Editor's Foreword

Chapter Five
Middle East and North Africa
IRAQ
In mid November 2008, after a year of intense negotiations,
the United States and the Iraqi government
signed a Status of Forces Agreement and a Strategic
Framework Agreement, in a bid to formalise relations
between the two sovereign states for the first
time since the 2003 invasion and subsequent regime
change. These agreements set out an unambiguous
timetable for Iraq’s security forces to take sole responsibility
for law and order across the whole country.
At the end of June 2009, US forces withdrew from all
of Iraq’s cities, towns and villages, and by December
2009, the US military’s role in Iraq will have evolved
into an assistance, training and advisory mission.
By August 2010, the US troop presence is due to fall
from the current 120,000 to 50,000. Under Article 24 of
the new US–Iraq treaty, ‘all US forces are to be withdrawn
from all Iraqi territory, water and airspace’ by
the end of December 2011.
Iraqi security forces
With such a rigid timetable for the complete removal
of all US combat troops, Iraq’s future stability lies
in the hands of its own army and police force. This
is a daunting responsibility for a military force less
than seven years old. In May 2003, the US occupation
authority disbanded the old Iraqi army, thereby
hastening Iraq’s descent into an insurgency and civil
war that lasted until at least 2007. Realising its error,
the US quickly attempted to build a new and effective
Iraqi military force.
As of April 2009, Iraq’s security forces employed
around 600,000 personnel, spread between the interior
and defence ministries, as well as the Iraqi
National Counter-Terrorism Force. Officially, their
command and control is centred on the Iraqi Joint
Forces Command, which reports to the National
Operations Centre in Baghdad. However, since his
appointment in 2006 Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki
has subverted the formal chain of command, tying
senior army commanders and paramilitary units
to him personally. This has been achieved, firstly,
through the creation of the Office of the Commander
in Chief (see The Military Balance 2008, pp. 228–9).
Maliki has used this platform to appoint and promote
senior officers loyal to him. Secondly, Maliki has
used a number of operational commands to bring
both the army and the police force together under
one regional organisation and appointed a favoured
general to run each centre. To date, command centres
have been created in Baghdad, Basra, Diyala, Karbala
and Samarra, allowing the prime minister to control
the security forces in five of Iraq’s most important
provinces. In addition, in April 2007, as control of
Iraq’s special forces was handed from the US to the
Iraqi government, a Counter-terrorism Bureau was
set up to manage special forces at ministerial level,
effectively placing them under the direct control of
the prime minister.
Lack of autonomous capacity
The main focus of American attempts to reconstitute
an indigenous security force has been the Iraqi army.
Iraq currently has 13 infantry divisions and one mechanised
division. Its ground force includes 185 fully
trained battalions and over 55 brigades. Although all
military operations are now conducted in conjunction
with the Iraqi army, the US Department of Defense has
indicated that the Iraqi military only takes the lead in
areas of the country where the security threat is low.
In terms of operational readiness, the US military estimates
that the vast majority of Iraq’s security forces
are at ‘level two’, which means they are capable of
conducting counter-insurgency operations only with
US assistance, or ‘level three’, which means they can
operate only in conjunction with US forces. There are
several reasons for this continued lack of autonomous
capacity: the relatively short time since this army was
created; poor levels of education among rank-and-file
soldiers (25% of soldiers do not meet the army’s own
educational standards and 15% are illiterate); and a
shortage of junior and non-commissioned officers
capable of leading troops into battle.
The Iraqi army is still dependent upon the US military
for close air support and communications, intelligence,
surveillance and logistical infrastructure. These
technical shortcomings could be overcome through
extended investment and training, but US military
trainers and advisers are concerned that the invest-
Middle East and
North Africa