<strong>European</strong> CommissionOccasional Paper 60, Volume IMENA region would have been higher in a hypothetical scenario without e<strong>migration</strong>, butunemployment rates remain high, <strong>and</strong> this has greatly softened the potential positive impact of<strong>migration</strong> on domestic wages. This suggests that the opportunity cost of the <strong>migration</strong> of universitygraduates is low; the majority of skilled migrants who decided to migrate were unemployed oremployed in the public sector. This also means that skilled <strong>migration</strong> does not create a brain draineffect <strong>and</strong>, probably, that it reduces the public wage bill (World Bank, 2008a). Table 6.1 suggeststhat Egypt has the highest selection rate among AMCs, <strong>and</strong> this can be traced back to the highunemployment rate among educated working age individuals. A comparison between Egypt <strong>and</strong>Morocco shows that there is a positive relationship between education level <strong>and</strong> the chances ofbeing unemployed in Egypt, while a similar relationship does not exist in Morocco (World Bank,2008a). Still, Boudarbat (2004) shows that the unemployment rate of Moroccan universitygraduates was, in 2000, about four times the rate of individuals with less than six years ofschooling. Indeed, Sorenson (2004) reports that the Moroccan government depicted <strong>migration</strong> as asolution to the problem of widespread underemployment <strong>and</strong> unemployment of the domesticworkforce in official documents.Other features of the <strong>migration</strong> process can produce more substantial impacts on the labour force,namely its uneven gender profile <strong>and</strong> the <strong>migration</strong> of workers out of specific sectors. As far asgender is concerned, <strong>migration</strong> can lead to a worsening wage gap – <strong>and</strong> a worsening too of otherlabour <strong>market</strong> outcomes, such as participation <strong>and</strong> unemployment rates – across genders, 89although such an effect – which is due to the uneven impact of <strong>migration</strong> on the endowments ofmale <strong>and</strong> female labour 90 – can be counteracted by the effects that <strong>migration</strong> exerts on the behavioron the labor <strong>market</strong>, possibly reducing female participation (see Section 7.1).Does <strong>migration</strong> create relevant shortages of workers in some sectors in AMCs? World Bank(2008a) argues that <strong>migration</strong> does not create bottlenecks in the domestic <strong>market</strong> of Middle Eastern<strong>and</strong> North African countries. Nevertheless, such a general statement should not lead us to overlookspecific instances of possible shortages. Doquier <strong>and</strong> Rapoport (2009) report data on researchersemployed in the science <strong>and</strong> technology sector in the United States: the number of Tunisiansworking there is 0.17 times the number of researchers working in Tunisia, <strong>and</strong> the correspondingfigure for Algeria is 0.25 times. Khelfaoui (2006), finds that engineers <strong>and</strong> scientists are the mostcommon professional category of Algerians in the United States, though they may not be employedaccording to their qualifications.It is also worthwhile paying a closer look at what happens to health workers. Docquier <strong>and</strong>Bhargawa (2007) collect data from 16 receiving OECD countries, <strong>and</strong> they define the totalphysician e<strong>migration</strong> rate of a country as the ratio between the stock of national physicians workingabroad <strong>and</strong> the number of physicians trained in the home country, thus excluding those trained inthe host country. The figures we present here represent an update of Docquier <strong>and</strong> Bhargawa(2007) presented by Doquier <strong>and</strong> Rapoport (2009), where the authors have added South Africa tothe destination countries.We observe in Table 6.3 that the percentage of physicians abroad – as far as a selected group ofOECD countries is concerned – is very high only for Lebanon <strong>and</strong> Syria. Estimates from the Arab-American Medical Association show that there are 15,000 Arab physicians in the United States,<strong>and</strong> 6,000 of them come from Syria (Kawakibi, 2009). Nevertheless, we have to keep in mind thedata limitations, as Achouri <strong>and</strong> Achour (2002), for example, point out that most Tunisianphysicians who migrate go to Saudi Arabia.89 UNDP (2006) observes that “in Jordan, for example, women university graduates earn 71 per cent of the amount earnedby males in the same cohort; this drops to 50 per cent among those who have completed basic education only, while illiteratewomen earn less than 33 per cent of male wages (Moghadam, 2005)”.90 The existing gender gap in <strong>migration</strong> <strong>flows</strong> out of AMCs could be off set by the steady growth in dem<strong>and</strong> for jobs, such ashousework <strong>and</strong> the care of the elderly, which are usually taken by women in <strong>European</strong> countries (Al Ali, 2004).130
Chapter IIThe impact of <strong>migration</strong> on labour <strong>market</strong>s in Arab Mediterranean countriesTable 6.3 E<strong>migration</strong> rates of physicians trained in their origin countryRate of e<strong>migration</strong>Algeria 7.1Egypt 5.6Jordan 9.9Lebanon 19.6Morocco 6.6Palestine 1.5Syria 17.5Tunisia 4.2Source: Docquier <strong>and</strong> Rapoport (2009)Moreover, if we take into account the physicians born in the AMCs but trained abroad – asClemens <strong>and</strong> Patterson (2006) do – the numbers are more worrisome 91 . Their estimates differdramatically from the previous ones: 44 percent of Algerian physicians, 31 percent of theMoroccans <strong>and</strong> 33 percent of the Tunisians are practicing abroad by these criteria. Regardingnurses, the numbers are lower: respectively 9, 15 <strong>and</strong> 5 percent of them work abroad. 92Notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing these impressive figures, there are some factors that suggest that medical braindrain has so far imposed limited direct costs on the Maghrebian countries. Most foreign-employeddoctors <strong>and</strong> nurses have been trained abroad, <strong>and</strong> their <strong>migration</strong> is more a symptom of theunderlying difficulties of the domestic health-care systems than its cause 93 . Therefore, it would behard for foreign-employed health-care workers to enter their origin country’s labour <strong>market</strong>s underthe current conditions, as a significant increase in the dem<strong>and</strong> for medical personnel seems highlyunlikely. Moreover, it is uncertain whether these doctors <strong>and</strong> nurses would have studied medicineanyway in the absence of a prospect to migrate.The same could be said about the thous<strong>and</strong>s of students from AMCs who acquire their tertiaryeducation abroad. Student <strong>migration</strong> from AMCs is an increasingly common phenomenon. It is aninstrument OECD countries use to select highly-skilled workers, as students tend to beprobationary migrants. About 7 percent of the foreign students in OECD currently come from theArab countries, in particular from Morocco. Table 6.4 shows the number of foreign studentsenrolled in tertiary education by country of origin. According to Dumont (2006), it is difficult forthe origin country to benefit from this kind of <strong>migration</strong>: to do so they should maintain links withthe students <strong>and</strong> offer them incentives to return home to work.91 Not only the country where physicians have been trained, but also the definition of who is a migrant matters: in thecountries of destination, such as France, where there are a lot of second- <strong>and</strong> third-generation migrants, <strong>and</strong> most of themhave double citizenship, it is not easy to determine who is a migrant.92 They count all the doctors <strong>and</strong> nurses employed in the main nine destination countries: the UK, Spain, France, the US,Australia, Canada, Portugal, Belgium <strong>and</strong> South Africa.93 In Morocco, the health-care system suffers from underutilization of services: hospital beds capacity, for example, despitebeing low, has a 56 percent average occupancy rate (WHO, 2006b). Although the WHO claims that more than 200 facilitiesare closed due to a lack of human resources, the main problem appears to be the lack of efficient planning, as they signal thelack of specific categories of specialists. Even the Tunisian health-care system experiences a deficiency in some kind ofspecialists (Achouri <strong>and</strong> Achour, 2002). In Algeria, public services have suffered from the reduction of public funds devotedto the welfare system since the mid 1980s, due to the economic <strong>and</strong> political crisis <strong>and</strong> the ensuing structural adjustment(Chemingui, 2003).131
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