<strong>European</strong> CommissionOccasional Paper 60, Volume IFigure 1.1. Relative skill premium <strong>and</strong> income levelSource: Bertoli <strong>and</strong> Brücker (2008)The decision to invest in education is driven not by the actual return to education at destination, butby the expected return for the would-be migrant, <strong>and</strong> the two differ whenever the countries ofdestination pursue skill-selective im<strong>migration</strong> policies. These policies, which confer a higherprobability of <strong>migration</strong> to better- educated individuals, increase the distribution of expected labourearnings at destination for potential migrants, inducing them to invest in education “in order to beeligible for e<strong>migration</strong>” (Mountford, 1997). As Stark <strong>and</strong> Wang (2002) provocatively suggest, theprospect of <strong>migration</strong> reduces the need to provide educational subsidies, as it increases theexpected private return on schooling. 71Still, some recent theoretical <strong>and</strong> empirical contributions have introduced relevant caveats againstthe endorsement of excessive optimism. The expected income-schooling profile at destination,which drives the educational decision of would-be migrants, can be flattened by relevantconfounding factors. Immigrants tend to be overqualified for the job positions that they take(Mattoo et al., 2008), <strong>and</strong> overrepresented in manual occupations. 72 Furthermore, Docquier et al.(2008) have shown that the theoretical predictions of the literature about the so-called beneficialbrain drain is based an unwarranted hypothesis, as they regard the governments of migrant-sendingcountries as passive by-st<strong>and</strong>ers concerning the foreign dem<strong>and</strong> for their talented workers.Governments can adjust their policies in response to the international mobility of highly-skilledworkers, <strong>and</strong> Docquier et al. (2008) predict that governments will cut back public subsidies toeducation, as all this “implies far-reaching changes in the geographic incidence of the costs <strong>and</strong>benefits of publicly-funded higher education” (Justman <strong>and</strong> Thisse, 1997). 73Thus, the dynamic contribution of the prospect to migrate upon human capital formation inmigrant-sending countries tends to fade away if migrants are poorly assimilated in the labour<strong>market</strong> at destination, when the country has a long-established <strong>migration</strong> history, <strong>and</strong> when thegovernments reduce educational subsidies to prevent an excessive leakage of fiscal resources with71 One could also argue that the prospect to migrate might influence the distribution of students across various disciplines, asit creates an incentive to invest in those fields which are dem<strong>and</strong>ed in the destination countries.72 Moreover, the income-schooling profile at destination tends to flatten over time, as the <strong>migration</strong> process gainsmomentum; such a change is due to the fact that an increase in the size of <strong>migration</strong> networks at destination has anuneven impact on <strong>migration</strong> costs across educational levels; low educated would-be migrants enjoy a greater reduction in<strong>migration</strong> costs than highly-educated individuals do (Munshi, 2003; McKenzie <strong>and</strong> Rapoport, forthcoming), <strong>and</strong> thisflattens the net income-schooling profile.73 Docquier et al. (2008) predict that the reduction in public subsidies more than offsets the increase in the expected return toschooling induced by the prospect to migrate, thus worsening rather than improving the skill composition of the domesticworkforce.116
Chapter IIThe impact of <strong>migration</strong> on labour <strong>market</strong>s in Arab Mediterranean countriesthe <strong>migration</strong> of the highly educated workers. If this is the case, then the static negative effect dueto the drain of the “best <strong>and</strong> the brightest” is unlikely to be offset by a substantial positive dynamiccontribution to human capital formation. Nevertheless, this need not represent an actual concern formigrant-sending countries: if the domestic economy is unable to productively employ talented thentheir <strong>migration</strong> would not represent a worrying brain drain but it would rather be the consequenceof a substantial mismatch between the higher-education system <strong>and</strong> the domestic labour <strong>market</strong>. 74The <strong>migration</strong> of skilled workers would thus alleviate the pressure on the labour <strong>market</strong>, rather thanrepresent a hindering factor in economic development.1.3 Return <strong>migration</strong>Return <strong>migration</strong> is currently depicted as one of the main channels through which migrant-sendingcountries can benefit from <strong>migration</strong> <strong>flows</strong>, as migrants can acquire higher education or relevant onthe-jobexperiences when abroad, <strong>and</strong> then employ them fruitfully upon their return. This statement(which applies mainly to scarce skills) should be mitigated, or even criticized: for example, thegovernment of Egypt now fears that the current economic crisis in the Gulf will result in a massivereturn of migrants to Egypt, <strong>and</strong> an upsurge in unemployment. Return <strong>migration</strong> is advocated by EUmember states as an implicit solution to their problem of integration <strong>and</strong> social cohesion, not tosending countries’ problem of development. The influence on the supply side of the labour <strong>market</strong> isdirect if returnees complete their <strong>migration</strong> experience while they are still in their working lives. Suchan effect is relevant if temporary – or circular – rather than the permanent <strong>migration</strong> representing thepredominant pattern of international mobility of domestic workers.1.4 RemittancesRemittances can influence the supply side of the labour <strong>market</strong> through a variety of channels. Thereceipt of remittances loosens the liquidity constraints that hinder investments in education (CoxEdwards <strong>and</strong> Ureta, 2003; Rapoport <strong>and</strong> Docquier, 2006). Note that this argument is closely related tothe one that was depicted in section 1.1.1, as young members of recipient households have a higherprobability of migrating than the rest of the population (van Dalen et al., 2005), due to already existingfamily networks in the country of destination. Thus, whether the positive income effects determined bythe receipt of migrant remittances feeds up into a higher investment in education depends crucially onwhether the prospect to migrate improves or worsens the incentives to undertake such an investment. 75Remittances reduce – in the short run – the size of the younger cohorts entering the labour <strong>market</strong>,either through a higher retention rate in the educational system, or through increased <strong>migration</strong>.Remittances can also produce a detrimental impact on human-capital formation, if they open upopportunities to undertake productive investments in family-run activities, which represent the use ofthe remittances that are supposed to deliver the greatest developmental contribution for the recipientcountries (see Taylor, 1999 for a criticque of this position). Child workers are mostly employed infamily-run economic activities – <strong>and</strong> all the more so in rural areas, <strong>and</strong> remittance-financed productiveinvestments can lead to an increase in the household dem<strong>and</strong> for child work. Child work <strong>and</strong> schoolingare not mutually exclusive, but are, nevertheless, conflicting activities (Ravallion <strong>and</strong> Wodon, 2001), sothat an increase in the household dem<strong>and</strong> for child work could have a detrimental impact on schoolattendance.74 Pritchett (2001) questions, on empirical grounds, the compelling theoretical argument that a larger endowment of humancapital is conducive to a more robust rate of economic growth.75 If the former is the case, then the receipt of remittances delays the entrance of young cohorts to the domestic labour <strong>market</strong>,as they raise the enrollment rates in higher-education institutions; in the medium run, this would improve theskill-composition of the labour force. If, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, the prospect to migrate reduces the incentives to invest ineducation, remittances could be used to finance the <strong>migration</strong> cost for an additional household member.117
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