coalition operations. Singapore is a firm
supporter of US overseas contingency operations.’
The implication that Singapore might contribute to
future coalition air operations, despite not being a
formal US ally, was clear.
Perhaps at least partly in reaction to Singapore’s
impressive military developments, Malaysia’s
defence establishment now emphasises the importance
of exploiting information and communications
technology to enhance its armed forces’ effectiveness.
Interviewed in September ����, soon after
becoming Malaysia’s first chief of defence forces
not drawn from the army, air force General Tan Sri
Azizan Ariffin highlighted the three main features of
the ‘�-D MAF’ (Fourth Dimension Malaysian Armed
Forces) plan, which is supposed to guide the development
of Malaysian military capabilities to ���� and
beyond: joint force integration and operations; information
superiority; and multi-dimensional operations
including information warfare. In consequence,
there is particular emphasis on developing Malaysian
armed forces’ C � ISR capabilities, and on embracing
network-centred operations. However, funding shortfalls
have delayed implementation of the �-D MAF
plan, with significant budget allocations only likely
under the ��th Malaysia Plan (�� MP) from ����–��.
While the ‘Army Two Ten Plus Ten’ development
plan emphasises increased readiness, enhanced
mobility and new surveillance, electronic-warfare
and communications capabilities, the army has been
undergoing important structural changes, most
importantly the conversion of the �rd Division from
East Asia and
Australasia