Editor's Foreword

The Military Balance 2010
Editor’s Foreword
Defence in a complex operating environment
The decision by US President Barack Obama to increase the
deployment of US troops in Afghanistan by a further 30,000
marked the end of a period of uncertainty over the future of
US strategy in that country. The move to bolster ISAF forces
came on top of an earlier US ‘surge’ in 2009, as well as changes
in senior military leadership designed to increase the tempo of
counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. This strategy has ‘the
protection of the Afghan population’ as its core objective with
the accelerated training of Afghan national security forces as
the key mission. It also aims to enable a phased drawdown of
US forces from 2011.
The war remains contentious in the US, as well as in many
other capitals of ISAF-contributing nations. The pace and
volume of Afghan security-force training is increasing, enabled
by the surge, though criticism remains over corruption and
poor governance within Afghan institutions. Afghan and international
casualties, meanwhile, continue to rise, with the issue
of civilian casualties being of particular concern to US General
Stanley McChrystal. Achievement of some success through the
strategy will be crucial to maintain US congressional support,
and thus funding for the overall effort. The definition of success
is still subject to some debate, with generally accepted yardsticks
focusing on increases in the training and retention of
indigenous security forces. Continued US engagement is vital
to maintain the wider international coalition, though some
governments, pressed by domestic political constituencies and
fear of ‘mission creep’, may adjust the form of their support. For
others, the enhanced US engagement gave political and military
backing that could allow them to renew and deepen their
own contributions.
Ongoing military operations in Afghanistan, like those in
Iraq, have forced a reassessment of the place held by COIN
and stability operations in military planning; some doctrines
are now drafted with these operations firmly in mind. But the
‘transformational’ military technologies so much discussed
earlier in the decade within the context of the ‘revolution in
military affairs’ (RMA) are not now necessarily secondary;
rather, such technologies are now viewed by many as being a
key component of, rather than comprising a ‘framework’ for,
the application of military force. ‘Information dominance’ and
advances in networking capacities remain important for militaries,
but the lessons of recent combat operations have led
to an appreciation of the limitations of such ideas in complex
operating environments where combat is often undertaken at
close quarters. Further, there is increasing appreciation of the
need to be�er understand the operating environment – linguistically,
historically, culturally and politically. Doing so could
help establish the long-term relationships with host communi-
ties needed to generate trust and influence, foster the growth of
local security and leadership capacity, and encourage effective
civil-society organisations that can in turn assist in generating
longer-term political maturity. The challenge is to take the RMA
concept and mould it to the needs of COIN and other forms
of twenty-first century warfare. In short, there is an acknowledgement
that militaries should continually evolve rather than
necessarily seek revolutionary capability enhancements; added
to this is a need to accelerate and continually evaluate forcedevelopment
processes.
Perceptions about organisational and doctrinal flexibility
and leader education are changing. Militaries such as the
US are beginning to give troops some flexibility in adjusting
approaches to be�er suit uncertain conditions at the tactical,
operational and strategic levels. Some responsibilities are being
devolved onto troops at differing levels of command; the US
Army uses the term ‘decentralisation’ in this context. While
decentralisation may allow for greater flexibility of action
within stabilisation and COIN operations, improved military
education in the more traditional sense – in leadership training
as well as more formal trade training – will remain essential for
militaries requiring personnel to operate increasingly sophisticated
equipment.
In the US, organisational depth, changes in the senior
leadership and an increasingly influential and devolved
‘lessons-learned’ structure have aided a shift in thinking.
Leaders are now saying that US forces should ready themselves
for irregular warfare as well as ‘high-end asymmetric
threats’ in an era characterised by uncertainty, complexity
and persistent conflict. (How much the fundamental nature of
conflict has actually changed has also been questioned.) For
the US, these judgements are informed by a greater appreciation
of the conflicts in which it is currently, or is likely to
be, involved. Of course the potential for conflict with nations
possessing considerable conventional-force capability as well
as so-called ‘asymmetric capabilities’, remains a concern, as
are the forces required for such eventualities. Some argue
that maintaining conventional-force capabilities is not only
critical for ensuring military effectiveness, but is also an
essential component of conflict prevention. Others argue that
a debate over developing either irregular or conventionalwarfare
capabilities is not useful because of a convergence
of non-state and state-based capabilities, continuous shifts in
the character of conflict such that wars resist clear categorisation,
and the need for military forces to be able to employ a
broad range of joint and combined-arms capabilities across
the ‘spectrum of conflict’. Militaries also have to consider
emerging issues such as cyber warfare and the potential
consequences of climate change.