<strong>European</strong> CommissionOccasional Paper 60, Volume Iaverage age of return migrants is between 30 <strong>and</strong> 44 years (Fourati, 2008). Finally, ELMPS (2006)data shows that 35 percent of returnees in Egypt are less than 40 years old, <strong>and</strong> 35 percent arebetween 40 <strong>and</strong> 50 years old.8.3 Remittances <strong>and</strong> consumption patternsAs we argued in section 2.1, the stimulus that <strong>migration</strong> – via remittances – brings to private dem<strong>and</strong>produces substantial effects on the labour <strong>market</strong> only inasmuch as it is directed towards domesticallyproduced goods <strong>and</strong> services. Regrettably, as Gallina (2006b) observes, there is limited information onthe pattern of remittance used in AMCs countries. Some information – albeit coming from a surveywith a limited coverage – are provided by EIB (2006), which analyzed the distribution of remittancesacross alternative budget items in all AMCs but Palestine. Table 8.1 reports the main findings fromthis survey, which demonstrates that everyday expenses absorb most of the income arising fromremittances, while limited resources are devoted to investments. Schramm (2009) provides evidence –for Tunisia, Morocco <strong>and</strong> Egypt – that suggests that basic consumption needs (food, heat <strong>and</strong>clothing), absorb most remittances.DailyexpensesPaymentof schoolfeesTable 8.1. Use of remittances in AMCsBuildinga houseSettingup acompanyInvestmentsOtherNumber ofintervieweesAlgeria 45 13 23 3 5 11 64Egypt 43 12 18 - 15 12 31Jordan 74 16 4 - 6 - 40Lebanon 56 24 5 5 5 5 41Morocco 46 31 16 - 5 2 40Tunisia - 23 34 2 16 25 40Syria 61 11 8 - - 20 49Source: EIB (2006)Still, the argument that most recipient households report that daily consumption needs absorb thegreatest share of their remittance incomes does not suffice to dismiss the concern that remittancesmay fuel the dem<strong>and</strong> for imported products. 109 An interesting – although admittedly extreme – caseis represented by Algeria, where most of the remittances are transferred in kind rather than in cash,as migrants distrust the local financial system. Khachani (2004) argued that the value of goodsimported by Algerian migrants who temporarily returned home on holidays was estimated at $2.5billion per year; needless to say, such a huge amount of resources fails to generate any job-creationeffect, as they cannot be directly used for productive investments, being mostly in the form ofconsumption goods. By the same token, Nassar (2005) argues that Egyptian recipient householdsdevote a sizeable part of remittances to accumulating hoards of valuable items, such as gold <strong>and</strong>precious stones, <strong>and</strong> this dampens the ensuing stimulus on the dem<strong>and</strong> for workers. 110Real estate can also represent a sizeable store of value for recipient households: Fletcher (1999)demonstrates that in Tunisia e<strong>migration</strong> areas have experienced a remittance-induced sharp raise in109 Note that respondents to these kinds of surveys always report that remittances are earmarked for basic consumptionexpenditures, although this does not suffice to rule out – given the inherent fungibility of incomes – the possibility that theyactually lead to a significant reshaping of expenditure patterns.110 Note that such behaviour can be linked to the temporary character of remittance incomes, <strong>and</strong> to the probability that sucha flow might come to an unexpected end, because of the major fluctuations in the dem<strong>and</strong> for immigrant workers in the Gulfcountries.140
Chapter IIThe impact of <strong>migration</strong> on labour <strong>market</strong>s in Arab Mediterranean countriesreal-estate prices, something that Vermeren (2001), quoted in Gallina (2006b), finds for the migrantsendingtown of Nador in the North of Morocco, where the l<strong>and</strong> prices increased more than in thesurrounding areas. Labaki (2006) shows that a large part of the remittances sent to Lebanon in the1980s was used for real-estate investments, buying l<strong>and</strong> or houses. Nyberg-Sørensen (2005) observesa boom in the construction sector in the Rif region in Morocco, where 71 percent of migranthouseholds buy l<strong>and</strong>, or a house or repair old houses. Clearly, professions <strong>and</strong> wages related to theconstruction sectors benefited from this boom. According to de Haas (2007), the investments thatmigrant households make in real estate have several positive consequences in Morocco, whereconstruction is one of the pillars of the economy <strong>and</strong> there is a persistent scarcity in the urban housing<strong>market</strong> 111 .De Haas (2007), although admitting that the information available on the use of remittances inMorocco is limited, tries to formulate a hypothesis based on his detailed literature review 112 .According to the author, the uses for remittances change across the life cycle: at the beginning ofthe <strong>migration</strong> experience, migrants <strong>and</strong> their households spend for their basic necessities <strong>and</strong> forthe housing (real investments have a peak 5-14 years after leaving); then they start to makeinvestments in the agricultural sector; 25 years from the beginning of the <strong>migration</strong> experience,they use the savings to invest in a non-farming business. If this theory is right, we would expectthat the older the migrant, the more likely he will be to invest in an economic activity (see section9.1 for the links between remittances <strong>and</strong> investments).The possibility that the dem<strong>and</strong> stimulus brought about by remittances to AMCs could leak out toimports is strengthened by the limited industrial base of these countries, which went through a longperiod of import substitution industrialization. According to the World Bank (2008b), the share ofthe manufacturing sector in the GDP of AMCs ranges from 11.4 percent in Lebanon to 19.2 percentin Jordan, so that – especially as far as consumer durables are concerned – the dem<strong>and</strong> is likely tobe directed towards imported goods. Such an effect is strengthened once remittances lead toinflationary pressures, <strong>and</strong> to the ensuing appreciation of the exchange rate which makes foreigngoods cheaper. This suggests that there might be a vicious circle operating here: <strong>migration</strong> isinduced by the limited capacity of domestic labour <strong>market</strong> to absorb the domestic supply of labour,which is connected to the small size of the domestic industrial base, which in turn prevents thedem<strong>and</strong> stimulus brought about by migrants’ remittances from being directed to domesticallyproduced goods, <strong>and</strong> thus lead to a sizeable job-creation effect.In Palestine, as Hilal (2007) observes, “the daily work of commuting in <strong>and</strong> out of Israel <strong>and</strong> itssettlements by a large percentage of the Palestinian labour force created <strong>and</strong> maintained a sizeableworking class, but without creating its own bourgeoisie or business class”. A middle-class patternof consumption has been created but without any accompanying impact on the Palestinianeconomy, which remained dependent on imported Israeli commodities. Palestinian workers,especially the ones living in the villages <strong>and</strong> in the camps, benefited from the jobs offered in Israel,but Palestinian industry, agriculture <strong>and</strong> basic infrastructure has been marginalized due to thisdependence.111 De Haas (2003) finds that 71.1 percent of migrant’s remittances are used in the real estate sector, 11.3 percent in theagricultural sector <strong>and</strong> 17.5 percent in non-agricultural enterprises. Kachani (2005) observes that in the INSEA survey onMoroccans living abroad, published in 2000, investments in real estate undertaken by migrants in the home countriesamounts to 83.7 percent of all investments, while 7.5 percent is devoted to agriculture <strong>and</strong> 4.9 to the retail trade sector.Fadloullah et al. (2000) observe that the investments in the real estate have been so numerous that several villages have beentransformed into towns.112 In this paper the author tries to review all the literature that is not translated into English <strong>and</strong> that is not in the academicdebate. This effort is extremely important <strong>and</strong> it permits us to have more information on the impact of <strong>migration</strong> on Moroccoabove all. Among his main references: Khachani (1998, 2002), Hamdouch (2000), de Haas (1998, 2001, 2003), Fadloullah etal (2000), Dhorte et al (2000), Bonnet <strong>and</strong> Bossard (1973), Bencherifa (1991, 1993), Popp (1999), Bencherifa <strong>and</strong> Popp(1990, 2000), Berriane (1996, 1997), <strong>and</strong> Refass (1999).141
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