<strong>European</strong> CommissionOccasional Paper 60, Volume ITable 6.4 Number of students from AMCs enrolled in tertiary educationin 2003 in 26 OECD countriesRate of e<strong>migration</strong>Algeria 2,028Egypt 5,875Jordan 5,261Lebanon 9,318Morocco 53,631Palestine 929Syria 4,908Tunisia 12,259Source: Dumont (2006)6.2 Prospect to migrate <strong>and</strong> labour forceWhile there is limited direct evidence with respect to the impact of the prospect to migrate on humancapital formation in AMCs, some indirect evidence can be gained by observing the pattern of<strong>migration</strong> by skill levels. The theoretical arguments depicted in section 1.2. reveal that a necessarycondition for the occurrence of a beneficial brain drain is represented by an increase in the expectedreturn to education once <strong>migration</strong> prospects open up, <strong>and</strong> this means that better-educated individualshave either a higher incentive to migrate because of prevailing wage distribution at destination, or abetter ability to do so, because of skill-selective im<strong>migration</strong> policies. Table 6.1 provided a firstsnapshot of e<strong>migration</strong>, broken down by skill levels, out of AMCs in the year 2000. This adverse staticeffect could be offset by the contribution that the prospect to migrate provides by way of humancapital formation in these countries. 94Still, what we observe in Table 6.1 need not be driven by a higher incentive or better ability tomigrate – because of the pattern of out-selection determined by im<strong>migration</strong> policies – for bettereducated individuals, as the skill premium in wage distribution tends to fall with higher levels ofincome (see Figure 1.1). Mattoo et al. (2008) provide evidence of so-called brain waste in the USlabour <strong>market</strong> from a survey which also provides data on Egyptian immigrants. 95 The possibilitythat the e<strong>migration</strong> rates across educational groups reported in Table 6.1 are influenced by theadoption of skill-selective im<strong>migration</strong> policies seems uncertain as well, as migrants to OECDcountries from the Maghreb countries – such as Morocco <strong>and</strong> Tunisia – tend to move to Europe(see figures from Ratha <strong>and</strong> Shaw, 2007). Although things may change with the eventualintroduction of the <strong>European</strong> Blue Card, EU member countries have not so far been the most activecontenders in the global contest to attract “the best <strong>and</strong> the brightest”, where traditionalim<strong>migration</strong> countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zeal<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> – to a lesser extent – the UnitedStates have prevailed, with the adoption of tight skill-selective im<strong>migration</strong> policies. Migration toEurope occurs mostly through family reunification provisions or through irregular routes, which donot induce a skill-selective pattern of <strong>migration</strong>. Clearly, this need not apply to the countries of theMashreq – such as Egypt <strong>and</strong> Lebanon – whose migrants tend to move predominantly towards theGulf countries <strong>and</strong> the United States, as these countries are characterized by higher wage dispersion94 Fargues (2008b) states that migrants from AMCs “may also have an increasing propensity to invest in their own education<strong>and</strong> to accumulate human capital in addition to financial capital”.95 Mattoo et al. (2008) shows that workers from the MENA region are more likely to obtain a qualified job if they hold aprofessional degree; the probability of obtaining a qualified job with a master degree is only 49 percent for an Egyptianmigrant, compared to 80 percent for an Indian.132
Chapter IIThe impact of <strong>migration</strong> on labour <strong>market</strong>s in Arab Mediterranean countriesacross skill levels than as the case with most OECD member countries. Egyptian <strong>and</strong> Lebanesewould-be migrants can be induced to invest more in higher education by the prospect to migrate,<strong>and</strong> also to adjust the profile of their education to better match labour dem<strong>and</strong> in the countries ofdestination. 96Nassar (2005) observes that half of Egyptian temporary migrants reside in Saudi Arabia, whileLibya, Jordan, Kuwait <strong>and</strong> Iraq host the rest of the temporary migrant population, which, accordingto OIM (2003), represents the prevailing pattern of Egyptian <strong>migration</strong>. 97 Temporary migrants are,on average, better educated than those who remain in the home country, <strong>and</strong> the composition of the<strong>migration</strong> <strong>flows</strong> has changed producing a larger share of scientists <strong>and</strong> technicians since 1985, whocurrently represent about 40 percent of the total. For instance, 69.1 percent of Egyptian migrants toYemen are technicians or scientists, while the corresponding figure for the main destination, e.g.Saudi Arabia, st<strong>and</strong>s at 40.5 percent (Nassar, 2005). As Section 5 demonstrated, the temporarycharacter of <strong>migration</strong> from AMCs to the Gulf is due to the fact that destination countries do notgrant citizenship to immigrants, whose length of stay at destination can actually be long enough tosupport the argument that individual educational decisions in the home country are sensitive to theprospect to migrate.As far as Jordan is concerned, Chatelard (2004) observes that there is still much dem<strong>and</strong> for highlyskilledworkers in the Gulf, while adequate employment prospects at home are limited for younggraduates, as De Bel Air (2008) argues. This means that we can safely assume that <strong>migration</strong> is away to improve on these low expectations, <strong>and</strong> to drive up educational investments, which willotherwise be wasted because of the domestic labour <strong>market</strong> conditions. A similar argument can beadvanced too in the case of Lebanon: the number of young, qualified individuals who wish to get aforeign job has increased, as – after the 2006 war with Israel – “insecurity pushes towards the braindrain” (Hourani <strong>and</strong> Sensening-Dabbous, 2007), <strong>and</strong> 35 percent of managerial positions ininternational enterprises located in the Gulf countries are taken up by Lebanese workers(Kasparian, 2008). 98These arguments suggest that the common pattern of e<strong>migration</strong> rates across educational groupsthat we observe for AMCs could be driven by different factors: while for Mashreq countries thehigher e<strong>migration</strong> rate for higher-educated individuals may suggest that the conditions for abeneficial brain drain 99 are in place, this is not the case for the Maghreb countries, where thepattern observed in Table 6.1 is likely to be due to the correlation between education <strong>and</strong> income.Individuals with a better level of education self-select themselves as migrants because they arebetter able to afford <strong>migration</strong> costs, but this does not lead to any beneficial brain drain dynamics.Still, even as far as Mashreq countries are concerned, we need to remind ourselves that theinfluence of the prospect to migrate on human-capital formation at home is directly related to thelength of individual <strong>migration</strong> episodes.96 The Egyptian university system has undergone some changes which partly reflect its reaction to the foreign dem<strong>and</strong> fordomestic workers; specifically, to avoid the occurrence of substantial leakages of fiscal resources to the countries ofdestination, it has progressively, albeit indirectly, increased cost-sharing in higher education, though tuition fees still remain apolitical taboo (Vossensteyn, 2004).97 Although im<strong>migration</strong>-based statistics seem to suggest that OECD countries represent the largest cause of brain drain forEgypt (see Table 6.1 <strong>and</strong> 6.2), it is actually the Gulf countries <strong>and</strong> Libya which absorb most Egyptian skilled migrants, asIOM (2003) – quoted in Nassar (2005) – points out.98 A different argument applies to Syrian migrants: the majority of temporary migrants to the Gulf are young professionals(health professionals, engineers, <strong>and</strong> other qualified workers) who plan to stay for at least five years because this is the timethey need to be able to be entitled not to serve in the military, in exchange for a monetary payment out of the savings theyaccumulated abroad (Kawakibi, 2008).99 Note that this term refers simply to an increase in the human-capital endowment of the migrant-sending country as a resultof the prospect to migrate, but it does not per se mean that this is welfare-improving for the country, as discussed in section3.2.133
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