17.11.2012 Views

Editor's Foreword

Editor's Foreword

Editor's Foreword

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

S-300 air-defence batteries, beyond those already<br />

protecting Astana and Almaty; some of these are<br />

planned for deployment in protection of energy infrastructure<br />

against unspecified threats. Western assistance<br />

has concentrated on enhancing peace-support<br />

operations capabilities, Caspian security, language<br />

training and developing professional NCOs, though<br />

the latter effort suffered after the decision to increase<br />

the number of conscripts. Kazakhstan’s Defence<br />

Institute for Foreign Languages, formed in 2005, has<br />

seen a haemorrhaging of trained linguists and has<br />

reportedly suffered from internal corruption, undermining<br />

its value.<br />

In June 2009, a scandal relating to efforts to<br />

procure Nayza, Aybat and Semser artillery systems<br />

from Israel for the airmobile forces precipitated the<br />

sacking of Defence Minister Daniyal Akhmetov; he<br />

was replaced by Adilbek Zhaksybekov, the former<br />

Table 29 Insurgent groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan<br />

South and Central Asia<br />

341<br />

Kazakh ambassador to Moscow. Kazakhstan’s peacekeeping<br />

brigade (KAZBRIG), which has received<br />

considerable assistance and training from the US, UK<br />

and NATO, is the country’s most capable formation,<br />

and as such can present a misleading impression of<br />

the overall effectiveness of its military. The annual<br />

US, UK and Kazakh military exercise Steppe Eagle<br />

in September 2009 provided another opportunity<br />

to pressure Astana to agree to operationally deploy<br />

elements of KAZBRIG to Afghanistan. Although<br />

the decision has not been taken at a political level in<br />

Astana, the structure has achieved a level of, albeit<br />

not full, interoperability with NATO. The options<br />

facing the Kazakh government, if it decided to send<br />

troops to support ISAF, appeared limited to medical<br />

or command elements, or to a company conducting<br />

force-protection duties, stopping short of combat<br />

operations.<br />

Organisation/group Aims and remarks<br />

TAliBAn AnD AFFiliATeS<br />

Afghan Taliban Regain power in Kabul; foreign withdrawal from AFG. Estimated strength 10–20,000; led by Mullah Omar and<br />

Quetta Shura. Presence predominantly in S. and E. AFG provinces. In main utilise low-level insurgent tactics but<br />

have undertaken conventional engagement of int’l military forces in lightly protected outlying areas. Funding<br />

through opium trade and donors (AQ included)<br />

haqqani network Fight coalition forces in AFG as part of Afghan Taliban. Regain control of traditional bases in Khost, Paktia and<br />

Paktika. Led by Sirajuddin Haqqani. Based mainly in N. Waziristan, PAK<br />

hizb-e islami<br />

Gulbuddin (hiG)<br />

OTher inSUrGenT GrOUPS<br />

Pakistan-based Baluch<br />

liberation Army<br />

(BlA)/Baluch People’s<br />

liberation Front<br />

(BPlF)/Popular Front<br />

for Armed resistance/<br />

Baluch Students<br />

Organisation<br />

Officially seeks foreign withdrawal from AFG; establish Islamic fundamentalist state. Two factions, Gulbuddin<br />

Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e Islami in Nuristan and Khalis faction, part of the AFG Taliban. Affiliates of Hizb-e Islami<br />

political faction (established 2005 and not officially associated with Hekmatyar), have won seats in the National<br />

Assembly and are active in the Wolesi Jirga in Kabul<br />

Independence for former Baluchistan encompassing S.W. PAK, IRN Sistan province and S.W. AFG. Liberation of<br />

Baluch land; establishment of sovereign Baluch government. Interim demands are greater regional autonomy<br />

and fairer distribution of Baluchi natural resources (gas/oil)<br />

harkat-ul-Jihad-i- Pro-Pakistan Islamic groups; seek Kashmir’s accession to PAK. Main area of operation is Pakistan-administered<br />

islami (huJi)/harkat Kashmir, though recent focus on AFG. HuA resulted from the amalgamation of HuJI and HuM. Majority of<br />

ul-Mujahideen (huM)/ HuM’s capability now resides under JeM. Leader Maulana Masood Azhar. Support and fundraising networks<br />

harkat ul-Ansar (huA)/ throughout EU<br />

Jaish-e-Mohammed<br />

(JeM)<br />

lashkar-e-Tayiba Islamic fundamentalist group. Established 1989 following the move of Mujahadeen from AFG to fight in<br />

(leT)/Jama’at ud Dawa Pakistan-administered Kashmir. JuD is LeT’s charitable and social arm. Led by Zakiur Rehman Lakhwi (arrested<br />

(JuD)/Army of the following Mumbai attacks in 2008). Hafiz Saeed leader of JuD; has been under house arrest<br />

righteous<br />

lashkar-e-islam (Army<br />

of islam)<br />

Khyber-based. Led by Mangal Bagh. Increasingly active in PAK. Allegedly seeks Islamic state in PAK. Does not<br />

align with AQ elements within Khyber. Allegedly maintains secure road link through Khyber Pass used to resupply<br />

ISAF<br />

South and<br />

Central Asia

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!