<strong>European</strong> CommissionOccasional Paper 60, Volume Iactivity in Egypt (Assad et al., 2007), thus reducing the probability that this child is fruitfullyattending school. 1046.5 Social remittances <strong>and</strong> labour forceThe contribution by Fargues (2007b) demonstrates that the transfer of ideas that occurs because of<strong>migration</strong> can substantially influence the labour <strong>market</strong>s of AMCs through its effect on demographicchoices; Fargues’ (2007b) idea is that the level of fertility in destination countries influences the levelthat prevails origin countries. Such an argument means that this effect is uneven across AMC countriesbecause – as section 5 showed – these countries greatly differ in the geographical distribution of theirmigrants. Migrants from the Maghreb predominantly move towards countries with a low level offertility – <strong>and</strong> higher rates of female participation on labour <strong>market</strong>s, see section 7.4 – while migrantsfrom the Mashreq move towards countries with higher levels of fertility, <strong>and</strong> more conservative socialstructures. Thus, while past <strong>migration</strong> <strong>flows</strong> are indirectly contributing to alleviate the current pressureon labour <strong>market</strong>s in Maghreb countries via a reduction in the size of younger cohorts in thepopulation, the opposite occurs in the Mashreq countries. This means that social remittances can eitherreinforce or dampen the effect of actual <strong>migration</strong>, as described in section 6.1.As far as the impact of <strong>migration</strong> on skill acquisition is concerned, Fargues (2008b) observes that“a shift from a remittances-driven to a human-capital-driven pattern of <strong>migration</strong> is underway” forAMCs, meaning that the decision to migrate is no longer solely driven by the willingness to sendremittances back home, but also by the desire to make an adequate use of would-be migrants’human capital. Fargues (2008b) also adds that “today the links MENA states establish with theirDiasporas are aimed at maximizing remittances <strong>and</strong> economic investments in the home country.Tomorrow, states will have to channel the diaspora’s knowledge <strong>and</strong> skills. For that purpose, theywill have to [create an environment] favourable to <strong>flows</strong> of ideas <strong>and</strong> knowledge”, emphasizing thekey role of social remittances in shaping the impact of <strong>migration</strong> upon AMCs (see section 9.3).7. Behaviour on the labour <strong>market</strong>7.1 Actual <strong>migration</strong> <strong>and</strong> behaviourMigration can exert a direct impact on the labour-<strong>market</strong> participation of stayers when migrants comefrom households which earn their livelihood from family-run economic activities, such as small-scaleagricultural concerns. As we have seen in section 2.1, the migrant is often the main breadwinnerwithin the household, <strong>and</strong> this gives rise to the need to replace him or her in family-run activities inorder to avoid a reduction in incomes. The book by Ennaji <strong>and</strong> Sadiqi (2008) analyzes the impact ofthe – predominantly male – <strong>migration</strong> from Morocco on the women left behind, <strong>and</strong> it finds that thesewomen tend to assume roles in production activities that were formerly covered by male migrants.Nevertheless, as Ennaji <strong>and</strong> Sadiqi (2008) argue, “most migrant husb<strong>and</strong>s would refuse to allow theirwives to work outside the home because this work jeopardizes their social role <strong>and</strong> the image ashousehold bread-winners”. Ennaji <strong>and</strong> Sadiqi (2008) also provide evidence that <strong>migration</strong> is associatedwith a change in family structures, as 26.2 percent of the sampled women go back to live with theirparents, who can help them in taking care of the children. 105 Such a change in family structure is104 ILO (2002) shows how the incidence of child work in Middle East <strong>and</strong> Northern African countries st<strong>and</strong>s at 15 percent, alevel that is lower than most other developing regions, but that nevertheless suggests that child work is far from being absentthere.105 This is so because AMCs are often characterized by “weak transportation <strong>and</strong> child care infrastructure [that] discouragewomen from going out to work, as does the lack of social support for children or the aged, the burden of whose care falls onwomen” (UNDP, 2006), <strong>and</strong> the women left behind do not seek employment because of “their inability to combine theirwork outside with duties as mothers <strong>and</strong> housewives” (Ennaji <strong>and</strong> Sadiqi, 2008).136
Chapter IIThe impact of <strong>migration</strong> on labour <strong>market</strong>s in Arab Mediterranean countriesclearly connected to the need for a greater female engagement in the labour <strong>market</strong>, <strong>and</strong> it suggeststhat <strong>migration</strong> per se can increase female participation rates in the labour <strong>market</strong> (see section 7.3 onthe contrasting effect of remittances). Nevertheless, such an effect need not materialize: even inPalestine, when the husb<strong>and</strong> migrates, women tend to live with their husb<strong>and</strong>s’ families, but this doesnot consolidate an active role for them in the labour <strong>market</strong> (Hilal, 2007). This happens because of thelack of opportunities, <strong>and</strong> because of the control that relatives exert upon the women left behind, whoremain dependent upon remittances.Thus, it is important to stress that such an increase in female participation is probably mostlyconfined to self-employment activities – such as family-run agricultural concerns or a retail trade –than to wage-earning employment, given the persistent <strong>and</strong> high levels of male unemployment evenin migrant-sending areas. Hijab’s argument then (1988) that those women left behind increasedtheir participation in the labour <strong>market</strong> in Egypt as there was a need at the country level to mobilizewomen to replace migrant men, seems hard to defend <strong>and</strong> generalize upon. 106The direct impact of male <strong>migration</strong> on female participation in the labour <strong>market</strong> thus counteracts thedivergence in labour-<strong>market</strong> outcomes across genders – specifically unemployment rates <strong>and</strong> labourearnings – that is induced by a reduction in the supply of male workers due to <strong>migration</strong> itself. Whilethe latter, as argued in section 1.1, tends to widen the gap, the former helps in narrowing it down.7.2 Prospect to migrate <strong>and</strong> behaviorSection 6.1 briefly recalled that there is some evidence that the level of unemployment among highlyeducatedindividuals in AMCs is higher than among individuals with a low level of education, whileSection 5 showed that e<strong>migration</strong> rates increase with the level of education. To what extent could thelatter factor be driving the former? There is, to the best of our knowledge, no paper which hasprovided solid, empirical evidence in this respect, but it is, nevertheless, fair to say that the chances forthe unemployment to increase substantially due to the high prospect to migrate are low. To see whythis is the case, one can recall the basic mechanism described in Fan <strong>and</strong> Stark (2007b): the authorsargue that the unemployment rate may rise provided that (i) wages for highly-educated individuals arestagnant, <strong>and</strong> (ii) the prospect to migrate induces more individuals to invest in higher education. Whileit is certainly the case that wages in AMCs countries are not <strong>market</strong>-clearing, the second conditionrequired by Fan <strong>and</strong> Stark (2007b) seems – at best – unlikely to hold for most AMCs, in light of whatwe have discussed in Section 6.1. Hence, the mechanism offered by Fan <strong>and</strong> Stark (2007b) seemsunlikely to work, perhaps with the limited exception of small countries, such as Lebanon.A more subtle argument is depicted in the job-search model presented in Fan <strong>and</strong> Stark (2007a),where the effect on unemployment is determined by the effort that would-be migrants have todevote to try to migrate. De Haas (2007) highlights what he labels as the “social consequences of<strong>migration</strong>”: migrant households in Morocco are now regarded as the new elites, which werepreviously determined on the basis of kinship <strong>and</strong> l<strong>and</strong> holdings. Such a change in relative socialpositions has induced the members of old elite groups to aspire to migrate (McMurray, 2001), <strong>and</strong>this is likely to have reduced their incentives to actively participate in the domestic labour <strong>market</strong>,which reduces the necessary resources to climb up the social ladder. If migrants are perceived to besuccess stories, then this can significantly alter the labour-<strong>market</strong> behavior of natives, which wishto emulate them.7.3 Remittances <strong>and</strong> behaviorRemittances can exert an influence on recipients’ behaviour in the labour <strong>market</strong> through two mainchannels, namely the income effect that modifies the willingness to work in exchange for a wage, or106 Hijab (1988) claims that in the 1980s women gained access to skilled occupations, <strong>and</strong> some highly-skilled women (suchas teachers <strong>and</strong> health care workers) were also tied movers to the Gulf countries.137
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