Editor's Foreword

Table 26 South african defence budget by programme, 2005–2011
rand m revised Budget
which it must be decided whether the force would
remain ‘finance-driven’ or ‘mandate-driven’ and
called for an increase in the budget from the current
level of 1.2% of GDP to 1.7% over the next four
years. The committee’s report had been preceded
by the Department of Defence’s Annual Report 2008
which said that for the SANDF to ‘largely attain’
its Credible Force Design (CFD) by 2025 and fully
realise it by 2031, a 30% increase in the defence
budget would need to be achieved by 2011.
Both reports pointed to severe strain within the
South African Army (SAA) in particular, with the
JSC noting that the service must have increased
funding as a ‘matter of urgency’. In the past decade
the army has lost out in budget terms to the air
force and navy, which have enjoyed the bulk of
procurement funds under the Strategic Defence
Procurement Programme (SDPP). The result is that
the army is now considered too small to sustain its
current deployments and lacks the funding to train
its personnel properly, or maintain and procure vital
equipment.
As illustrated in Table 27, now that annual
payments towards the SDPP – four MEKO-class
A-200 frigates, three diesel-electric submarines, 30
utility helicopters, 24 Hawk trainers and 26 Gripen
fighter aircraft – have fallen dramatically from their
peak in 2002 there is greater potential to increase
the funding of the SAA. Under plans outlined in
Defence Update 2007, the country’s landward forces
budget is set to grow to enable the SAA to become
more flexible and mobile, creating ‘the backbone of
South Africa’s peace and stability initiative on the
continent’.
The first priority will be light and motorised
forces, intelligence and engineering elements used
Sub-Saharan Africa
291
revised
Budget Budget Budget
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2009 2010 2011
Administration 1,869 2,012 2,153 2,459 2,860 2,880 3,142 3,505
Landward Defence 5,603 6,422 7,128 7,062 8,749 8,909 9,502 9,988
Air Defence 7,924 7,261 7,314 8,021 10,272 9,056 8,885 9,402
Maritime Defence 3,019 2,643 2,396 1,874 1,968 2,011 2,102 2,145
Military Health Support 1,557 1,705 1,877 2,148 2,440 2,482 2,605 2,791
Defence Intelligence 219 353 461 512 589 599 612 646
Joint Support 1,710 1,911 2,266 4,036 3,341 3,460 3,676 3,960
Force Employment 1,605 1,508 1,581 1,783 1,801 1,924 1,862 1,978
Total 23,510 23,817 25,180 27,899 32,024 31,325 32,389 34,418
mainly in support of international commitments,
and concomitant air and maritime inter- or intratheatre
lift. This was to be provided by eight Airbus
A400M transport aircraft and two strategic support
ships capable of carrying about 12 helicopters and
800 soldiers, plus their equipment and vehicles.
Second-tier priorities include mechanised infantry,
artillery, armour and other conventional elements
of the SANDF’s landward capability. However, in
November 2009, the government announced that it
was terminating its contract with Airbus Military for
the A400M, saying the decision was ‘due to extensive
cost escalation and a failure on the part of the
supplier to deliver the aircraft within the stipulated
timeframe’. This leaves the armed forces with a
fleet of aging C-130 and C-160 transport platforms
which the chief of joint operations has indicated is
inadequate, owing to the long lines of communication
experienced by the deployment of forces across
the continent. It has been suggested that the air force
may now turn its attention to the acquisition of
C-295, as a short-term stop-gap.
Without significant additional resources, the
DoD has indicated that it will probably have to scale
back its ambitions and will only be able to partially
fulfil its CFD targets. As such, the emphasis would
shift to those programmes that are deemed critical
to the fulfilment of South Africa’s international UN
and AU peace missions, humanitarian and disaster
assistance, and contributions to the ASF. Under
this scenario important force elements would be
motorised infantry battalions, airborne and other
rapid-entry forces, engineering, tactical intelligence,
logistics support and military health capabilities.
There would be little or no money for mechanised
elements and these platforms would, therefore, have
Sub-Saharan
Africa