Editor's Foreword

340 The MiliTAry BAlAnCe 2010
deployment of its armed forces abroad. The lack of
parliamentary ratification of the CORF agreement
by members raised issues of protocol surrounding
the first exercise, Interaction 2009, conducted by the
new force in Belarus and Kazakhstan in September
and October. Similar arguments were proffered
by the Uzbeks against another Russian initiative
announced in July 2009, the opening of an additional
Russian military base in southern Kyrgyzstan. The
memorandum of understanding between Moscow
and Bishkek envisaged establishing a base in Osh
under the CSTO, with negotiations ongoing as of late
November 2009. Following Uzbek opposition to the
planned base, and disclosure that Moscow had made
no effort to consult Tashkent on the issue, Russian
diplomats actively attempted to secure Uzbek
support retroactively.
CORF was hurriedly formed, based on the nucleus
of the existing Collective Rapid Reaction Forces, and
enhanced from battalion-sized contributions to a
new structure centred on the Russian 98th Airborne
Division and 31st Air-Assault Brigade. Kazakhstan
agreed to provide a brigade drawn from its air mobile
forces based in Kapchagai, while Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan were to contribute supporting battalions.
The emerging structure was therefore Russian dominated,
and given reported widespread corruption
in Kazakhstan’s airmobile forces and their ageing
and obsolete equipment inventory, it is likely that
Astana’s participation in CORF would demand
significant levels of assistance from the Russian
armed forces.
The rapprochement between the US and
Uzbekistan culminated in August 2009 with Uzbek
Defence Minister Kabul Berdiyev and US CENTCOM
commander General David Petraeus signing a bilateral
agreement on a programme of military educational
exchanges and training. Indeed, Washington’s
defence relations with Tashkent have become more
sophisticated, accompanied by efforts to downplay
US military cooperation and assistance to Uzbekistan.
The Uzbek government agreed indirectly to grant
access to Navoi airport for the transit of supplies to
Afghanistan by leasing the facility to South Korea,
which in turn subcontracted to the US.
Kyrgyzstan skilfully exploited its concerns about
the US base at Manas to extract a significant increase
in rent for the facility. Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek
Bakiyev first announced his intention to close the base
in February 2009 at the CSTO summit in Moscow,
only to agree a last-minute deal with Washington
prior to his re-election in late July 2009. Officially, the
Manas base is now designated a ‘transit centre’, and
its future appears secure so long as the NDN receives
continued support from Moscow. Russia has also
provided air-defence systems deployed in southern
Kyrgyzstan, and developed the railway infrastructure
around the sensitive naval testing facility on
Lake Issyk Kul it leases from Bishkek.
Tajikistan also engaged in ‘base politics’, notably
in relation to reported attempts to extract rent from
Moscow for the 201st Division’s base in Dushanbe. The
Tajik government also failed to reach agreement with
Moscow on exclusive Russian use of the Ayni airfield,
which was being upgraded by India. A Russian–Tajik
counter-terrorist exercise held in southern Tajikistan
in September 2009 was justified by both sides on the
basis that the Taliban might cross the Tajik border and
seek to destabilise the country or the wider region.
Tajik defence-cooperation programmes with NATO
and its members have focused on border security
and demining, while its border service continued to
receive support from Russian border-guard advisers.
Despite high-level visits to the region by senior officials
from CENTCOM, NATO officials and contacts
at bilateral level between Alliance members and
the country, defence cooperation has become more
cautious and sensitive to the concerns of Moscow.
While the Barack Obama administration has pursued
a more cooperative approach to dealing with Russia
through the CSTO and at a bilateral level, Moscow
has been asserting greater influence. Broadly ambivalent
to Alliance assistance to the regional militaries
that might build local defence capabilities, Moscow
has liaised closely with its CSTO partners on issues
where it perceives its interests to be at stake.
Kazakhstan has continued to diversify its foreign
military cooperation, including intensifying defence
relations with Belarus and India and exchanging
defence attachés with Iran, though in the latter case
Astana is wary of damaging relations with Israel. The
underlying cause of this diversification is the need to
modernise and repair the Kazakh air force’s ageing
aircraft fleet; Belarusian aircraft-repair plants are
currently undertaking such work. The large quantities
of Russian-made weapons and equipment in the
Indian military’s inventory have stimulated considerable
interest among Kazakh defence officials.
Despite these growing ties, however, Kazakhstan’s
armed forces remain heavily reliant on cooperation
with Russia. In March 2009, for example, a contract
was signed with Moscow to procure up to ten further