<strong>European</strong> CommissionOccasional Paper 60, Volume IThis process is expected to be complemented by political, economic, social <strong>and</strong> culturalcooperation. The EMAA with Algeria, which was the latest to be signed, 190 also includes a chapteron cooperation in the field of Justice <strong>and</strong> Home Affairs.Upon reading the main objectives pursued by the Association Agreements, 191 it is clear that<strong>migration</strong> or human mobility was not the principal focus of the Partnership at the time the EMAAswere drafted. 192 The EC-Algeria Association Agreement is a noticeable exception in this respectbecause article 1§2 among other objectives includes the “facilitation of human exchanges,particularly in the context of administrative procedures”. Here visa <strong>and</strong> admission procedures aretargeted (see article 83 of the EC/Algeria AA).Notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing these remarks, “The EMP is centred on the Economic <strong>and</strong> Financial Partnership<strong>and</strong> on the expected positive effects of the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Free tradeArea (EMFTA)” (Brach, 2007).Regarding <strong>migration</strong>, the Barcelona Declaration’s implicit rationale, as drawn from the abovequotations, was that migratory pressures should be tackled through job creation <strong>and</strong> development,combating illegal im<strong>migration</strong> <strong>and</strong> protecting the rights of legal immigrants. 193 But no specificpolicy with regard to the <strong>migration</strong> challenge <strong>and</strong> its various dimensions was foreseen. Therationale was to tackle the root causes of <strong>migration</strong> such as unemployment <strong>and</strong> to cooperate in thefield of illegal <strong>migration</strong>. The establishment of schemes for legal <strong>migration</strong> is certainly the missinglink here.Indeed, while the Free Trade Area to be established includes the liberalisation of the movement ofgoods, services <strong>and</strong> capitals, it is important to note that workers, not to say people, were notgranted the same freedom of movement, even as a distant goal. At best, regular social dialogueshall be used to find ways to achieve progress in the field of free movement of workers alongsideequal treatment <strong>and</strong> social integration. This reflects the static position taken by the partnersregarding the liberalisation of labour force circulation at the time of the drafting of the EMAAs. Ithas to be recalled that at the time of the entry into force of the first EMAA, the Schengen ruleswere being implemented by most EU countries <strong>and</strong> admission of third-country nationals foreconomic purposes was officially banned.Nevertheless, to the extent that the EMP will succeed, it is supposed to have an impact onmigratory <strong>flows</strong> in the region, addressing the root causes of <strong>migration</strong> such as economic disparities<strong>and</strong> unemployment (Aubarell, <strong>and</strong> Aragall, 2003). According to this theory, progressivedevelopment <strong>and</strong> economic integration in the Mediterranean region would, in the long run, ensurejob creation <strong>and</strong> increase the quality of life in southern Mediterranean Countries. Meanwhile, in theshort term <strong>and</strong> due to economic adjustments, negative effects such as job loss are expected, whichcould intensify <strong>migration</strong> pressures. 194 Still, with regard to <strong>migration</strong>, no specific measuresaddressing those effects were foreseen.190 April 2002; in entered into force in September 2005.191 See articles 1 of the AA in the Appendix.192 The ones with Tunisia, Morocco <strong>and</strong> Jordan were signed before the so called “communitarisation” of the legal basis related to <strong>migration</strong> by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 <strong>and</strong> thusbefore the Tampere Summit which set the milestones of <strong>European</strong> common policy, including the cooperation with third countries. While the ones with Egypt, Lebanon <strong>and</strong> Algeria weresigned afterwards, it is worth noticing that they all include more extensive provisions in relation to cooperation in the field of illegal <strong>migration</strong>, even for Algeria a full Chapter onCooperation in the field of Justice <strong>and</strong> Home Affairs.193 They acknowledge the importance of the role played by <strong>migration</strong> in their relationships. They agree to strengthen their cooperation to reduce migratory pressures, among other thingsthrough vocational training programmes <strong>and</strong> job creation programmes. They undertake to guarantee protection of all the rights recognised under existing legislation of migrants legallyresident in their respective territories. In the area of illegal im<strong>migration</strong> they decide to establish closer co-operation. In this context, the partners, aware of their responsibility forreadmission, agree to adopt the relevant provisions <strong>and</strong> measures, by means of bilateral agreements or arrangements, in order to readmit their nationals who are in an illegal situation. Tothat end, the Member States of the <strong>European</strong> Union take citizens to mean nationals of the Member States, as defined for Community purposes.194 See the Sustainability Impact Assessment Study of Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Areas carried out by the Institute for Development Policy <strong>and</strong> Management of the University ofManchester.188
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towards Arab Mediterranean Countries <strong>and</strong> its Impact on their <strong>Labour</strong> MarketsThis section will not evaluate the success of the Euro-Med partnership as a co-development project.Suffice it to say that scholarly work has already addressed this aspect. 195 Nevertheless, it should bestressed that a consensus has emerged on the weakness of the democratization process, as well asof the human dimension of the Partnership. More specifically, external political factors haveundermined this process. 196Despite the enlightened <strong>and</strong> ambitious goals of the Barcelona Declaration regarding the building ofbridges across the Mediterranean, no concrete measures regarding mobility of people are providedfor in the EMAAs.3.1.2 The Euro-Med Association agreements (EMAA) <strong>and</strong> MigrationIn this section, we will further explore the EMAA’s content. This will substantiate our statementregarding the absence of dynamic objectives for human mobility in the EMAA, <strong>and</strong> will give us theopportunity to show how each EMAA has a somewhat different approach towards <strong>migration</strong>.Indeed, some provisions of the EMAA concluded with the Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria,Tunisia) reflect the peculiar relations that these countries have with <strong>European</strong> countries with regardto <strong>migration</strong>. The most recently concluded EMAAs, meanwhile, give, as we have alreadymentioned, more emphasis to the need for cooperation in the field of “illegal” <strong>migration</strong> but remainsilent on a comprehensive approach to <strong>migration</strong>.Beyond that, the Euro-Med framework provides for a privileged institutional framework in whichdialogue on <strong>migration</strong> may be conducted at various political levels. This institutional frameworkhas also provided the channels through which the ENP has progressively been implemented since2003.The EMAA dealt with <strong>migration</strong> issues under Chapters dedicated to “cooperation in social <strong>and</strong>cultural matters”. In those chapters, some specific provisions related to <strong>migration</strong> are set out. 197The first important point to make is that, contrary to the expectations raised by the BarcelonaDeclaration regarding the establishment of a full-fledged Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, thefree movement of workers is not enabled by any of the Association Agreements.In the following subsections, we will deal with specific provisions regarding <strong>migration</strong> (a), <strong>and</strong>give an overview of the institutional mechanisms through which the social dialogue regarding<strong>migration</strong> is supposed to take place (b).a) Substantial provisionsCooperation in the field of illegal im<strong>migration</strong> is seen as part of the partnership in only three of theEMAAs: with Algeria, 198 Egypt 199 <strong>and</strong> Lebanon. 200 It is important to note that all those that were195 See i.e. A. MARCHETTI (ed.), “Ten Years Euro-Med Partnership – Defining <strong>European</strong> Interests for the next decade”, ZEI, Discussion Paper, C154, 2005; J. BRACH, “The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: The Role <strong>and</strong> Impact of the Economic <strong>and</strong> Financial Dimension”, <strong>European</strong> Foreign Affairs Review, n°12, pp. 555-579, 2007; G. AUBARELL, G., <strong>and</strong> X.ARAGALL, “Im<strong>migration</strong> <strong>and</strong> the Euro-Mediterranean Area: Keys to Policy <strong>and</strong> Trends, EuroMescoPapers, n°47, September 2005; MARTÍN, I. “In Search of Development Along theSouthern Border. The Economic Models Underlying the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership <strong>and</strong> the <strong>European</strong> Neighborhood Policy”, in Anna Maria Ferragina (ed.), Bridging the Gap: TheRole of Trade <strong>and</strong> FDI in the Mediterranean, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche-Instituto di Studi sulle Società del Mediterraneo, 2009.196 Terrorism <strong>and</strong> the fear that the changing elite would provoke a rise in Islamic political parties, <strong>and</strong> the breakdown of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, L. KUHNHARDT, “10 YearsEuro-Mediterranean Partnership – The Human Dimension Revisited”, ZEI, Discussion Paper, C154, 2005.197 For an exhaustive overview of those provisions, please refer to the tables in the Appendix. Here when we do not refer to one of the EMAAs in particular we make use the EC/TunisiaAssociation Agreement provisions, which was the first to be signed <strong>and</strong> served as a model for the negotiation of the others.198 Title VIII Cooperation in the field of Justice <strong>and</strong> Home Affairs – Cooperation for prevention <strong>and</strong> control of illegal im<strong>migration</strong> article 84.199 See Title VI Cooperation for prevention <strong>and</strong> control of illegal im<strong>migration</strong> (art. 68-70).200 See Title VI Chapter 3 Cooperation for prevention <strong>and</strong> control of illegal im<strong>migration</strong> (art. 68-69).189
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