<strong>European</strong> CommissionOccasional Paper 60, Volume IBut this traditional view of <strong>migration</strong> as a net loss of human capital <strong>and</strong> skills has recently beenqualified by factoring in the positive incentives it creates for increasing education investment on thepart of families in the countries of origin <strong>and</strong> accounting for the net increase of skills this investmentbrings about. In AMCs, given that returns on education are comparatively low in the region,<strong>migration</strong>, under the right circumstances, could offer a means of increasing those returns. Stark et al.(1997) argue that “higher prospective returns to skills in a foreign country impinge on skill acquisitiondecisions at home”, <strong>and</strong> this positively influences the sending country as only a fraction of the wouldbemigrants who increased their private investments in education in response to the prospect tomigrate succeed in turning that prospect into reality. In our region, this is most obvious in Lebanon,but also in other AMCs.Still, some recent theoretical <strong>and</strong> empirical contributions have introduced relevant caveats againstthe endorsement of excessive optimism here. The expected income-schooling profile at destination,which drives the educational decision of would-be migrants, can be reduced by relevant distortionfactors. Immigrants tend to be overqualified for the job positions they take (Mattoo et al., 2008), <strong>and</strong>are overrepresented in manual occupations. Mattoo et al. (2008) includes Egypt in their analysis ofbrain waste in the US labour <strong>market</strong>; they show that workers from the MENA region have a higherprobability of obtaining a qualified job if they hold a professional degree; however the probability ofobtaining a qualified job with a master degree is only 49 per cent for an Egyptian migrant, comparedto 80 per cent for an Indian.This notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing, the static negative effect due to the drain of the “best <strong>and</strong> the brightest” isunlikely to be offset by a substantial positive dynamic contribution to human capital formation.Migration can also have a relevant influence on the endowment of specific kinds of labour, such ashealth-care workers or doctors <strong>and</strong> engineers. This is the most frequent concern regarding the possibleadverse effects of <strong>migration</strong> upon countries of origin (an argument often mentioned for Tunisia <strong>and</strong>Morocco, for instance in the National Background Papers).This need not represent an actual concern for the migrant-sending countries if the domesticeconomy is unable to productively employ skilled workers; then their <strong>migration</strong> would not represent aworrying brain drain, but it would rather be the consequence of a substantial mismatch between thehigher education system <strong>and</strong> the domestic labour <strong>market</strong>. The <strong>migration</strong> of skilled workers would thusalleviate the pressure on the labour <strong>market</strong> rather than represent a hindering factor for economicdevelopment. Indeed, in many AMCs the existence of large stocks of unemployed, underemployed or(in the case of women) inactive graduates would warrant the argument that those countries do not losepart of their human capital through <strong>migration</strong>, but rather valorise it <strong>and</strong> prevent its deterioration.Another important channel leading to loss of skilled workers or brain drain from developing countriesis through student <strong>migration</strong>. Many foreign students carry on living in the country where they moved toacquire higher education, <strong>and</strong> although the education costs fall on their families <strong>and</strong>/or the hostingcountries, the positive selection of these students entail a loss of human capital for the country of origin.In the case of AMCs, empirical evidence points to the need for a differentiated country-by-countryanalysis: in fact, some countries seem to suffer one kind or another of brain drain (in terms even ofshortage of qualified labour in certain sectors induced by <strong>migration</strong>), whereas others do not, or couldeven be experiencing a “brain gain” through the increased investment in education stimulated by theprospects of <strong>migration</strong> <strong>and</strong> the positive impact on skill availability among returning migrants. Wahba(2007) has demonstrated that <strong>migration</strong> ends up producing a certain degree of brain drain in Morocco,Tunisia <strong>and</strong> probably Lebanon, but not so in other countries of the region where there is a huge supplyof skilled labour.In percentage terms, Lebanon is the AMC where the loss of skilled workers is most evident: migrantsconstitute almost a third of Lebanon’s labour force, half of them skilled professionals. Data from the2001 USJ survey (the most recent available) shows that the e<strong>migration</strong> rate among the tertiary educated70
Chapter IFinal Reportst<strong>and</strong>s at 29.7% (based on data from OECD countries, the rate of <strong>migration</strong> for the high skilled st<strong>and</strong>s at38.6%, according to data of Docquier <strong>and</strong> Marfouk 2005 – see Table 5.2.1). Almost 22% of universitygraduates migrate each year, <strong>and</strong> 50% of current university students wish to leave.However, the rates of migrant selectivity among AMCs are highest in Egypt <strong>and</strong> Jordan, where theshare of graduate migrants exceeds 50% (but due to the large stock no brain drain seems to beunderway). In any case the region has seen the <strong>migration</strong> of 9% of their university graduates onaverage, almost double as much as the 5% world average. In the case of Algeria, for instance,estimates range from between 9.4% <strong>and</strong> 18% of all national graduates, in Morocco between 17% <strong>and</strong>19.5% <strong>and</strong> for Tunisia between 12.5% <strong>and</strong> 21.5%, a very high level. In Egypt, by contrast, it st<strong>and</strong>s atfewer than 5% (World Bank 2009a, p. 96). Figures in Table 5.2.1 are roughly equivalent to the morerecent data provided for North Africa <strong>and</strong> Near <strong>and</strong> Middle East Countries in Table 6.3.1.1, referredexclusively to migrant workers in the EU. In any case, the figures in Table 5.2.1 should be taken as aminimum estimation of graduate <strong>migration</strong> in AMCs, since they exclude <strong>migration</strong> to Gulf States.Table 5.2.1. Rates of e<strong>migration</strong> <strong>and</strong> selection rates of migrants from AMCs, 1990-2000Rate of e<strong>migration</strong> (%)by skillsSelection rate (%)by skillsLow Medium High Total Low Medium High TotalAlgeria 4.6 2.1 9.4 4.5 76.7 9.2 14.1 100.0Egypt 0.2 0.8 4.6 0.9 18.3 22.9 58.9 100.0Jordan 1.0 2.4 7.2 2.8 16.4 28.0 55.6 100.0Lebanon 9.4 11.1 38.6 15.0 30.4 25.1 44.5 100.0Morocco 6.8 8.1 17.0 7.6 70.6 16.5 12.9 100.0Palestine 1.0 2.5 7.2 2.9 15.8 29.1 55.0 100.0Syria 0.9 2.3 6.1 1.9 31.0 24.7 44.3 100.0Tunisia 5.1 3.8 12.5 5.4 73.0 12.1 14.9 100.0Source: Docquier <strong>and</strong> Marfouk (2005). Based on OECD countries of destination statistics.In any case, what is clear is that the loss caused by <strong>migration</strong> of qualified workers is not only adirect cost, i.e. the cost of losing the production of those workers in the best jobs available for them inthe county (that cost tends to be zero when graduate unemployment is very high, as it is the case inAMCs). There is also the opportunity cost of losing the returns on the investment in education made inthose qualified workers, often with a substantial investment of public resources (public expenditure oneducation averages more than 5% in AMCs, a very substantial part of it on university education).To what extent this loss of human capital <strong>and</strong> public education investment is compensated throughthe increase in private educational investment induced by the prospects to migrate in AMCs is unclear.While there is limited direct evidence with respect to the impact of the prospect to migrate on humancapital formation in AMCs, some indirect evidence can be gained by observing the pattern of <strong>migration</strong>by skill levels reflected in Table 5.2.1. The theoretical arguments outlined above reveal that a necessarycondition for the occurrence of a beneficial brain drain is represented by an increase in the expectedreturn to education once <strong>migration</strong> prospects open up, <strong>and</strong> this entails that better educated individualshave either a higher incentive to migrate because of the prevailing wage distribution at destination, or abetter ability to do so, because of skill-selective im<strong>migration</strong> policies. Still, what we observe in Table5.2.1 need not be driven by a higher incentive or better ability to migrate for better educatedindividuals, as the skill premium in wage distribution tends to fall with higher levels of income. Thepossibility that the e<strong>migration</strong> rates across educational groups reported in Table 5.2.1 are influenced bythe adoption of skill-selective im<strong>migration</strong> policies seems unreliable as well, as migrants to OECD71
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