<strong>European</strong> CommissionOccasional Paper 60, Volume IAs far as remittances to Jordan are concerned, these have been representing an important incomesource since the 1980s: consumption levels of households with a migrant abroad have been highthanks to the remittances received. The residential activities <strong>and</strong> the import sector benefited themost from this inflow, but also the agricultural technology improved, determining an ensuing jobcreationin this sector, together with the building <strong>and</strong> the service sector. The Jordanian governmentrelied on remittances to sustain the Balance of Payments, <strong>and</strong> this revenue item has contributed tothe creation of jobs in the public sector. The flip side of this coin was that, when remittancesdeclined due to the political instability of the area, Jordanian public debt increased substantially,<strong>and</strong> this – via the ensuing reduction in the size of the public wage bill – led to a significantimpoverishment of the middle class (Chatelard, 2004). Nevertheless, remittances from Jordanianmigrants are still very important in sustaining the consumption level of recipient households, asremittances have steadily increased between 1994 <strong>and</strong> 2006 (Arouri, 2008).8.4 Social remittances <strong>and</strong> consumption patternThough it is - to say the least – uncontroversial that the transfer of ideas exerts a powerful influence onthe pattern of consumption in the areas of origin of the migrants, as social remittances have been foundto influence much more deeply-rooted phenomena such as fertility choices in AMCs (see section 6.5),only limited systematic research has been conducted on this topic. As <strong>migration</strong> <strong>flows</strong> often followprevious colonial ties – as in the case of <strong>migration</strong> from the Maghreb countries to France – it is hard toassess to what extent the old colonial power would have exerted cultural influence even without thelater <strong>migration</strong> <strong>flows</strong>.9. Investments <strong>and</strong> entrepreneurial models9.1 Remittances <strong>and</strong> investmentsIt is well-known that is not possible to disentangle the analysis of the economic effects of remittancesupon recipient countries from a proper underst<strong>and</strong>ing of the determinants of the underlying <strong>migration</strong>process (Taylor, 1999), as the same factors which induce people to migrate can prevent remittancesfrom producing their full development potential. For instance, the use of remittances for productiveinvestments crucially impinges upon the economic <strong>and</strong> institutional context in the migrant-sendingareas, <strong>and</strong> a telling – albeit admittedly extreme example – of such a relationship has been presented insection 8.3, where we showed that remittances to Algeria are mostly transferred in kind rather than incash. 113 This reflects the distrust of the migrants in the domestic financial system, <strong>and</strong> clearly hinders adirect productive use of remittances. Though remittances still allow recipient households to employresources from other income sources for productive investments, such an outcome is unlikely whenthe basic preconditions for investments are not in place, a conclusion that has been advanced forAMCs by Lazaar (1996), Abdel-Fadil (2003) <strong>and</strong> Gallina (2006a).The amount of remittances used for productive investments in some countries is not negligible: 30percent of foreign capital that is invested in Syria comes from emigrants living in the Gulf(Kawakibi, 2009), in Morocco on average current <strong>and</strong> return international migrants investrespectively four <strong>and</strong> five times more that non migrants (de Haas, 2003), in Palestine migrants haveinvested a lot in their home countries after the Oslo accord (see below), <strong>and</strong> in Jordan remittanceshave always been considered extremely important for starting up a business (Chatelard, 2004)Gallina (2006b) argues that – assuming that in the Mediterranean region between 5 <strong>and</strong> 7 percent ofremittances are spent for productive investment in micro <strong>and</strong> small enterprises – between $1.5 <strong>and</strong>$2.1 billion is invested annually thanks to remittances. This low level of investments can –113 The only sector where Algerian emigrants invest their capital accumulated abroad is real estate (Khelfaoui, 2006).142
Chapter IIThe impact of <strong>migration</strong> on labour <strong>market</strong>s in Arab Mediterranean countriesaccording to Gallina (2006b) – be traced back to the lack of economic incentives for productivelyemploying these earnings, which are mostly devoted to financing basic consumption needs, thusincreasing recipient households’ welfare. The limited evidence of a direct productive use ofremittances goes against the fact that remittances can be just a temporary source of income, whicheconomic theory predicts should not have a large effect on current consumption levels. Thetemporary character of remittance income is also compounded by its possible volatility, asmigrants’ ability to transfer resources back home is influenced by the ups <strong>and</strong> downs of thebusiness cycle in the destination countries, which tend to be more pronounced for migrants to theGulf, which are exposed to the major fluctuations in the world price of oil (Glytsos, 2001), <strong>and</strong> to alesser extent for Western Europe. Still, as seen in section 8.3, households react to the temporary<strong>and</strong> possible volatile character of remittances by using them to buy up stores of valuables, ratherthan ensuring a longer lasting source of income through risky productive investments.This rather pessimistic view of the impact of remittances on investments based on the microevidence on the behavior of recipient households has been recently challenged in a paper byBillmeier <strong>and</strong> Massa (2009), who focus, instead, on the indirect effects of remittances oninvestments. Billmeier <strong>and</strong> Massa (2009) analyzes a panel of 17 countries in the Middle East <strong>and</strong>Central Asia, which includes Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco <strong>and</strong> Tunisia, to test whetherremittances contribute to the deepening of capital <strong>market</strong>s in these countries. The authors find thatmigrants’ remittances have a strong impact on the level of capitalization of the stock <strong>market</strong>s innon-oil exporting countries, as they represent a source of private savings <strong>and</strong> they increase theliquidity that circulates in the economic system 114 . Such a conclusion suggests that the macro ratherthan the micro impact of remittances on investments can be relevant, <strong>and</strong> it also entails that thelabour <strong>market</strong> effects of <strong>migration</strong> due to remittance-financed investments are not confined tomigrant-areas.The above argument is also corroborated by de Haas (2006), who shows that the use of remittancesfor investments in Southern Morocco has contributed to the diversification of the economic system,<strong>and</strong> the urbanization of the population. This specific example suggests that a country – not tomention the whole AMCs area – probably represents a unit of analysis that is unfit to gauge theactual impact of remittances on the labour <strong>market</strong> via productive investments, as there is alsorelevant heterogeneity within countries in the factors that mediate how the dem<strong>and</strong> stimulusbrought about by migrant transfers is matched by a supply side response.Saad (2005) emphasizes the investments by Egyptian migrants based in France in the agriculturesector in the area of Beheira, <strong>and</strong> in the real estate sector in the Northern Coast or in Cairo. Fletcher(1999) also finds an increase in the concentration of l<strong>and</strong> tenure in the h<strong>and</strong>s of few householdsconnected to <strong>migration</strong>, which has in turn led to an increase in unemployment in rural areas, afinding that is in line with what Saad (2005) observes in the Mid Bad Halawa village in Egypt.Schramm (2009) observes that remittances to Maghreb countries give only a limited contribution tothe development of entrepreneurial activities, which are mostly concentrated in the non-tradedservice sector, or in agriculture. Poor recipient households undertake small productive investmentsin cattle, in setting up a small retail shop, or in buying a car to be used as a taxi, while better offhouseholds opt for a restaurant or for a hotel. Provided that these activities are on a small scale,then the direct job-creation effects that they induce are mostly exhausted within the recipienthousehold itself, which is likely to provide most of the required labour supply: still, Schramm(2009) argues that remittance-induced investments contributed as much as 2 percent of the totalnumber of new jobs created in Tunisia over the 1997-2001 period. The bias of remittance-financedinvestments towards the non-traded sector was also found by Labaki (2006) for Lebanon, where thepart of remittances which was not directed to the real-estate sector was used to invest in the retailtrade or in a transportation activity.114 Kachani (2005) argues that migrants show an increasing interest in investing in the Moroccan stock <strong>market</strong>, a findingthat is in line with the more general conclusion reached by Billmeier <strong>and</strong> Massa (2009).143
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