Editor's Foreword

238 ThE MiliTAry BAlANcE 2010
while, which has a number of officers in training in the
UK in addition to their Iraq-based training, has seen
its inventory increase in line with these heightened
responsibilities. It took delivery of a series of small
boats for riverine and inshore duties, while a patrol
boat procured from Italy (the first of four on order)
was due to come into service at the end of 2009.
IsRAel, GAzA And IRAn
The June 2008 ceasefire between Israel and Hamas
held for a number of months despite rocket attacks
by mainly non-Hamas militants, but by November
the rate of fire had increased. The first armed clash
between an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) raiding party
and Hamas forces occurred on 4 November. Dozens
of rockets and mortars were fired in retaliation and
additional IDF incursions to close border tunnels
effectively annulled the ceasefire, which had been due
to expire on 19 December. Around 330 rockets and
mortar rounds had been fired during the six-month
ceasefire; in the week after the deadline passed, almost
half that number were launched into southern Israel.
As detailed in Strategic Survey 2009 (pp. 236–9),
Israel initiated an aerial assault on Gaza on 27
December 2008 with the aim of reducing rocket attacks
and ‘restoring Israeli deterrence’. Operation Cast Lead
was a broad bombing campaign and ground invasion
aimed to knock out as much of Hamas’s commandand-control
facilities as possible. A ground invasion
began on 3 January 2009, proceeded from the northern
part of Gaza and surrounded Gaza City within a few
days. During the campaign, rocket and mortar fire
persisted, but decreased in intensity as Israel’s forces
tightened their grip. After firing some 600 rockets
into Israel and losing 1,200 to IDF attacks, Hamas was
only left with about 1,200 by the time of a renewed
ceasefire on 17 January (though rocket fire and Israeli
military strikes carried on until the spring). The twoweek
offensive caused substantial damage to Gaza’s
infrastructure – extending to 14,000 homes, 68 government
buildings and 31 NGO offices. At least 1,300
Palestinians and 13 Israelis were reported killed. The
large difference in fatalities stemmed from the IDF’s
use of heavy firepower, which kept Israeli casualties
low, but led to many casualties on the Palestinian
side. There was a strong international reaction to the
campaign and the post-conflict humanitarian situation
in Gaza. Perhaps partly in response to the international
reaction, but more directly to a domestic
debate arising out of the critical testimony of some
soldiers who had fought in Cast Lead, the IDF carried
out internal investigations relating to its conduct
during the campaign. A number of commanders gave
interviews focusing on rules of engagement and IDF
actions on the ground in Gaza, while IDF Chief of the
General Staff Lieutenant-General Gabi Ashkenazi
repudiated soldiers’ critical testimonies. (In October
2009, a report by Judge Richard Goldstone alleging
possible war crimes by both sides during the conflict
was endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council.
Given its contents, the report was subject to much
critical attention.)
As noted in previous editions of The Military
Balance, Israel’s air force is engaged in a project to
move some of its bases and units to the south of
the country. A number of squadrons moved to the
Nevatim air base in the Negev in August 2008, and
elements of the last squadron to leave Lod air base
in central Israel flew south in January 2009. Lod was
subsequently closed. The move to the Negev locations
gives more flexibility in terms of infrastructure,
but the Israeli government is also promoting
the moves in terms of developing and settling the
south. Meanwhile, the IDF has stated that it has
learnt lessons both from the 2006 conflict in Lebanon
(The Military Balance 2006 (p. 233) noted the establishment
of the Winograd Commission to investigate the
conflict) as well as Cast Lead. Reports during 2009
point to efforts to develop inter-service cooperation,
while in the wake of the successful missile attack on
the INS Hanit during the conflict in Lebanon, the
navy conducted a review of its missile-boat operations,
aiming to improve operational procedures as
well as issues concerning crew training and morale.
Iran’s nuclear activities continue to be of great
concern to the international community. Israel, in
particular, considers a nuclear-armed Iran an existential
threat and refuses to rule out the possibility
of a pre-emptive or preventive strike against Iran’s
nuclear infrastructure. But while Iran in early 2009
had already produced enough low-enriched uranium
for one nuclear weapon if further enriched, it had
not yet crossed the line of weaponisation that would
present an imminent threat. Many other problems
make a military option difficult for Israel. Even if
Iran’s major nuclear sites at Isfahan, Natanz and Arak
could be successfully destroyed through air attacks or
missile launches, this might not be enough if Iran has
redundant secret facilities. Indeed, the unmasking
of Iran’s hitherto secret enrichment facility outside
Qom, in September, (although known to Western