11.07.2015 Views

Labour market performance and migration flows - European ...

Labour market performance and migration flows - European ...

Labour market performance and migration flows - European ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

Chapter IFinal ReportBut one should not forget that one of the main causes of graduate unemployment in AMCs is the lack ofdem<strong>and</strong> for graduate employment in the private sector, reflecting the underdevelopment of high addedvalue economic activities <strong>and</strong> more generally the choice for a low wages, low added value exportorientedeconomic model, often promoted by the tax incentives structure (see Saif <strong>and</strong> El-Rayyes 2009,National Background Paper on Jordan). To this extent, it is a whole review of industrial policies, <strong>and</strong>more generally economic policies, what is required to face this challenge (see Section 7.3).In any case, graduate unemployment is a source of major macro-economic inefficiency, as the humancapital of the country is wasted, the education investment made in these workers is lost <strong>and</strong> does notcontribute to economic growth <strong>and</strong>, most worryingly, it reduces the incentives for new generations toinvest in education (unless this investment is related to <strong>migration</strong> prospects) instead of engaging ininformal employment, bypassing the positive externalities derived from this investment for the economyas a whole.In all countries but Palestine there is a positive correlation between the level of education attained<strong>and</strong> the unemployment rate, which is very specific to the region (see Table 2.4.1). In Maghrebcountries, in particular, this is a major problem. In Tunisia, for instance, the average level of educationamong unemployed workers exceeds that of the employed population: between 1994 <strong>and</strong> 2007 it hasgone up from 4.5 to 8.3 years of education for the unemployed <strong>and</strong> from 5.4 to 7.3 for the employed.Expectations <strong>and</strong> reservation wages also play a role in explaining high rates of graduateunemployment, to the point that, as stated by other authors in the past (see Middle East YouthInitiative 2009, pp. 8-9), the National Background Paper for Egypt points out that “probably for them[graduate workers] unemployment is a luxury”.This phenomenon of graduate unemployment in AMCs is attracting much public <strong>and</strong> specializedattention, in part due to the higher degree of political mobilization among this class, <strong>and</strong> in part also tothe higher potential interest they have as migrant workers for host countries. However, it should not beforgotten that, whereas graduate unemployment underlines a major distortion in resource allocation<strong>and</strong> incentives in the economy, in most AMCs the majority of the unemployed are not graduate, buthave only a primary or secondary education. In Tunisia, for instance, 35% <strong>and</strong> 40% of the unemployedhave only primary or secondary education, whereas graduate unemployed make up 20% of totalunemployment. So it is unemployment among workers with only primary or secondary education thatposes the main challenge in absolute figures (<strong>and</strong> hence also in <strong>migration</strong> potential terms): onlyslightly more than 1 out of the 7 million unemployed in AMCs are graduates.2.5 Informal EmploymentGiven the current state of labour <strong>market</strong>s in AMCs, an active <strong>and</strong> dynamic informal sector remains theonly systemic response to their malfunctioning, working as a buffer to allow an important part of theworkforce to make a living. So in practice it serves as a kind of security net, offering jobs or at leastincome generating activities to excluded workers. This has become a structural, integral part of labour<strong>market</strong>s in AMCs <strong>and</strong> indeed the main objective symptom of the distortions they are exposed to.If we know little about employment in AMCs <strong>and</strong> data is very unreliable, the knowledge aboutinformal employment is even slighter, even in those countries, such as Morocco, where specificsurveys have been conducted to gauge the informal economy (in 1999 <strong>and</strong> 2008). The share ofinformal employment in AMCs can be estimated in the 35-55% range for non-agriculturalemployment, but estimates for the same country show huge variations (depending on methodology <strong>and</strong>definition of “informal”). For Syria, for instance, they varied between 19% <strong>and</strong> 59%. In Morocco,informal employment has been estimated at 45% of non-agriculture employment. And in Algeria,excluding the public administration, where by nature there is no informal employment, <strong>and</strong>agriculture, where it is not well measured, informal employment goes to make up 45% of total47

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!