<strong>European</strong> CommissionOccasional Paper 60, Volume IThe situation has improved in some cases for young male workers, but still entails long spells ofunemployment prior to a first job: in Egypt, in 2006, 50% of male school leavers had found their firstjob within 2 years of leaving school, down from three years in 1998. 75% found jobs in 2006 within 5years of leaving school, whereas in 1998 it would have taken nearly 8 years for that proportion to findjobs. However, the female rates of transition from school to work are much lower <strong>and</strong> do not exceed25% even after 15 years: for women there is no perceptible improvement in the transition period from1998 to 2006.Female Unemployment <strong>and</strong> PrecariousnessThe other important (<strong>and</strong> aggravating) aspect of unemployment in AMCs is its gender dimension: femaleunemployment rates are higher than those for males for all ages <strong>and</strong> all levels of education (with theexception of the “over 45s” <strong>and</strong> the “no education” categories, where the retreat of women from thelabour <strong>market</strong>, <strong>and</strong> hence inactivity, leads to frictional unemployment rates). The increase in femaleunemployment rates generally experienced in AMCs over the last years is due to the growth in thefemale working-age population <strong>and</strong> the rising labour force participation rates brought about by highereducational attainment. Like female participation in the labour force, female unemployment is stronglycorrelated with education. In Jordan, for instance, more than half of all unemployed women have postsecondaryeducational qualifications.Educated women have been much more negatively hit by unemployment than educated men. As aresult, in part, of structural adjustment programmes <strong>and</strong> privatization they can no longer find jobs inthe public sector, while the private sector gives clear priority to men (in Egypt, for instance, in 200637% of working women worked in the public sector, compared to 54% in 2006). In Morocco, between1999 <strong>and</strong> 2005, women got a third of all new jobs created in the private sector, more than their 27%share in the labour force, but they occupied two thirds of the jobs lost, so that, in net terms, they onlyexperienced a 4.8% net increase in employment over this six years period. And female employmentremains concentrated in low productivity sectors (62% work in the agricultural sector).Barriers for female entry into the private sector are due to a number of factors, including employerswho are unwilling to hire workers whose commitment to the labour force may be short-lived,predominant social norms, <strong>and</strong> attitudes limiting what constitutes gender-appropriate employment, aswell as mobility constraints, constraints that limit women’s job search activities to local labour<strong>market</strong>s (a barrier underlined by four of the National Background Studies, those for Egypt, Jordan,Lebanon <strong>and</strong> Palestine). At the other end of the spectrum, it is important to take into consideration thata growing proportion of total female employment (up to 50% in Egypt <strong>and</strong> Morocco) corresponds tounpaid family aid, in particular in the agricultural sector.Graduate UnemploymentUniversity graduates are still a minority of the AMC labour force, ranging from 6.1% of it in Syria <strong>and</strong>8.5% in Morocco to 26.9% in Palestine <strong>and</strong> 24.9% in Jordan (see Table 1.2.2). Indeed, at least half ofthe AMCs (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia <strong>and</strong> Syria) still produce a relatively low proportion of universitygraduates. However, graduate workers show a higher than average propensity to unemployment. Thedata demonstrates that, in the past decade, unemployment has been rising among individuals withsecondary <strong>and</strong> university education, reaching double the unemployment rate levels for persons with noeducation at all.Graduate unemployment reflects, in part, a major mismatch between skills of supply <strong>and</strong> dem<strong>and</strong>(<strong>and</strong> hence a distortion of the education systems in those countries): there are too few graduates intechnical <strong>and</strong> scientific disciplines <strong>and</strong> those there suffer from the poor quality of university education.More than half of the graduates are women, who are mostly excluded from participating in the labour<strong>market</strong>. It also reflects a problem of expectations (see discussion of reservation wages in section 2.3).46
Chapter IFinal ReportBut one should not forget that one of the main causes of graduate unemployment in AMCs is the lack ofdem<strong>and</strong> for graduate employment in the private sector, reflecting the underdevelopment of high addedvalue economic activities <strong>and</strong> more generally the choice for a low wages, low added value exportorientedeconomic model, often promoted by the tax incentives structure (see Saif <strong>and</strong> El-Rayyes 2009,National Background Paper on Jordan). To this extent, it is a whole review of industrial policies, <strong>and</strong>more generally economic policies, what is required to face this challenge (see Section 7.3).In any case, graduate unemployment is a source of major macro-economic inefficiency, as the humancapital of the country is wasted, the education investment made in these workers is lost <strong>and</strong> does notcontribute to economic growth <strong>and</strong>, most worryingly, it reduces the incentives for new generations toinvest in education (unless this investment is related to <strong>migration</strong> prospects) instead of engaging ininformal employment, bypassing the positive externalities derived from this investment for the economyas a whole.In all countries but Palestine there is a positive correlation between the level of education attained<strong>and</strong> the unemployment rate, which is very specific to the region (see Table 2.4.1). In Maghrebcountries, in particular, this is a major problem. In Tunisia, for instance, the average level of educationamong unemployed workers exceeds that of the employed population: between 1994 <strong>and</strong> 2007 it hasgone up from 4.5 to 8.3 years of education for the unemployed <strong>and</strong> from 5.4 to 7.3 for the employed.Expectations <strong>and</strong> reservation wages also play a role in explaining high rates of graduateunemployment, to the point that, as stated by other authors in the past (see Middle East YouthInitiative 2009, pp. 8-9), the National Background Paper for Egypt points out that “probably for them[graduate workers] unemployment is a luxury”.This phenomenon of graduate unemployment in AMCs is attracting much public <strong>and</strong> specializedattention, in part due to the higher degree of political mobilization among this class, <strong>and</strong> in part also tothe higher potential interest they have as migrant workers for host countries. However, it should not beforgotten that, whereas graduate unemployment underlines a major distortion in resource allocation<strong>and</strong> incentives in the economy, in most AMCs the majority of the unemployed are not graduate, buthave only a primary or secondary education. In Tunisia, for instance, 35% <strong>and</strong> 40% of the unemployedhave only primary or secondary education, whereas graduate unemployed make up 20% of totalunemployment. So it is unemployment among workers with only primary or secondary education thatposes the main challenge in absolute figures (<strong>and</strong> hence also in <strong>migration</strong> potential terms): onlyslightly more than 1 out of the 7 million unemployed in AMCs are graduates.2.5 Informal EmploymentGiven the current state of labour <strong>market</strong>s in AMCs, an active <strong>and</strong> dynamic informal sector remains theonly systemic response to their malfunctioning, working as a buffer to allow an important part of theworkforce to make a living. So in practice it serves as a kind of security net, offering jobs or at leastincome generating activities to excluded workers. This has become a structural, integral part of labour<strong>market</strong>s in AMCs <strong>and</strong> indeed the main objective symptom of the distortions they are exposed to.If we know little about employment in AMCs <strong>and</strong> data is very unreliable, the knowledge aboutinformal employment is even slighter, even in those countries, such as Morocco, where specificsurveys have been conducted to gauge the informal economy (in 1999 <strong>and</strong> 2008). The share ofinformal employment in AMCs can be estimated in the 35-55% range for non-agriculturalemployment, but estimates for the same country show huge variations (depending on methodology <strong>and</strong>definition of “informal”). For Syria, for instance, they varied between 19% <strong>and</strong> 59%. In Morocco,informal employment has been estimated at 45% of non-agriculture employment. And in Algeria,excluding the public administration, where by nature there is no informal employment, <strong>and</strong>agriculture, where it is not well measured, informal employment goes to make up 45% of total47
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