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292 The MiliTAry BAlAnce 2010<br />

Table 27 South africa’s Strategic armaments package – Quantities and costs (rm)<br />

cost of 4 MEKO<br />

frigates<br />

cost of 3 Type-209<br />

submarines<br />

to be retained in ‘survival mode with life extension<br />

programmes’.<br />

In July 2009, new Defence Minister Lindiwe<br />

Sisulu used her first budget speech to acknowledge<br />

the impact that the recession was having on the<br />

government’s finances and the pressure that this<br />

may place on defence spending, but argued that<br />

the economic environment should not be used as an<br />

excuse to erode the defence budget, as was the case<br />

in the 1990s. In light of possible budget restraints she<br />

singled out efficiency gains as a major goal, noting<br />

that the strained relationship between the DoD and<br />

SANDF was detrimental in this regard. Her speech<br />

also included a commitment to review South Africa’s<br />

‘outdated defence policy’, which she said would take<br />

account of the new challenges facing the country and<br />

continent. She noted that previous defence policies<br />

had been deliberately designed in a way that did not<br />

intimidate South Africa’s neighbours, but now left<br />

a force that was lacking the strength and capabilities<br />

required for the regional security role that had<br />

emerged.<br />

It remains to be seen whether Sisulu and other<br />

interested parties can garner sufficient support<br />

in the Cabinet to obtain the necessary funding to<br />

recover from this ‘downward spiral’. However,<br />

regardless of the trajectory of future defence<br />

spending, the composition of the spending itself<br />

will need to be addressed. Despite efforts by the<br />

DoD and individual service branches, personnel<br />

costs will have risen from 30% of the budget in 2004<br />

to 38% of spending by 2011. But in spite of higher<br />

cost of 30 A109<br />

utility helicopters<br />

cost of 28 Gripen<br />

aircraft<br />

cost of 24 Hawk<br />

trainer aircraft Total cost<br />

2000 1,643 126 154 228 750 2,901<br />

2001 1,846 755 316 446 861 4,223<br />

2002 1,895 1,528 434 1,104 1,381 6,342<br />

2003 2,100 1,461 213 713 1,376 5,864<br />

2004 1,188 1,303 106 1,460 445 4,502<br />

2005 599 1,254 235 3,199 1,045 6,331<br />

2006 378 820 447 2,599 293 4,537<br />

2007 – 753 201 2,794 767 4,515<br />

2008 41 23 176 3,457 185 3,882<br />

2009 – 130 169 1,447 98 1,843<br />

2010 – – – 1,323 – 1,323<br />

2011 – – – 1,136 – 1,136<br />

Total 9,690 8,152 2,451 19,908 7,200 47,401<br />

salaries and improved benefits, the SANDF is still<br />

failing to attract enough people into the force. The<br />

air force, for example, has experienced a steady<br />

drain of experienced staff, meaning that there is a<br />

shortage of individuals to train and mentor newer<br />

members. In 2008, the SAAF had only 38% of its<br />

target strength in fighter pilots and 60% in technicians;<br />

the helicopter force had 72% of its necessary<br />

pilots and 68% technicians; and the transport<br />

force had 68% of its target pilot quota and 59% of<br />

technicians. Equally troublesome are the rising<br />

costs of operational and training activities due to<br />

improvements in air- and naval-base infrastructure<br />

to accommodate the platforms procured by<br />

the SDPP, as well as the costs of deploying around<br />

4,000 personnel abroad.<br />

With the budget being squeezed by rising<br />

personnel, training, maintenance and operational<br />

costs, the fate of a number of procurement<br />

programmes is uncertain. One immediate concern is<br />

Project Vistula, a R3.2bn programme to acquire more<br />

than 1,200 tactical logistical vehicles that was meant<br />

to have been completed between 2008 and 2011.<br />

Another army programme that has yet to get the<br />

go-ahead is Project Sapula, a new family of armoured<br />

personnel carriers to replace the 30-year old Casspir<br />

and Mamba vehicles, while funding for the groundbased<br />

air-defence system (GBADS) also appears to<br />

have dried up. The first phase of the new GBADS<br />

involves the deployment of multiple batteries of<br />

Starstreak surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), which will<br />

be followed by the development of mobile anti-

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