Editor's Foreword

354 The MiliTAry BAlAnCe 2010
lery, rifles, night-vision equipment and communication
systems.
Once the army has been re-equipped, the focus
will switch to the navy. It has been promised three
new frigates, three maritime-patrol aircraft, four helicopters,
12 patrol craft, two utility landing craft, one
hydrographic ship, one salvage vessel and four missilearmed,
fast-attack craft. By 2019, it will also receive a
submarine. New naval bases are to be constructed,
along with a submarine base, and the force will be
increased by 4,000 personnel. In the meantime, the
navy’s existing frigates will be modernised with new
anti-ship missiles.
The air force, which currently gets only 16% of the
annual defence budget, will see its budget increase by
10% a year over the next ten years. The first phase of
the modernisation programme will include upgrades
to the existing fleet of F-7 fighters and Russian helicopters.
By 2021 the plan is to have replaced these
platforms with new aircraft and to have also procured
new jet trainers and an airborne early warning and
control (AWAC) capability.
However, Bangladeshi governments of all persuasions
have a history of promoting grandiose schemes
for their armed forces, which fail to materialise in
anything like the original scale. It should be noted that
even with this year’s budget increase, spending will
only reach US$1.2bn annually. This appears insufficient
for the proposed modernisation programmes.
In late 2008, Pakistan was forced to turn to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a three-year,
US$10bn loan to avoid defaulting on its currentaccount
payments. The Pakistan media initially
suggested that, in return for the loan, the IMF would
stipulate a cut of some 30% in the country’s defence
budget. However, publication of the 2009–10 state
budget revealed that rather than falling, defence
spending would increase by 15% to PKR342bn
(US$4.11bn). Indeed, with tensions between Pakistan
and India rising after the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks,
the Pakistani government cut its non-development
expenditures by 20% to ensure the military had sufficient
funds to respond to any threat. As previously
noted in the Military Balance, the official defence
budget in Pakistan does not include all military-related
expenditure; it omits items such as military pensions,
benefits for retired and serving personnel, military
aid from Gulf states, space and nuclear programmes,
and income generated by the armed forces’ diverse
business interests. Furthermore, because of its special
relationship with China, Pakistan is able to purchase
Chinese-produced weapons at favourable prices. It
has also been the recipient of significant amounts of
US military aid. All of this indicates that the level of
actual defence spending is substantially higher than
the official budget suggests.
Since 2001, Pakistan has received more than
US$11bn in military aid from the US, thanks largely
to the government’s ongoing support in counterterrorism.
Pakistani soldiers have complained,
however, that this money has only been sufficient
to cover the army’s increased operational costs and
that very little has been made available for capability
improvements in basic areas such as night-vision
equipment. The US Government Accountability
Office itself has also called for better oversight of
how any future aid money is spent in Pakistan, highlighting
that the US government has never received
documentation from Pakistan on a ‘large number
of reimbursement claims’. Upon assuming office,
President Barack Obama said the US would not give
the Pakistani army ‘a blank cheque’ and that funds
must be targeted towards those ‘tools, training and
support that Pakistan needs to root out the terrorists’.
To that end, General David Petraeus announced
in April that the US would introduce a new funding
mechanism called the Pakistani Counter-Insurgency
Capability Fund (PCCF). The fund will provide a total
of US$2.8bn specifically to the military over the next
five years. This is in addition to US$7.5bn that the US
will donate to civilian projects in Pakistan during the
same period.
Ever mindful of the arms embargo placed on it by
the US in the 1990s, Pakistan continues to diversify its
foreign weapons suppliers, as well as attempting to
improve its own indigenous defence-industrial capabilities.
Pakistan and China have already cooperated
on several defence-manufacturing projects, including
F-22P frigates and the Al-Khalid main battle tank. The
two countries announced in March 2009 that serial
production of the joint JF-17 fighter aircraft would
begin with an order of 42 aircraft built by Pakistan
Aeronautical Complex (PAC). The air force intends
the JF-17 to become the backbone of its fleet and plans
to acquire up to 250 of the aircraft by 2015. However,
given the dire state of Pakistan’s public finances, it
seems likely that China has agreed to a long-term
credit facility, or some other arrangement, for the
programme to have been given the go-ahead. A joint
marketing organisation has also been created between
the two countries to promote sales of the JF-17 aircraft
as an ideal choice for countries that are ‘mindful of