Labour market performance and migration flows - European ...

European CommissionOccasional Paper 60, Volume I REAL WAGES are at a very low level in comparison to the EU and the trend in mostAMCs is for further divergence from EU rates….Real wages in AMCs stand on average at less than 1/6 of EU net wages (in purchasing powerparity). In the last few years, instead of converging towards EU levels, in Morocco, Algeria(where a negative average yearly decrease of PPP wages at -1.7% in 1996-2006 wasregistered, in contrast with the 3% annual increase in the EU-15), Tunisia, Syria and Jordanthere has been a slight divergence of wage levels in relation to those of the EU. As forminimum wages, they are often too low to maintain a typical family and too high to ensure theinternational competitiveness of national industry. …and the low PRODUCTIVITY prevailing in AMCs makes it very difficult to improveeconomic prospects for the coming yearsIn a context of trade liberalization (and hence the imperative of competitiveness) and relativemacroeconomic discipline, the convergence of wages depends, to a large extent, onproductivity increases. But this is a very difficult path for countries suffering from inefficienteducation systems and a widespread informal economy, as the stagnation of aggregateproductivity in AMCs over the last few years demonstrate. The current development modeldoes not seem to guarantee the level of job creation required by demographic trends in AMCs.MIGRATION AND LABOUR MARKETS AMCS HAVE A LONG TRADITION OF LABOUR MIGRATION, AND A LARGEMIGRATION POTENTIALThere are more than 10 million AMC citizens resident in third countries (see Table 4.2.1).This amounts to more than 8% of their working age population, with higher average levels oflabour participation, employment and qualifications than those prevailing in the nationallabour markets. This is a very substantial share of the AMC labour force, both in quantitativeand qualitative terms, even if in Mashreq countries, in contrast to Maghreb countries, womenhave largely abstained from migrating so far.If this migration ratio is maintained through sustained migration, the growth of working agepopulation in AMCs would translate into an increased yearly migration flow of 200,000persons between 2010 and 2020 (i.e., 2 million more new AMC migrants over the period; seeFigure 1.1.1). But there is strong evidence for increasing migration rates across AMCs in thelast decade (23% in Tunisia, close to 100% in Lebanon), so that this flow could easily triple to6 million more new migrants over the next ten years if migration rates reach, in a way that isconsistent with recent evidence, a level of 24%. These figures could be easily multiplied ifcurrent restraints on the labour participation – and migration – of women were eased. This makes economic development of AMCs PARTICULARLY DEPENDENT ONREMITTANCESAs a consequence, several AMCs are heavily dependent on remittances: Lebanon (22.8% ofGDP) and Jordan (20.3%) are the AMCs where money transfers from migrant workersrepresent the highest share in their economies; in absolute terms, Egypt, Morocco andLebanon are amongst the top 20 remittance recipient countries in the world. This has, ofcourse, major macro-economic consequences, but also affects the behaviour of people in thelabour market, particularly in regard to education and labour participation: it may increaseeducation investment given the prospects for migration and the skill premium abroad (thereis evidence of this in countries like Lebanon); and reduce incentives to work (although thelow participation rate of women seem to have mainly cultural as opposed to economic16