<strong>European</strong> CommissionOccasional Paper 60, Volume I4. Outward <strong>Labour</strong> Migration in Arab Mediterranean Countries<strong>Labour</strong> <strong>migration</strong> has been an important source of employment in all Arab Mediterranean Countries overthe last four decades. Neither their societies, nor their economies, including their labour <strong>market</strong>s, can beunderstood without considering the impact of outward <strong>migration</strong>. There are more than 10 million AMCscitizens living in third countries (see Table 4.2.1, where the number of Jordanian <strong>and</strong> Syrian emigrants islargely underestimated, <strong>and</strong> Palestine has not been considered). This amounts to more than 8% of theirworking age population, with higher average levels of labour participation, employment <strong>and</strong>qualifications than those prevailing in the national labour <strong>market</strong>s.4.1 Outward <strong>Labour</strong> Migration in AMCs: Literature ReviewInterest in <strong>migration</strong> <strong>flows</strong> in Arab Mediterranean, Southern <strong>and</strong> Eastern Mediterranean or MENAcountries has grown considerably in the last few years. A series of specialized research centres have evenemerged, such as CARIM (Consortium for Applied Research in International Migration). So far theliterature has to a large extent focused on demographic aspects <strong>and</strong> <strong>migration</strong> <strong>flows</strong> (for a thoroughreview of literature on this topic, see Schramm 2006). For a comprehensive analysis of <strong>migration</strong> <strong>flows</strong>(outward, inward <strong>and</strong> transit <strong>migration</strong>) in 10 Southern <strong>and</strong> Eastern Mediterranean Countries (ArabMediterranean Countries object of the present Study plus Israel <strong>and</strong> Turkey), with detailed studies on thedemographic <strong>and</strong> economic, the legal <strong>and</strong> the social <strong>and</strong> political dimensions of <strong>migration</strong> in eachcountry, see the Mediterranean Migration 2006-2007 <strong>and</strong> 2008-2009 Reports (Fargues 2007 <strong>and</strong> 2009).CARIM has also published more than 200 papers on issues of relevance in this field, in particularcircular <strong>migration</strong> <strong>and</strong> irregular <strong>migration</strong>. In the last few years, inward labour <strong>migration</strong> to AMCs <strong>and</strong>inter-Arab <strong>migration</strong> have been subjects of growing interest as well.In the traditional approach to labour <strong>migration</strong>, wages <strong>and</strong> per capita national income, or moreprecisely their differentials, are considered as strong <strong>migration</strong> drivers. Since evidence from AMCsseems to confirm the value of this theory, it is worth quickly reviewing it. If young i is assumed toface a wage w 0 in his or her country of origin <strong>and</strong> a wage w 1 if he or she migrates (wage indestination country) <strong>and</strong> if C is the cost of international mobility – which can be assumed to befixed, proportional to wage or decreasing as the level of education increases – the <strong>migration</strong> ratewill equal the probability ofbeing positive (Chiquiar et Hanson 2002). So the<strong>migration</strong> rate is negatively correlated to average income in the country of origin <strong>and</strong> to thefinancial, human <strong>and</strong> social cost of mobility <strong>and</strong> positively correlated to average income in the hostcountry. In this way, the analysis of the development of income in AMCs (minimum wage, averagewage or per capita national income) <strong>and</strong> its comparison with that of the potential countries ofdestination (the EU eventually) provides information, in the first place, on the <strong>performance</strong> oflabour <strong>market</strong>s in AMCs, as well as on the factors determining the <strong>migration</strong> choice.However, the relation between income levels <strong>and</strong> <strong>migration</strong> <strong>flows</strong> is likely to be non linear, so thatfor a relatively poor sending country an increase in income will have a positive impact on thepropensity to migrate, even controlling for the income differential with the receiving country, but if thehome country is relatively better off, an increase in income may be associated with a fall in thepropensity to migrate (see Faini <strong>and</strong> Venturini 2008). Quite clearly, most AMCs have left behind thepoverty threshold where the financial constraint to <strong>migration</strong> does operate, but have not yet reached thehome bias threshold. This, combined with the increasing wage differential (see Section 2.3), leads to anincrease of <strong>migration</strong> pressures. Interestingly, beyond general surveys on the reasons for <strong>migration</strong> (seeSection 5.1) there is no systematic research on wages of AMC migrants to developed countries.56
Chapter IFinal ReportFrom a different perspective, centred on demographic prospects <strong>and</strong> skills profiles, a recentreport of the World Bank (2009, pp. 57-61) links increasing <strong>European</strong> dem<strong>and</strong> for migrant labourover the next two decades, the education <strong>and</strong> labour force participation of women in the Middle East<strong>and</strong> North Africa. It argues that MENA countries are currently not well placed to meet increaseddem<strong>and</strong> for labour in the <strong>European</strong> Union. Whether assuming zero <strong>migration</strong> or a persistence ofcurrent <strong>migration</strong> rates the dem<strong>and</strong> for replacement labour in the <strong>European</strong> countries is projected topeak in the 2020s. But it will predominantly concern medium-skilled workers who have completed asecondary education. Currently, however, workers from e<strong>migration</strong> countries in the MENA Regionprovide a poor match in relation to Europe’s needs, as the 15-39 labour force will mainly exp<strong>and</strong>among those who have completed their primary education. If education rates <strong>and</strong> labour forceparticipation rates stay unchanged, the skill mismatch will become significant. This mismatch willbe most apparent in the 2020s, when Europe’s potential dem<strong>and</strong> for secondary-educated migrants ofroughly 10 million will coexist with a projected potential supply of labour migrant with secondaryeducation of only 0.5 million in MENA. If MENA’s e<strong>migration</strong> countries make efforts to increaselabour force participation <strong>and</strong> education rates significantly, the scope for arbitrage would be muchhigher. Assuming, as in the scenarios developed for the report, that labour force participation rates<strong>and</strong> education rates can converge over time to the levels of southern <strong>European</strong> countries, the matchbetween MENA <strong>and</strong> the <strong>European</strong> Union would improve considerably (as the Figure 4.1.1 clearlyshows). Between 2005 <strong>and</strong> 2050, the MENA e<strong>migration</strong> countries would produce a net increase of20 million people with secondary education <strong>and</strong> 10 million people with tertiary education. Thisscenario’s outcome will depend partly on the success of MENA countries in improving participationrates for women. In Section 6.3 we take a different approach, based on Venturini, Fakhoury <strong>and</strong>Jouant 2009, to conclude that a matching opportunity does indeed exist.Figure 4.1.1. Skill Mismatch With <strong>and</strong> Without Policy Reform in MENA CountriesSource: World Bank (2009)What is clear is that the sheer size of employment creation in the AMCs implies that <strong>migration</strong>cannot provide a solution to the AMC unemployment problem. The aforementioned World Bankreport (World Bank 2009a) is very clear in this respect: “Migration is not a panacea for sluggish jobcreation in MENA countries or for an aging <strong>European</strong> population, but it could form part of the policyapproach to address these challenges”. However, many of the policy actions <strong>and</strong> institutional reformsrequired to become more competitive in the global labour supply <strong>market</strong> – specially enhanced57
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