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Labour market performance and migration flows - European ...

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Chapter IFinal ReportAs far as the supply of labour is concerned, remittances can reduce the work effort of the members ofrecipients households due to the positive income effect they bring about (see the recent empiricalcontribution, related to Mexico, by Cox Edwards <strong>and</strong> Rodríguez-Oreggia 2009). Remittances also loosenthe liquidity constraints that can hinder investments in education (Cox-Edwards <strong>and</strong> Ureta, 2003;Rapoport <strong>and</strong> Docquier, 2006) as young members of recipient households have a higher probability ofmigrating than the rest of the population (Van Dalen et al., 2005). Thus, whether the positive incomeeffects determined by the receipt of migrant remittances feeds into higher investment in educationdepends on whether the prospect to migrate improves or worsens the incentives to make such aninvestment. If the former is the case, then remittances can delay the entrance of young cohorts to thedomestic labour <strong>market</strong>, as they raise the enrolment rates in higher-education institutions. In the mediumrun, this would improve the skill-composition of the labour force. If, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, the prospect tomigrate reduces the incentives to invest in education, remittances could be used to finance the <strong>migration</strong>cost for an additional household member. Observe that in both cases remittances reduce – in the shortrun – the size of the younger cohorts which enter the labour <strong>market</strong>, either through a higher retention ratein the educational system, or through increased <strong>migration</strong>. Remittances can also produce a detrimentalimpact on human capital formation, if they open up opportunities to undertake productive investments infamily-run activities, which represents the use of remittances which is supposed to be the use whichdelivers the greatest developmental contribution for the recipient countries (see Taylor, 1999 for acritique of this position). For evidence for selected Middle Eastern countries, see Bouhga-Hagbe (2006).Although the educational systems in most AMCs impose limited direct costs upon the students <strong>and</strong> theirfamilies (Vossensteyn 2004), indirect costs can be substantial, <strong>and</strong> the positive income effect due toremittances can improve households’ ability to afford them, thus raising the educational achievement ofyoung members in recipient households. Table 5.2.1 shows that – as far as the Maghreb countries areconcerned – the vast majority of current migrants have low levels of education, so remittances can givean opportunity to break this poverty trap, raising the level of education of young family members over<strong>and</strong> above the one of the migrants. Indeed, Table 5.3.1 above reveals that school fees represent thesecond or third most relevant use of remittances in recipient households in all the seven AMCs surveyedby EIB (2006). There are a number of studies – such as Berriane (1996), Bencherifa (1996) <strong>and</strong> de Haas(2003), quoted in de Haas (2007) – which argue that remittances to Morocco contribute to an increase inexpenditures in education which benefits young pupils of both sexes.As far as the impact of remittances on the labour participation rate of women is concerned, a recentbook by Ennaji <strong>and</strong> Sadiqi (2008) analyzes the impact of the – predominantly male – <strong>migration</strong> fromMorocco on the women left behind, <strong>and</strong> it finds that they tend to assume roles in the productionactivities that were formerly covered by the male migrants so their participation rate increases insteadof decreasing. Nevertheless, Ennaji <strong>and</strong> Sadiqi (2008) argue that “most migrant husb<strong>and</strong>s would refuseto allow their wives to work outside the home because this work jeopardizes their social role <strong>and</strong> theimage as household bread-winners”. They also provide evidence that <strong>migration</strong> is associated with arelevant change of family structures, as 26.2% of the sampled women went back to live with theirparents, who can help them in taking care of the children. This is so because AMCs are oftencharacterized by “weak transportation <strong>and</strong> child care infrastructure [that] discourage women fromgoing out to work, as does the lack of social support for children or the aged, the burden of whose carefalls on women” (UNDP 2006), <strong>and</strong> the women left behind do not seek employment because of “theirinability to combine their work outside with duties as mothers <strong>and</strong> housewives”. Such a change infamily structure is clearly connected with the need for greater female engagement in the labour<strong>market</strong>, <strong>and</strong> it suggests that <strong>migration</strong> per se can increase female participation rates on the labour<strong>market</strong>. Nevertheless, such an effect need not materialise: even in Palestine, when the husb<strong>and</strong>migrates, women tend to live with their husb<strong>and</strong>s’ families, but this does not consolidate an active rolein the labour <strong>market</strong> (Hilal 2007). Thus, it is important to stress that increased female participation canbe expected to be mostly confined to self-employment activities – such as family-run agriculture orretail trade – rather than to wage employment, given the persistent <strong>and</strong> high levels of maleunemployment even in migrant-sending areas. Thus, the argument provided by Hijab (1988), who75

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