Editor's Foreword

284 The MiliTAry BAlAnce 2010
Qazi, indicated that ongoing insecurity as well as
tensions among JIUs themselves meant that UNMIS
must have full freedom of movement in the Abyei
region. The greatest source of uncertainty in North–
South relations in Sudan remains whether the
South will vote for independence in 2011 and, if so,
whether Khartoum will acquiesce. If not, it remains
to be seen how the outside powers – in particular,
the US, which as the principal broker of the CPA has
a substantial stake in it – will respond.
The other major area of crisis in Sudan is Darfur,
where conflict continued among armed opposition
factions, the Sudanese armed forces, governmentbacked
militias and ethnic groups, displacing some
2.7 million people. Between January and mid May
2009, violence uprooted another 137,000. Although
the security situation marginally improved in 2009,
it remained poor overall. In August, the UN–AU
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) received 124 additional
police officers from Tanzania, the Philippines
and Cameroon. This increase, to at that time over
2,000 police officers, enabled UNAMID to increase
police patrols throughout Darfur. Meanwhile,
the military component also increased modestly
during the year, including new contributions from
Tanzania and Burkina Faso, as well as additions
from Senegal and South Africa. However, at time of
writing, UNAMID’s total military and police forces
stood at around 75% of their mandated strength of
26,000.
Insecurity in Sudan has continued to affect the
security of neighbouring Chad, where about 250,000
of 500,000 refugees and internally displaced persons
are from Darfur and the CAR. The European Union
peacekeeping force (EUFOR), which deployed
around 3,300 troops in eastern Chad and northern
CAR to protect displaced civilians and assist in operations
in support of UNAMID, ended its mission in
March 2009 and transferred operational responsibility
to a strengthened UN Mission in the CAR and Chad
(MINURCAT). But MINURCAT is underfunded, and
attacks by rebels seeking to overthrow Chad’s government
have challenged the force’s mandated political
neutrality.
The african STandby force
As noted in recent editions of The Military Balance,
the ASF is the AU’s prescribed instrument for eventually
meeting the military demands of the continent,
with five regional brigades planned of roughly
6,500 soldiers in each. The ‘Policy Framework for the
Establishment of the ASF’ sets out six scenarios as
contingency-planning guidelines for the five regional
brigades:
• Scenario one:
AU/regional military advice
to a political mission.
• Scenario two:
AU/regional observer mission
co-deployed with UN mission.
• Scenario three:
Stand-alone AU/regional
observer mission.
• Scenario four:
AU/regional peacekeeping
force for preventive deployment missions
and those mandated under Chapter VI of
the UN Charter.
• Scenario five:
AU peacekeeping force for
complex multidimensional peacekeeping
mission, including low-level spoilers (a
feature of many current conflicts).
• Scenario six:
AU intervention – e.g. genocide
situations where the international community
does not act promptly.
For the ASF, 2010 is an important year. According
to the AU’s African Peace and Security Architecture
(APSA) roadmap of 2005, by then the ASF must be
ready to implement all of the conflict and missions
scenarios, but especially scenario six. The roadmap
set out a phased implementation plan for the ASF to
build capacity as follows:
• Phase 1 (completed by 30 June 2006):
{ AU: Expanded planning elements for
{
management of a political mission and
co-deployed AU observer mission, deployable
within 30 days (scenarios one and two).
Establish military observers and civilian
police standby rosters.
Regions: Planning elements, brigade headquarters,
regional standby arrangements;
Chapter VI operation and preventive
deployment, deployable within 30 days
(scenario four). (Implementation of these
arrangements did not always go according
to plan and the regional forces selectively
implemented according to practicality.
Nonetheless, these elements do exist in all
the brigades in one form or another).
• Phase 2 (to be completed by 30 June 2010):
{ AU: Ability to manage complex missions.
Development of civilian roster.