Labour market performance and migration flows - European ...

European CommissionOccasional Paper 60, Volume IThe causes of under-assimilation are, however, not easy to tackle. Integration policies in the hostcountry such as language courses and training courses have had a very limited effect. Probablymore binding programmes have to be envisaged such as linguistic tests for a permanent residencypermit and training courses. The selection of migrants will reduce cases of under-assimilation andremains one of the few options available in this field. But as under-economic assimilationfrequently means under-social assimilation, the selection of migrants does not insure against socialexclusion, which is affected by income level and by the education level of workers.It is important to stress that policies used to reduce the number of under-assimilated foreigners, andthe incentive return policies for the unemployed have already shown their inefficiency asunemployed migrants do not go back home. If host countries are keen on revising their migrationpolicies so as to reduce the number of permanent migrants but not the number of workers, asolution is to combine more temporary migration schemes which insure a return on human capitalto the origin country with more efficient integration policies optimising the long-term migrant’sintegration in the host country.After having studied how and to what extent highly-skilled migration, temporary circular-migrationschemes, and integration policies could empower the promoted Global Approach to Migration in theEuro-Arab Mediterranean Framework, we will now look more closely at the Euro-Mediterraneanframework and the European Neighborhood Policy, and evaluate whether they are adequateinstruments capable of refining the Global Approach to Migration and the EU’s external migrationpolicy at both bilateral and regional levels in the Euro-Arab Mediterranean migratory and economicspace.3. The Euro-Mediterranean framework and the European Neighborhood Policy:Adequate tools for an external migration policy?The need for “a comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights anddevelopment issues in countries and regions of origin and transit” was already stressed in the TampereEuropean Council’s conclusions (1999). Thus, the latter emphasizes that “this requires combatingpoverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts and consolidatingdemocratic states and ensuring respect for human rights, in particular rights of minorities, women andchildren”. In many respects, those general objectives, considered as causes of undesirable immigrationto the EU, match the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’s (EMP) declared aims.However, paradoxically, the consideration of migration issues both in the Barcelona Declarationand in the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAs) between the EU andMediterranean Partner Countries was quite limited, except in the field of non-discrimination withregard to legally residing migrant workers (see Appendix). Whereas, in the most recent EMAAs,cooperation in the field of illegal migration is stressed (this is particularly clear in the EMAA withAlgeria), migration remains part of a social dialogue to be held between partners with no particularincentives, and not of the economic cooperation. Only in the last few years, after the Summitmarking the first ten years of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (1995-2005), have migrationissues come to the fore in Euro-Mediterranean co-operation, with a new pillar of cooperation inJustice and Home Affairs.The European Neighbourhood Policy launched in 2003 raised new expectations in the Euro-Mediterranean context, as a result of which new cooperation methods and funds have been made185 It means that the more talented go back and the less qualified remain. Migration literature has usually assumed that migrants are positively selected, namely that the best move. Still thisdoes not necessarily mean that the more educated move. For a given level of observable characteristics, the unobservable variables which positively effect the wage equation affectspositively too the probability of leaving. This is the case in Italy and Germany (Venturini Villosio 2008, Massey Constance 2003) and is one of the explanation of the lower assimilation.186 Even after controlling for language, human capital, years since migration and the economic cycle a national fixed effect remain which probably leads back to the social capital of themigrants or to a form of discrimination – be that discrimination open or otherwise.186