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Editor's Foreword

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392 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2010<br />

Table 34 China – Estimated Total Military-Related Funding 2008<br />

specific mention of defence spending, emphasising<br />

instead demographic developments, the environment<br />

and rural development, funds allocated to the PLA<br />

continue to grow at a significant pace. The official<br />

���� state budget included yet another hefty increase<br />

in defence spending, up ��% from the previous year<br />

to RMB���bn (US$��.�bn at market exchange rates).<br />

As pointed out in the essay ‘Calculating China’s<br />

Defence Expenditure’ in The Military Balance ���� (pp.<br />

���–��), the official defence budget, although the best<br />

indicator of the overall trend in military spending,<br />

does not reflect the true level of resources devoted to<br />

the PLA.<br />

According to the ���� White Paper on China’s<br />

National Defence published by the Chinese authorities,<br />

the official defence budget is broadly distributed<br />

in three equal shares: personnel, operations<br />

and equipment. However, it is widely believed that<br />

the official budget takes no account of other militaryrelated<br />

expenditures, including weapons purchased<br />

from overseas or research and development (R&D)<br />

funding. In addition, a�empts to calculate China’s<br />

true military burden should include funds allocated<br />

to the People’s Armed Police (PAP). For many years<br />

analysts suggested that calculations of Chinese military<br />

spending should include reference to substantial<br />

government subsidies provided to the state’s<br />

loss-making defence enterprises. While China’s<br />

defence companies operated at a significant loss and<br />

required considerable financial support from central<br />

government during the ����s and the early part<br />

of this century, in ���� the Chinese defence sector<br />

moved into profit and is now one of the most profitable<br />

sectors of the Chinese economy. Furthermore,<br />

A B C<br />

RMB bn US$bn at market<br />

exchange rates<br />

O�cial PLA budget (Including local militia funding) 417 60.1 83.5 b<br />

Foreign weapons purchase (2001–2008 average) 13.9 2.0 2.0<br />

Defence Industry Subsidies See text (p. 392)<br />

R&D 46.1 6.6 6.64<br />

Government funded science and technology 34.5 4.9 4.97<br />

People’s Armed Police<br />

Central funding 50.2 7.2 12.9<br />

Local funding 16.1 2.3 4.1<br />

Total 577.8 83.1 114.1<br />

% of GDP 1.88<br />

US$bn incl. PPP<br />

estimates a<br />

Sources: China Statistical Yearbook 2009 and ‘Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations 2001–2008’, Congressional Research Service.<br />

a Where appropriate.<br />

b Arms Includes PPP estimate.<br />

the nature of the state’s role in the sector is changing<br />

rapidly as Chinese defence companies now raise<br />

investment funds in capital markets through bond<br />

issues, stock-market listings and private investment.<br />

Meanwhile, changes in the procurement system<br />

mean the state is finally paying closer to the market<br />

rate for weapons systems. As such, the level of state<br />

subsidies to the defence industry is now unlikely to<br />

be significant and is no longer taken into account by<br />

The Military Balance.<br />

Table �� includes estimates for additional<br />

military-related elements. Column A includes figures<br />

for the ���� official budget plus estimates of foreignweapons<br />

purchases, R&D and new product expenditure,<br />

and outlays on the PAP. These figures are all in<br />

local currency and when combined suggest that total<br />

military-related spending amounted to RMB���.�bn<br />

(US$��.�bn), about �.� times greater than the official<br />

budget figure. However, in a�empting to determine<br />

the level of total Chinese defence expenditure, there<br />

is also the problem of exchange rates to consider. In<br />

����, for example, when converted at the average<br />

market exchange rate for the year, China’s GDP<br />

measured US$�.� trillion. However, the World Bank<br />

calculated that using PPP rates China’s ���� GDP<br />

was the equivalent of US$�.� trillion. (In the case<br />

of countries at different stages of economic development<br />

it is conventional to use Purchasing Power<br />

Parity (PPP) to help compare macroeconomic data.)<br />

In consideration of these variables, Table ��<br />

includes data using two alternative methodologies<br />

for calculating Chinese military spending. Column<br />

B uses the data from column A and converts it to US<br />

dollars using the market exchange rate for ����. In

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