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Editor's Foreword

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{ Regions: Deployment of mission HQ for<br />

Chapter VI and preventive deployment<br />

within 30 days.<br />

The focus of the regional brigades in the first half of<br />

2010 will be in ensuring that they are operationally<br />

ready for deployment if needed to execute any of the<br />

six scenarios above.<br />

The five regional brigades planned and held various<br />

exercises during 2009 in anticipation of the AU’s<br />

Exercise Amani Africa, planned for 2010, and which<br />

will test their readiness to implement the conflict and<br />

missions scenarios. The West Africa ASF has already<br />

completed two exercises, while the East Africa ASF is<br />

planning one for late 2009 or early 2010. The East and<br />

West Africa ASF exercises are supported by European<br />

and US funding, equipment and advisers.<br />

The South African Development Community<br />

Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG) recently held Exercise<br />

Golfinho in South Africa. The September 2009 fieldtraining<br />

exercise, involving 7,000 troops from 12<br />

countries, was preceded by a map exercise in Angola<br />

in January 2009 and a command post exercise in<br />

Mozambique in April 2009. In an effort to prove its<br />

own operational competence, the SADC made a<br />

deliberate decision not to draw on external support<br />

for the planning and execution of Exercise Golfinho,<br />

which was instead a locally driven exercise from the<br />

scenario-generation stage onwards.<br />

Tackling the two most difficult situations – a<br />

scenario-six intervention mandated by Chapter VII<br />

of the UN Charter and a scenario-five multidimensional<br />

peacekeeping operation – Golfinho involved<br />

the joint deployment of military police and civilian<br />

components. It also tested force interoperability;<br />

meanwhile the issue of strategic lift was overcome by<br />

using multiple modes of transport (air, road, rail and<br />

sea) to assemble the force. Portuguese-, French- and<br />

English-speaking troops were dispersed throughout<br />

the formations, with each of the battalions composed<br />

of as many countries as possible (other regional<br />

standby forces have tried this tactic with mixed<br />

success). SADCBRIG deemed the exercise a success<br />

saying that all objectives were met, lessons were<br />

learned and shortcomings were identified. After the<br />

exercise, SADCBRIG declared that it could deploy to<br />

anywhere in Africa or even beyond, provided that<br />

the strategic lift is available and logistical support<br />

can be sustained. Indeed, the biggest challenge for<br />

the APSA is not how to intervene in complex emergencies,<br />

but how to equip, fund and sustain such<br />

interventions.<br />

Sub-Saharan Africa<br />

285<br />

The situation faced by the AU Mission in Somalia<br />

(AMISOM) is an example of the type of contingency<br />

that the ASF brigades should be able to address, and<br />

exposes the amount of work that remains to be done<br />

by the regional brigades before their 2010 readiness<br />

deadline. Since its establishment in June 2002,<br />

AMISOM has consisted of a lead nation assisted by<br />

other contributing nations; in contrast to the ASF<br />

concept. The AU has learned lessons from these<br />

deployments and hopes to address them through<br />

a serious of regional-level exercises culminating in<br />

Exercise Amani. But unlike the SADCBRIG Exercise<br />

Golfinho, the AU is already using international support<br />

to plan and execute Amani Africa.<br />

TerroriSm in Sub-Saharan africa<br />

Following counter-terrorism operations by US and<br />

Pakistani forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well<br />

as similar efforts by Saudi Arabia, there has been<br />

some movement of al-Qaeda operatives into Yemen,<br />

where al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula appears to<br />

have relocated. Yemen’s security forces are facing<br />

substantial difficulties in combating the threats posed<br />

by insurgents, as well as al-Qaeda, but if they can<br />

respond effectively, jihadist migration could shift<br />

towards Somalia.<br />

Though some Somali Islamists seem to harbour<br />

relatively little rancour for the internationally recognised<br />

and essentially secular Transitional Federal<br />

Government (TFG) – particularly after the TFG’s<br />

change of leadership – the administration remains<br />

beleaguered (see IISS Strategic Survey 2009, p. 279). The<br />

TFG was reformed through greater Islamist representation<br />

but, nonetheless, militant Islamism has intensified<br />

with the rise of the rejectionist terrorist groups<br />

al-Shabaab (the youth), which is tied to al-Qaeda, and<br />

Hizbul Islam. In addition to staging terrorist operations<br />

against the TFG throughout Somalia, al-Shabaab<br />

retaliated against a September 2009 US military operation<br />

in Somalia that killed Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan –<br />

one of the most-wanted al-Qaeda members in Africa,<br />

linked to the 1998 embassy bombings in Tanzania<br />

and Kenya, and the 2002 hotel attack in Kenya – by<br />

attacking AU peacekeepers in Mogadishu, and has<br />

recruited operatives from the Somali diaspora in<br />

North America. Meanwhile, the activity of al-Qaeda<br />

in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continued in 2009.<br />

The group has focused mainly on Algerian security<br />

forces, with one attack in summer 2009 killing about<br />

30; in May they also killed a British hostage.<br />

Sub-Saharan<br />

Africa

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