<strong>European</strong> CommissionOccasional Paper 60, Volume IRemittances can also be channeled through migrant associations – the so-called home townassociations – formed by migrants living in the same country, <strong>and</strong> coming from the same area, whoput together their savings to invest them in projects to promote the economic <strong>and</strong> socialdevelopment of their origin community. Collective remittances are usually used for theconstruction of hospital, schools <strong>and</strong> other social investments, <strong>and</strong> they can thus stimulate thedem<strong>and</strong> for workers in the building sector, with positive ensuing spillover effects (Guarnizo <strong>and</strong>Smith, 1998).4.2 Return migrantsReturnees can bring back home new skills they have acquired in destination countries. Moreover,thanks to the savings they have accumulated abroad, they can also afford to undertake costlyinvestments. They may also be better placed to become entrepreneurs, <strong>and</strong> to adopt new models ofentrepreneurial activities, which they have experienced in destination countries.The hypothesis that return <strong>migration</strong> increases the probability of opting for entrepreneurial activityhas been recently tested, comparing returnees with stayers. Kilic et al. (2007) find that returnees toAlbania are, ceteris paribus, more likely than stayers to become entrepreneurs. Wahba <strong>and</strong> Zenou(2008) conversely find that Egyptian returnees have a lower propensity to set up an entrepreneurialactivity, notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing the experiences <strong>and</strong> the savings they have accumulated abroad, as<strong>migration</strong> also produces a loss of social capital that represents a key factor in establishing anenterprise which operates in an informal setting. Most existing empirical studies pool together selfemployed<strong>and</strong> employers as being entrepreneurs, while the ensuing job creation effect is clearlydifferent.Returnees’ skills <strong>and</strong> savings can bring a substantial contribution to the development of medium<strong>and</strong> small enterprises: MSEs in developing countries are extremely vulnerable, <strong>and</strong> theestablishment of a new entrepreneurial activity may be of little significance if it does not last.Returnees may be better able to overcome the difficulties faced by MSEs, as they can draw on theirforeign savings not only to finance the initial capital investment, but also to reduce the vulnerabilityof their enterprises in the face of adverse dem<strong>and</strong> shocks. If this is the case, then the job creationeffect due to return <strong>migration</strong> would induce a lasting increase in the dem<strong>and</strong> for labour.4.3 Social remittancesThe transfer of new forms of entrepreneurial models is not limited to return migrants alone, but it canalso occur through the increased tightness of communication with the countries of destination. Socialremittances not only permit migrant households to improve their knowledge of available technologies<strong>and</strong> entrepreneurial models, but there is also a “multiplier” effect due to communication among nonmigranthouseholds. A specific kind of social remittances is represented by the technological transferbrought about by networks of skilled migrants (Docquier <strong>and</strong> Lodigiani, 2007).Part II - Empirical evidenceAfter an introductory section on the salient features of <strong>migration</strong> out of the Arab MediterraneanCountries, the structure of this part of the paper mirrors the first part, where we presented thetheoretical arguments about the impact of <strong>migration</strong> on labour <strong>market</strong> outcomes in origin countries.But its content does not, as the empirical evidence lags seriously behind the theory because of theremarkable analytical challenges that this evidence poses, <strong>and</strong> because of binding data limitations.Wherever possible, we nevertheless try to offer an – albeit limited <strong>and</strong> tentative – assessment of therelevance of the theoretical arguments for AMCs. It is important though to flag up an important caveathere. This paper does not provide new empirical evidence. Rather it systematizes the existing <strong>and</strong>dispersed evidence according to the structure laid out in the previous section. While importantknowledge gaps remain, the systematization of the existing empirical evidence will hopefully reducethe number of the gaps that a reader might have initially feared.122
Chapter IIThe impact of <strong>migration</strong> on labour <strong>market</strong>s in Arab Mediterranean countries5. Salient features of <strong>migration</strong> out of the Arab Mediterranean CountriesThis section is meant to briefly outline the salient features of <strong>migration</strong> from Arab MediterraneanCountries that are relevant in shaping <strong>migration</strong> impact on domestic labour <strong>market</strong>s. Such an effort isriddled with substantial difficulties, as the most widely-quoted figures on emigrants areim<strong>migration</strong>-based (Dumont <strong>and</strong> Lemaitre, 2005; Docquier <strong>and</strong> Marfouk, 2005), i.e. obtained throughthe aggregation of data gathered in the destination countries. Such an approach can give rise tosubstantial discrepancies with e<strong>migration</strong>-based statistics, 79 which – in the case of Egypt - can even be246 percent higher than data gathered in the countries of destination (Fargues, 2007c). This problemcan also be traced back to the fact that one of the main destinations for migrants from AMCs – <strong>and</strong>specifically for those from the Mashreq – are the Gulf Countries, which provide only limited statisticson im<strong>migration</strong>. This entails that data gathered from the OECD countries alone provide only a partialrepresentation of the <strong>migration</strong> out of AMCs. Moreover, intra-regional <strong>migration</strong> is also substantial –<strong>and</strong> not particularly selective in terms of migrant skills (World Bank, 2008a). Though this may falloutside the scope of this paper – as this need not be replacement <strong>migration</strong> 80 – intra-regional <strong>migration</strong>represents a further important caveat against taking <strong>migration</strong> statistics about AMCs at face value.Fargues (2007c) estimates the number of first generation migrants from the Arab MediterraneanRegion at 12-15 million. Migration from the area is on the rise – particularly from Morocco,Lebanon, Egypt <strong>and</strong> Algeria – <strong>and</strong> it will continue in the next decades because of the persistence ofboth push <strong>and</strong> pull factors. 81 Table 5.1 reports the figures about the stocks of emigrants from sixAMCs based on data from origin countries, <strong>and</strong> provides information about the magnitude ofcumulative <strong>flows</strong>, as well as about the geographical distribution of migrants.79 “The main reasons for the observed discrepancies can be summarized by artificially generated data, different sources ofinformation in terms of year <strong>and</strong> the country that the migrants are counted at, the ambiguity of how refugees <strong>and</strong> transitmigrants are dealt” (Isaoglu, 2007).80 This can be traced back to the segmented nature of the labour <strong>market</strong>s in the AMCs; Corm (2009) shows that Jordanrecords substantial <strong>flows</strong> of highly educated migrants towards the Gulf Countries, <strong>and</strong> relevant in<strong>flows</strong> of low-skilledimmigrants – mostly from Syria <strong>and</strong> Egypt – who tend to take up low-paid jobs in the Jordanian labour <strong>market</strong>. In Jordan, inthe 1980s, a large number of workers from Egypt <strong>and</strong> Syria was attracted by the availability of jobs in the agriculture <strong>and</strong>construction sectors: although this was portrayed as replacement <strong>migration</strong>, it was actually an im<strong>migration</strong> which “respondedto the upscale mobility of non expatriated Jordanians”. A segmented labour <strong>market</strong> was created: these sectors until thatmoment had always been dominated by foreign nationals, who receive very low wages <strong>and</strong> do not have legal protection(Chatelard, 2004; De Bel Air, 2008).81 For a short review of the determinants of <strong>migration</strong> from AMCs <strong>and</strong> predictions for the next decades, see MediterraneanReport (2007).123
- Page 5 and 6:
STUDYLABOUR MARKETS PERFORMANCE AND
- Page 7 and 8:
Table of ContentsLABOUR MARKETS PER
- Page 10:
8.1 Actual migration and consumptio
- Page 15 and 16:
Chapter IFinal Report 15 MILLION NE
- Page 17 and 18:
Chapter IFinal Report …so that MI
- Page 19 and 20:
Chapter IFinal Reportroots). The cu
- Page 21 and 22:
Chapter IFinal Report In AMCs, REMI
- Page 23 and 24:
Chapter IFinal Reportpolicies. This
- Page 25 and 26:
Chapter IFinal ReportMediterranean
- Page 27 and 28:
Chapter IFinal ReportMore recently,
- Page 29 and 30:
Chapter IFinal Reportfor EU employm
- Page 31 and 32:
Chapter IFinal Reportchosen, these
- Page 33 and 34:
Chapter IFinal Reportexit of women
- Page 35 and 36:
Chapter IFinal ReportFigure 1.2.1.
- Page 37 and 38:
Chapter IFinal ReportA Declining Em
- Page 39 and 40:
Chapter IFinal ReportThe same year,
- Page 41 and 42:
Chapter IFinal ReportTable 2.2.1. I
- Page 43 and 44:
Chapter IFinal Reportminimum wages
- Page 45 and 46:
Chapter IFinal Report2.4 Unemployme
- Page 47 and 48:
Chapter IFinal ReportYouth Unemploy
- Page 49 and 50:
Chapter IFinal ReportBut one should
- Page 51 and 52:
Chapter IFinal Reportmillion) 10 .
- Page 53 and 54:
Chapter IFinal Reportmight intensif
- Page 55 and 56:
Chapter IFinal Reporttrue labour ma
- Page 57 and 58:
Chapter IFinal Reportto reform the
- Page 59 and 60:
Chapter IFinal ReportFrom a differe
- Page 61 and 62:
Chapter IFinal ReportTable 4.2.1 Ou
- Page 63 and 64:
Chapter IFinal ReportSource: Adams
- Page 65 and 66:
Chapter IFinal Reportin the destina
- Page 67 and 68:
Chapter IFinal ReportIn conclusion,
- Page 69 and 70:
Chapter IFinal Reportorganised in B
- Page 71 and 72:
Chapter IFinal Reportsecond Intifad
- Page 73 and 74: Chapter IFinal Reportstands at 29.7
- Page 75 and 76: Chapter IFinal Reportconstruction w
- Page 77 and 78: Chapter IFinal ReportAs far as the
- Page 79 and 80: Chapter IFinal Reportother cases, l
- Page 81 and 82: Chapter IFinal Reportunemployment a
- Page 83 and 84: Chapter IFinal Reportof Egypt, so f
- Page 85 and 86: Chapter IFinal ReportWhile progress
- Page 87 and 88: Chapter IFinal ReportThese reservat
- Page 89 and 90: Chapter IFinal ReportAs Figure 6.3.
- Page 91 and 92: Chapter IFinal Reportin skill devel
- Page 93 and 94: Chapter IFinal ReportThe Directive
- Page 95 and 96: Chapter IFinal ReportThe need for
- Page 97 and 98: Chapter IFinal Reportobjectives are
- Page 99 and 100: Chapter IFinal Reporttrue Euro-Medi
- Page 101 and 102: Chapter IFinal Report- Putting empl
- Page 103 and 104: Chapter IFinal Report promotion of
- Page 105 and 106: Chapter IFinal ReportOtherADAMS, R.
- Page 107 and 108: Chapter IFinal ReportDE BEL-AIR, F.
- Page 109 and 110: Chapter IFinal ReportGUPTA, S., C.
- Page 111 and 112: Chapter IFinal ReportOECD (2000): M
- Page 113 and 114: Chapter II - Thematic Background Pa
- Page 115 and 116: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 117 and 118: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 119 and 120: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 121 and 122: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 123: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 127 and 128: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 129 and 130: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 131 and 132: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 133 and 134: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 135 and 136: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 137 and 138: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 139 and 140: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 141 and 142: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 143 and 144: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 145 and 146: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 147 and 148: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 149 and 150: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 151 and 152: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 153 and 154: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 155 and 156: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 157 and 158: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 159 and 160: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 161 and 162: Chapter III - Thematic Background P
- Page 163 and 164: Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 165 and 166: Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 167 and 168: Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 169 and 170: Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 171 and 172: Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 173 and 174: Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 175 and 176:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 177 and 178:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 179 and 180:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 181 and 182:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 183 and 184:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 185 and 186:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 187 and 188:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 189 and 190:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 191 and 192:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 193 and 194:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 195 and 196:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 197 and 198:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 199 and 200:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 201 and 202:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 203 and 204:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 205 and 206:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 207:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa