<strong>European</strong> CommissionOccasional Paper 60, Volume IThe causes of under-assimilation are, however, not easy to tackle. Integration policies in the hostcountry such as language courses <strong>and</strong> training courses have had a very limited effect. Probablymore binding programmes have to be envisaged such as linguistic tests for a permanent residencypermit <strong>and</strong> training courses. The selection of migrants will reduce cases of under-assimilation <strong>and</strong>remains one of the few options available in this field. But as under-economic assimilationfrequently means under-social assimilation, the selection of migrants does not insure against socialexclusion, which is affected by income level <strong>and</strong> by the education level of workers.It is important to stress that policies used to reduce the number of under-assimilated foreigners, <strong>and</strong>the incentive return policies for the unemployed have already shown their inefficiency asunemployed migrants do not go back home. If host countries are keen on revising their <strong>migration</strong>policies so as to reduce the number of permanent migrants but not the number of workers, asolution is to combine more temporary <strong>migration</strong> schemes which insure a return on human capitalto the origin country with more efficient integration policies optimising the long-term migrant’sintegration in the host country.After having studied how <strong>and</strong> to what extent highly-skilled <strong>migration</strong>, temporary circular-<strong>migration</strong>schemes, <strong>and</strong> integration policies could empower the promoted Global Approach to Migration in theEuro-Arab Mediterranean Framework, we will now look more closely at the Euro-Mediterraneanframework <strong>and</strong> the <strong>European</strong> Neighborhood Policy, <strong>and</strong> evaluate whether they are adequateinstruments capable of refining the Global Approach to Migration <strong>and</strong> the EU’s external <strong>migration</strong>policy at both bilateral <strong>and</strong> regional levels in the Euro-Arab Mediterranean migratory <strong>and</strong> economicspace.3. The Euro-Mediterranean framework <strong>and</strong> the <strong>European</strong> Neighborhood Policy:Adequate tools for an external <strong>migration</strong> policy?The need for “a comprehensive approach to <strong>migration</strong> addressing political, human rights <strong>and</strong>development issues in countries <strong>and</strong> regions of origin <strong>and</strong> transit” was already stressed in the Tampere<strong>European</strong> Council’s conclusions (1999). Thus, the latter emphasizes that “this requires combatingpoverty, improving living conditions <strong>and</strong> job opportunities, preventing conflicts <strong>and</strong> consolidatingdemocratic states <strong>and</strong> ensuring respect for human rights, in particular rights of minorities, women <strong>and</strong>children”. In many respects, those general objectives, considered as causes of undesirable im<strong>migration</strong>to the EU, match the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’s (EMP) declared aims.However, paradoxically, the consideration of <strong>migration</strong> issues both in the Barcelona Declaration<strong>and</strong> in the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAs) between the EU <strong>and</strong>Mediterranean Partner Countries was quite limited, except in the field of non-discrimination withregard to legally residing migrant workers (see Appendix). Whereas, in the most recent EMAAs,cooperation in the field of illegal <strong>migration</strong> is stressed (this is particularly clear in the EMAA withAlgeria), <strong>migration</strong> remains part of a social dialogue to be held between partners with no particularincentives, <strong>and</strong> not of the economic cooperation. Only in the last few years, after the Summitmarking the first ten years of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (1995-2005), have <strong>migration</strong>issues come to the fore in Euro-Mediterranean co-operation, with a new pillar of cooperation inJustice <strong>and</strong> Home Affairs.The <strong>European</strong> Neighbourhood Policy launched in 2003 raised new expectations in the Euro-Mediterranean context, as a result of which new cooperation methods <strong>and</strong> funds have been made185 It means that the more talented go back <strong>and</strong> the less qualified remain. Migration literature has usually assumed that migrants are positively selected, namely that the best move. Still thisdoes not necessarily mean that the more educated move. For a given level of observable characteristics, the unobservable variables which positively effect the wage equation affectspositively too the probability of leaving. This is the case in Italy <strong>and</strong> Germany (Venturini Villosio 2008, Massey Constance 2003) <strong>and</strong> is one of the explanation of the lower assimilation.186 Even after controlling for language, human capital, years since <strong>migration</strong> <strong>and</strong> the economic cycle a national fixed effect remain which probably leads back to the social capital of themigrants or to a form of discrimination – be that discrimination open or otherwise.186
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towards Arab Mediterranean Countries <strong>and</strong> its Impact on their <strong>Labour</strong> Marketsavailable. In the following section, we will assess to what extent the present conjunction of EMP(as multilateral track) <strong>and</strong> ENP (as a bilateral scheme) incorporates the Global Approach toMigration’s objectives in a more systematic way than in the previous EMP era, <strong>and</strong> could therebypave the way for a more proactive cooperation in the Euro-Arab Mediterranean space.3.1 The Barcelona Process (1995-2005)Launched in 1995, the Barcelona Process provided for an institutional framework for multilateralcooperation between the EU <strong>and</strong> its Mediterranean neighbours with a view to creating a commonspace of “prosperity, stability <strong>and</strong> security”. Through the Barcelona Declaration, partnersproclaimed their commitment to a free-<strong>market</strong> economy <strong>and</strong> to democratic governance around theMediterranean basin. The objective aiming at the establishment of a zone of peace, prosperity <strong>and</strong>stability in the Mediterranean region without any prospect of formal EU membership wasemphasised. In order to meet those far reaching objectives, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnershipwas implemented through a limited number of regional programmes <strong>and</strong> through the AssociationAgreements concluded between the EU <strong>and</strong> each of the Mediterranean Partner Countries involvedin the Barcelona Process (among them, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Palestine Lebanon <strong>and</strong>Jordan). 187 In the Barcelona Declaration establishing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership,<strong>migration</strong> was only mentioned in the chapter on the “Partnership in Social, Cultural <strong>and</strong> HumanAffairs” 188 in the following terms:“They acknowledge the importance of the role played by <strong>migration</strong> in their relationships. Theyagree to strengthen their cooperation to reduce migratory pressures, among other things throughvocational training programmes <strong>and</strong> programmes of assistance for job creation. They undertake toguarantee protection of all the rights recognized under existing legislation of migrants legallyresident in their respective territories.In the area of illegal im<strong>migration</strong> the decide to establish closer cooperation. In this context, thepartners, aware of their responsibility for readmission, agree to adopt the relevant provisions <strong>and</strong>measures, by means of bilateral means or arrangements, in order to readmit their nationals who arein an illegal situation”.3.1.1 The Euro-Med Partnership’s objectivesEach of the Euro-Mediterranean Association agreements concluded in the framework of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership relies on three pillars: political cooperation <strong>and</strong> security, economic <strong>and</strong>financial cooperation, <strong>and</strong> cooperation in the field of human <strong>and</strong> social affairs <strong>and</strong> culture. Accordingto the EMAA’s aims, a free-trade area between partners should be established over a transitionalperiod of twelve years. This economic “negative” 189 integration process would imply free trade inindustrial goods <strong>and</strong> the progressive liberalisation of trade in agricultural products as well as the futureliberalisation of trade <strong>and</strong> services.187 We note that until now no EU-Syria Association Agreement has come into force.188 According to the Barcelona Declaration, the partners agreed to establish a partnership in social, cultural <strong>and</strong> human affairs with a view to bringing peoples closer together, promotingunderst<strong>and</strong>ing between them <strong>and</strong> improving their perception of each other. This partnership is based on the delicate compromise between, on the one h<strong>and</strong>, the existence, recognition <strong>and</strong>mutual respect of diverse traditions, cultures <strong>and</strong> civilisations throughout the Mediterranean <strong>and</strong>, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, the promotion of common roots: to this end, the Barcelona Declaration<strong>and</strong> its work programme emphasise: the importance of intercultural dialogue, <strong>and</strong> of dialogues between religions; the importance of the role the media can play in the reciprocal recognition<strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong>ing of cultures; the development of human resources in the area of culture: cultural exchanges, knowledge of other languages, implementation of educational <strong>and</strong> culturalprograms that respect cultural identities; the importance of health <strong>and</strong> social development <strong>and</strong> respect for fundamental social rights; the essential contribution civil society can make to theEuro-Mediterranean partnership <strong>and</strong> the need to strengthen the instruments of decentralized cooperation to encourage exchanges between those active in development; cooperation in thefield of illegal im<strong>migration</strong>, the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, international crime <strong>and</strong> corruption.189 Negative because it implies removal of trade obstacles.187
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