Editor's Foreword

386 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2010
a naval stand-off with Bangladesh in November
���� over conflicting sea boundaries, reinforced the
SPDC’s sense of weakness and spurred its efforts
to enhance its external defence capabilities. While
there is no credible evidence to support allegations
by exiles and some foreign analysts that Myanmar
is developing nuclear weapons (see Preventing
Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia, IISS
Strategic Dossier, ����, pp. ���–��), it is apparently
trying to modernise its air-defence and naval forces
to the extent that its resources, international contacts
and defence-industrial capacities allow. Ultimately,
though, in the event of an invasion the regime would
almost certainly be forced quickly to fall back on a
strategy of mass mobilisation and guerrilla warfare.
Australia and New Zealand continue to watch
political and military developments in Asia closely.
In May ����, Australia released its first defence White
Paper since ����. Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific
Century: Force ���� was wri�en amidst a widespread
perception in Australian analytical and policy circles
that the distribution of power in the Asia-Pacific and
Indian Ocean regions is in flux, and it outlines plans
for significant improvements in Australian defence
capabilities over the next two decades. In its chapter on
Australia’s strategic outlook to ����, the White Paper
says tensions between major powers in the region are
likely to increase, that miscalculation between them
is possible and that there is even some chance of
‘growing confrontation’. If China fails to explain its
military modernisation more carefully, regional states
are likely to question the ‘long-term strategic purpose
of its force development’. Closer to home, the White
Paper stresses that while Indonesia has made remarkable
gains over the past decade, it could be a ‘source
of threat’ if it became weak and fragmented, while
an ‘authoritarian or overtly nationalistic regime’ in
Jakarta could create ‘strategic risks’. The paper also
says that the Indian Ocean will assume much greater
strategic significance over the next two decades.
The Australian White Paper argues that defending
Australia against direct armed a�ack remains the
country’s ‘basic strategic interest’. But Australia
does have wider strategic interests, most importantly
‘the security, stability and cohesion’ of the
immediate neighbourhood. The paper claims that
the government has factored into future military-
capability planning the heightened defence posture
that Australia would almost certainly need in the
event of instability in Indonesia. The White Paper also
discusses Australia’s enduring strategic interest in the
stability of the broader Asia-Pacific region. To this
end, Canberra is a�empting to bolster the regional
security architecture through its proposal for a panregional
Asia-Pacific community aimed at strengthening
political, economic and security cooperation.
Nevertheless, the White Paper is clear that the United
States’ alliances and security partnerships, including
with Australia, remain crucial to regional stability.
Australia will continue to support the US in maintaining
global security where their interests ‘align’.
This assessment of Australia’s strategic interests
means that some commentators’ efforts to frame the
debate as a choice between ‘defence of Australia’ and
an expeditionary approach are misleading. The White
Paper implies that elements of both approaches are
needed, explaining that while defence policy will still
be based on the ‘principle of self-reliance in the direct
defence of Australia’, the country needs ‘the capacity
to do more when required’.
According to the White Paper, Australia will need
to project power and demonstrate strategic presence
beyond its ‘primary operational environment’. The
Australian Defence Force (ADF) will need to prepare
for offensive operations ‘as far from Australia as
possible’ using ‘strike capabilities, including combat
aircraft, long-range missiles and special forces’. The
ADF will further need to be ready to contribute,
potentially substantially, to supporting Southeast
Asian security partners and to operations as part of
US-led coalitions, while simultaneously defending
Australia itself. While the government under Prime
Minister Kevin Rudd has decided that ADF deployment
on land operations against heavily armed foes
in the Middle East, Central and South Asia or Africa
should not be seen as a primary potential task (thus
constraining any expectation that Australia could
become involved in major combat operations in Iraq
or Afghanistan, let alone potential new theatres such
as Pakistan or Somalia), the White Paper emphasises
the importance for national strategic interests of the
present deployment of special forces and other troops
in Afghanistan.
The maritime strategy that defence planners see
as necessary to defend Australia’s homeland and
Australian interests requires ‘forces that can operate
with decisive effect throughout the northern maritime
and li�oral approaches’. To this end, the ADF of ����
will be significantly strengthened in key areas, notably
undersea warfare and anti-submarine warfare, maritime
surface warfare including air defence, air superiority,
strategic strike, special forces, intelligence,