Editor's Foreword

in Atalanta can arrest, detain and transfer individuals
who are suspected of involvement in acts of piracy
or armed robbery at sea. They can further seize the
vessels and goods involved. Since March 2009, the
EU has been cooperating with Kenya, which prosecutes
detained individuals on the basis of a bilateral
agreement. While EU member states can also prosecute
suspected pirates, the precise legal situation
varies between member states. This has an impact on
national approaches. The Spanish defence minister,
for instance, has actively encouraged Spanish vessels
to use private security contractors given the limited
operational and legal capacity of the Spanish armed
forces to address piracy beyond their contribution to
multinational efforts. Overall, the EU’s naval mission
was relatively successful in tackling legal questions of
arrest and prosecution of suspects, and demonstrated
the widening range of the Union’s – albeit still modest
– capacity to mobilise capabilities for challenging
missions.
Meanwhile, the EU completed its mission in Chad
and the Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/
RCA) and handed over responsibility to MINURCAT,
the UN mission, in March 2009. EUFOR had carried
out some 3,000 short-range and 440 long-range patrols.
EU leaders estimated that an improved security situation
had enabled some 10,000 displaced persons to
return to their villages. Furthermore, cooperation
with the UN appeared to have matured compared
with earlier such attempts in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. EUFOR helped strengthen MINURCAT
by providing escorts for convoys and securing sites.
In contrast to previous practice, under which contingents
from EU member states left the theatre after
EU operational duties were completed, a significant
number of troops transitioned into the UN force to
provide continuity and improve capability.
The EU’s civilian monitoring mission to Georgia,
EUMM Georgia, launched in October 2008, was
extended by the EU Council in July 2009 by one year
to September 2010. Its task was to monitor implementation
of the ceasefire agreement between Georgia and
Russia, particularly the withdrawal of Russian forces
to the positions held prior to the outbreak of hostilities.
EUMM Georgia also monitored the deployment
of Georgian police and observed whether all parties
were complying with human-rights obligations. At
the time of writing, EUMM Georgia had still not
gained access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, limiting
its impact. In Kosovo, the delayed civilian EU ruleof-law
mission, EULEX, finally reached full opera-
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tional capability on 6 April 2009. By July 2009, EULEX
consisted of some 1,710 international staff plus 925
local staff. Mandated until 14 June 2010, its main
objectives were to assist and support the authorities
in Kosovo, which declared independence from Serbia
in February 2008, in the areas of police, judiciary and
customs. Meanwhile, NATO continued its KFOR military
mission in Kosovo. The EU also began preparatory
work for a possible transition of the 2,000-strong
Operation Althea in Bosnia into a capacity-building
and training mission. However, EU leaders said such
a move would depend on political circumstances on
the ground. While initial planning steps for such a
transition have been taken, several member states,
including the United Kingdom, have cautioned that
the situation in Bosnia remains fragile.
Capability gaps
On 11 December 2008, the EU Council adopted a
‘Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities’ which
reflected the desire of the then-French EU presidency
to reinvigorate this topic. Despite ESDP reaching its
tenth anniversary in 2009, the core capability shortfalls
identified in 1999–2000 in strategic and tactical
lift, intelligence and reconnaissance, and force protection
in large part remained. The declaration was noteworthy
in that it set out in relatively clear terms the
EU’s level of ambition for civilian and military crisismanagement
missions: the EU, in implementing the
military and civilian Headline Goal 2010 obligations,
should be able to simultaneously conduct two major
stabilisation and reconstruction operations involving
up to 10,000 troops plus a civilian contingent for at
least two years; two rapid-response operations using
EU battlegroups; an evacuation operation lasting
fewer than ten days; a maritime- or air-surveillance/
interdiction operation; a civil–military humanitarianassistance
operation lasting up to 90 days; and around
one dozen civilian missions, including one major
operation involving up to 3,000 personnel for several
years. Notably absent from this list of scenarios is an
operation dealing with the separation of parties by
force. Even though such an operation falls within the
EU’s ambitions, persistent capability shortfalls seem
to have precluded its inclusion.
The declaration prioritised improvements in
civilian capabilities, given expectations for increasing
demand in this field. On the military side, the declaration
asked member states to embrace innovative
methods for capabilities development, including the
pooling and multinational management of assets;
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