Editor's Foreword

Chapter Two
Latin America and the Caribbean
There is now both a need and an opportunity for
the nations of Latin America collectively to cater
more effectively for the region’s own security. The
opportunity stems, in part, from a lack of appetite
in the US for regional conflict management, while
the need derives from the fact that there are increasingly
numerous and complex threats to this security.
Democratic decay, prospective state failure, transnational
organised crime, terrorism and/or insurgency,
the trafficking of illegal weapons, narcotics
and people, resource competition, environmental
degradation and the consequential disruption to
social cohesion all pose serious threats to regional
stability, and all these domestic and non-state problems
impinge on regional relationships. As noted
in recent editions of The Military Balance, nations in
Latin America and the Caribbean have been trying
to develop regional institutions to develop defence
and security cooperation (see also ‘South America:
Framing Regional Security’ by John Chipman
and James Lockhart Smith, Survival, vol. 51, no. 6,
December 2009–January 2010).
The Military Balance 2009 discussed how Central
American states have organised more cooperation
among their armed forces, as well as many other
meetings, symposia and cooperation agreements (p.
53). Furthermore, the establishment of the Unión de
Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR) and the accompanying
South American Defence Council (SADC)
indicate that South America is now taking its own
steps to address continental security. (UNASUR
excludes Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean.)
But gaps remain in the institutional architecture. In
the Andean region, there is no systemic approach
to the handling of transnational threats, despite
past attempts to develop one within the Andean
Community, while in the Southern Cone states, border
and energy disputes regularly consume the détente
achieved through careful diplomacy (Argentina and
Chile’s accommodation over their border notwithstanding).
Although Brazil and Argentina put to one
side their prior interest in nuclear weapons, Brazil is
now interested in developing nuclear technology for
submarine propulsion.
The SADC was off to a good start with the Santiago
Declaration of March 2009, containing a four-part plan
of action in the fields of defence policy, military cooperation,
defence industries and training. Chipman
and Lockhart Smith argue that the Council needs to
do more to create a long-term agenda resistant to
hijacking by sub-regional and single-issue concerns,
such as enhancing defence transparency (through
the publication and updating of White Papers), legal
norms of transnational cooperation, information
sharing on non-state actors, and harmonisation of
participation in extra-regional security arrangements
(such as the Proliferation Security Initiative).
Though regional security cooperation remains
weak, limited military and security ties do exist bilaterally,
through numerous other institutions in Central
and South America, and with external actors. Mexico
and Colombia have strengthened their military relationships
with the United States, mainly through the
Mérida Initiative and Plan Colombia. Venezuela has
developed ties with China and Iran as well as with
Russia, with whom it has been active in procurement
discussions. Other members of the Bolivarian
Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) – Ecuador,
Bolivia, Nicaragua and Cuba – have also established
or renewed military links with Russia. Many of the
region’s armed forces have transformed throughout
the decade to address their national-security challenges
with various degrees of success. However,
with military expenditure increasing, the strategic
purposes to which strengthened militaries might be
put remain in many cases opaque.
Force transformation and modernisation
Mexico’s war on organised crime has made headlines
in recent years, with violence spilling over
into the United States and Guatemala. As much as
90% of the cocaine in US markets travels through
Mexico and is controlled by Mexican cartels. Mexican
President Felipe Calderón has deployed 45,000 troops
throughout the country and has scored major victories
against the cartels. But the Mexican public has been
increasingly affected by an unprecedented surge in
violence. Calderón acknowledged that deploying the
Latin America
and Caribbean