<strong>European</strong> CommissionOccasional Paper 60, Volume Isector. The most important by far in absolute numbers is the latter. The public sector is highlyregulated <strong>and</strong> workers cannot be dismissed <strong>and</strong> wages are set relative to seniority rather than<strong>performance</strong>. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, in the private sector, a small proportion of firms abide by labour<strong>market</strong> regulations while the majority do not. So the labour <strong>market</strong> is highly compartmentalized <strong>and</strong>“labour mobility between economic sectors has been limited. Where it does occur, it has flowed frompoorly-paid jobs in the agricultural sector to low-paid service sector jobs” or informal employment(see Saif 2006 for Jordan). The same is true of Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Morocco <strong>and</strong> Lebanon.Furthermore, labour mobility between civil service <strong>and</strong> private sectors, <strong>and</strong> also within the privatesector is discouraged by the inadequate portability of benefits. This segmentation, <strong>and</strong> the low labourparticipation rates, explains the coexistence of high job creation rates over several years (2000-2007)with high unemployment rates, rates which even grew over the period in Jordan.In several countries, such as Lebanon <strong>and</strong> Jordan (the latter until 2008), whole categories of workersare not subject to labour <strong>market</strong> regulations, in particular domestic servants employed in private homes<strong>and</strong> seasonal agricultural workers. The same applies in some countries to all foreign workers.The social security regime, despite its low coverage (as a percentage of the total population, lessthan 50% on average; only 5 to 10% of the elderly receive a pension), adds to this general rigidity.Social security contributions for formal employment in most AMCs are in the range of 20% of wagesfor Morocco <strong>and</strong> 34% for Algeria (Lebanon 26%, Tunisia 24%) <strong>and</strong> discourage labour-intensiveinvestments. In practice, the effective rate of deductions as a percentage of total labour costs is muchlower. In addition: (a) employers <strong>and</strong> workers evade them, through mutual agreement <strong>and</strong> underreportingof wages; (b) employers may impose tax avoidance on workers as a pre-condition foremployment; or (c) employers may also diversify their workforce through the use of contract/informallabour with a resulting decline in their overall obligation to payroll contributions.In conclusion, AMC labour <strong>market</strong>s are characterized by de facto flexibility, due to the widespreadevasion of labour regulations (not only in the informal sector), high unemployment <strong>and</strong> poor lawenforcement. So labour regulation in AMCs imposes a high degree of rigidity <strong>and</strong> costs but,paradoxically, a low level of worker protection. This pattern may have severe implications for thelevels of informal employment in general <strong>and</strong> of female unemployment in particular, partiallyexplaining these two specificities of the AMC labour <strong>market</strong>s (see Figure 2.2.1).In this context, recent <strong>European</strong> labour <strong>market</strong>s experiences with so-called flexicurity schemes,providing at the same time more flexibility of the labour <strong>market</strong>s <strong>and</strong> more protection to workers,combined with enhanced active labour <strong>market</strong> policies, could only be usefully explored in AMCs forthe small segment of the population enjoying extensive social protection systems. But for any flexicurityscheme to be effective in AMCs, a precondition would be to extend coverage of social securitysystems (as mentioned above, social protection systems in AMCs are notoriously weak, <strong>and</strong>unemployment insurance schemes, for instance, do not exist or cover only a small fraction of theworking population) <strong>and</strong> improve the design <strong>and</strong> implementation of active labour <strong>market</strong> policies (seesection 3.1) to effectively contribute to the employability of unemployed workers.2.3 Increasing Wage <strong>and</strong> Income DifferentialsWage <strong>and</strong> income levels <strong>and</strong> differentials are recurrently mentioned as among the most important pullfactors for labour <strong>migration</strong>. They might also explain the direction of <strong>migration</strong> <strong>flows</strong>: as set out belowin Section 4.2, AMC skilled labour tends to migrate to the US <strong>and</strong> Gulf countries (an income of almost37,000 euros PPP/year/person in 2007), whereas <strong>European</strong> countries are a less attractive destination <strong>and</strong>tend to receive unskilled workers.Data on average wages is scarce, not collected in a systematic way <strong>and</strong> unreliable, <strong>and</strong> is to beconsidered under the caveat of widespread non-compliance <strong>and</strong> informal employment (absorbingbetween 45% <strong>and</strong> 55% of total employment). Table 2.3.1 provides an overview of wage averages <strong>and</strong>40
Chapter IFinal Reportminimum wages in AMCs. The segmentation of labour <strong>market</strong>s mentioned above makes the pictureeven more complex, since it is often the case that a country has different minimum wages for differentcategories of workers (Algeria, Morocco, Syria). However, all AMCs have some form of minimumwage regulation.Table 2.3.1. Minimum <strong>and</strong> average wages in Arab Mediterranean Countries.Monthly wages, in eurosMorocco Algeria Tunisia Egypt Palestine Jordan Lebanon SyriaPublic sector (avg) 489 180 153 349 335 150Private sector (avg) 281 220 338 106 315 268 484 144Minimum wage 163 120 133,5 102 157 256 103Source: National Background Papers based on latest available official data. For Lebanon private sector, the labour costs <strong>and</strong>not wages are considered.Minimum wages are often too low to maintain a typical family <strong>and</strong> too high to ensure internationalcompetitiveness. In Syria, for instance, the minimum monthly salary amounts to 103 €, nowhere nearenough to sustain a typical Syrian family (on average 5.6 persons) above the poverty line. Aneconomist has recently 6 calculated the minimum monthly family salary for assuring food subsistenceabove the poverty line at 13,580 SYP (224 €), <strong>and</strong>, if other needs are taken into account, 22,063 SYP(364 €). Jordan’s national minimum wage is currently 150JD (157 €). Given that the averageJordanian household is composed of 5.7 individuals, a household with one member earning theminimum wage would fall far below the poverty line, which is currently set at 506JD (530 €) perperson annually. This poverty gap is even more pronounced given that average household size amongthe poorest three deciles is 7 individuals. 7 To lift a household of this size above the poverty line wouldrequire a monthly income of 295JD (308 Euros). This is significantly higher than even the income ofone breadwinner earning the average wage for low-skill jobs. Minimum wages tend to operate as aceiling for informal sector workers. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, in several countries (such as Lebanon <strong>and</strong>Jordan) the minimum wages are not applied to foreign workers <strong>and</strong> exclude certain categories, causinghigh unemployment among unskilled workers.As shown in the case of Morocco, this does not prevent a debate about the level of minimumwages. In comparison to some of their industrial competitors in EU <strong>market</strong>s, minimum wages inAMCs are higher <strong>and</strong> closer to average wages than in competing countries (Romania <strong>and</strong> Bulgaria areoften quoted in this respect, where according to Eurostat in 2009 minimum wages st<strong>and</strong> at 140 € <strong>and</strong>122 € respectively), hence reducing AMC competitiveness <strong>and</strong> encouraging informal employment.However, as shown in National Background Papers, this has not prevented the distribution of incomefrom becoming more unequal over the last years.As for the comparative development of wage <strong>and</strong> income levels in purchasing power parity,National Background Studies demonstrate that in the cases of Morocco, Algeria (with a negativeaverage annual increase in PPP wages of -1.7% in 1996-2006, in contrast with the 3% year increase inthe EU-15), Tunisia, Syria <strong>and</strong> Jordan a divergence of average wages with those of the EU isobserved. Thus, the good macroeconomic <strong>performance</strong> of most AMCs in the last ten years, which hasbeen reflected in a progression of per capita GDP, has not been matched by a correspondingimprovement in income distribution or wages nor a clear convergence path towards EU income levels(see Table 2.3.2).6 See Kadri Jamil, Syrian Economic Sciences Society, April 22, 2008: http://www.mafhoum.com/syr/articles_08/jamil.pdf.7 DoS (2006) Household Income <strong>and</strong> Expenditure Survey 2006 Report.41
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