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Editor's Foreword

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388 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2010<br />

account for SKW���tr (US$���bn). However, in<br />

summer ���� it emerged that the total budget would<br />

fall by at least �.�% and that certain procurement<br />

programmes would be affected.<br />

In se�ing out its priorities, the revised plan<br />

acknowledged that developments in North Korea<br />

required the speedier delivery of certain weapons<br />

systems, such as artillery, cruise missiles and torpedoes,<br />

which would come at the expense of longerterm<br />

programmes. It also recommended a smaller<br />

cut in troop numbers, down to ���,��� instead of the<br />

originally planned ���,���.<br />

The revised ���� plan includes delays to several<br />

naval and air-force platforms, including KSS-III<br />

submarines and air-to-air refuelling aircraft, as well<br />

as a ��% cut in the proposed number of XK-� main<br />

ba�le tanks, down to just ���. Also in the pipeline<br />

is a major rethink of the future KF-X programme,<br />

aimed at developing a new fifth-generation stealth<br />

fighter aircraft. In July ����, the Defense Acquisition<br />

Program Administration (DAPA) suggested that,<br />

rather than build a fighter with superior stealth<br />

fighting a�ributes, a cheaper option may be necessary<br />

and that the programme might be downgraded<br />

to create a multi-role jet on a par with an F-�� Block ��<br />

aircraft. It had been hoped that the KF-X programme<br />

would be entirely indigenous. However, President<br />

Lee Myung-bak is thought to be more interested in<br />

a thorough cost–benefit analysis, which in practice<br />

would leave the door open to some level of participation<br />

with a foreign manufacturer.<br />

It had seemed that North Korea’s continuing<br />

military activities and the ongoing modernisation<br />

of China’s armed forces would reverse the sevenyear<br />

decline in Japan’s defence budget. The ruling<br />

Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had appeared to<br />

view defence spending as an emerging priority when<br />

it implemented the Honebutu initiative, whereby the<br />

Prime Minister’s Office is able to exert influence in the<br />

development of budgets and arrange priorities. The<br />

Honebutu initiative for the first time named North<br />

Korea as a possible threat and stressed the need to<br />

deal ‘appropriately’ with Pyongyang’s missile threat.<br />

Before the country’s general elections, the ruling<br />

LDP defence-policymaking panel had also requested<br />

that ����’s new five-year National Defense Program<br />

Guidelines (NDPG) include multi-year budgets for<br />

sea-launched cruise missiles and a domestic earlywarning<br />

satellite system, so that Japan would not<br />

be reliant on the US. The Ministry of Defence (MoD)<br />

requested an additional US$�bn for the lower tier of<br />

its two-tier ballistic-missile shield. However, after<br />

the August ���� elections, the victorious Democratic<br />

Party of Japan (DPJ) indicated it will more inclined to<br />

further reduce, rather than increase, the country’s military<br />

budget. It promised instead to increase spending<br />

on social-welfare and tuition-aid programmes.<br />

After �� months of preparation, Australia released<br />

its new Defence White Paper on � May ����. Entitled<br />

Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force<br />

����, the document sets out the strategic framework<br />

to be adopted by Australia’s armed forces over the<br />

coming two decades in order for them to achieve<br />

‘the defence of Australia, the security and stability<br />

of the regional security environment and a rulesbased<br />

global order’. In pursuit of that goal, the White<br />

Paper highlighted specific capability improvements<br />

needed to make the Australian Defence Force a ‘more<br />

potent force’, including undersea and anti-submarine<br />

warfare, surface naval warfare, air superiority, strategic<br />

strike, special forces, intelligence, surveillance<br />

and reconnaissance, and cyber defence.<br />

All three services are intended to grow, particularly<br />

the navy, which will double its submarine fleet<br />

to ��, acquire eight new frigates with anti-submarine<br />

warfare (ASW) capabilities, two Landing Helicopter<br />

Dock ships and at least �� naval-combat helicopters.<br />

The future air force will be built on a fleet of ��� joint<br />

strike fighters, eight maritime-patrol aircraft (MPAs)<br />

and several high-altitude, long-range unmanned aerial<br />

vehicles (UAVs). Although no new major acquisitions<br />

are envisaged for the army, the document confirms<br />

previously announced equipment programmes,<br />

including the acquisition of seven Chinook helicopters<br />

and �,��� support vehicles. It also outlines a project<br />

to deliver a combat vehicle system that will ‘greatly<br />

improve fire power, protection and mobility’.<br />

To achieve these ambitious long-term procurement<br />

goals the White Paper included a new funding<br />

model with three specific elements:<br />

• a �% real growth in the defence budget to<br />

����, followed by �.�% real annual growth<br />

from ���� to ����;<br />

• a �.�% fixed indexation to the defence budget<br />

from ���� to ����; and<br />

• a strategic reform programme that will<br />

release A$��bn of savings for redirection to<br />

priority areas.<br />

The government claimed these measures would<br />

ensure a ‘fully costed’ and ‘affordable’ business plan

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