<strong>European</strong> CommissionOccasional Paper 60, Volume IWe might also observe that both World Bank (2008a) <strong>and</strong> World Bank (2009) argue that MENAcountries should adopt policies aimed at reducing the mismatch between the qualifications offeredby their educational system <strong>and</strong> those dem<strong>and</strong>ed by destination countries. Such a policyprescription indirectly suggests that a beneficial brain drain is unlikely to occur at present, as itsuggests that domestic human capital formation does not respond to the labour <strong>market</strong>s atdestination.6.3 Return <strong>migration</strong> <strong>and</strong> labour forceReturn <strong>migration</strong> is often depicted – as section 1.3 recalled – as one of the main channels throughwhich <strong>migration</strong> can benefit origin countries. The project on Return Migration to the Maghreb,MIREM, conducted at the Robert Schuman Centre showed that almost two thirds of the surveyedreturn migrants went back to the Maghreb before the age of 50, <strong>and</strong> 43.2 percent of them before theage of 40, with the prospect of spending a sizeable portion of their working-age life back in thecountries of origin. Similarly, the data from the two waves of the Egyptian <strong>Labour</strong> Force Surveyconducted in 1998 <strong>and</strong> 2006 suggest that even for Egypt a sizeable share of the returnees went backhome well before retirement age 100 . This entails that the direct impact of return <strong>migration</strong> on the labour<strong>market</strong>s of AMCs can be sizeable, <strong>and</strong> all the more so if the <strong>European</strong> Union – which represents themajor destination for migrants from the Maghreb countries – decides to push on in its attempt to makemost <strong>migration</strong> out of these countries circular (see Fargues, 2008a <strong>and</strong> Venturini, 2008).The impact of return <strong>migration</strong> can be expected to be positive once migrants deliberately decide toreturn to their source countries, after having accumulated valuable skills <strong>and</strong> resources atdestination. 101 For instance, in Jordan public <strong>and</strong> private universities try to actively recruit returneesfor academic positions, as their foreign experience gives them skills which attract students. Still, asizeable part of return <strong>migration</strong> <strong>flows</strong> to AMCs are – to use the terminology adopted by theMIREM project – undecided. Major business cycle fluctuations – or political events – in thecountries of destination can induce migrants to return back home, <strong>and</strong> Fergany (2001) recalls thelabour-<strong>market</strong> problems experienced by Egypt <strong>and</strong> Palestine during the First Gulf War in the early1990s, when migrants were forced to leave the major host countries – namely Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait<strong>and</strong> Saudi Arabia. Similarly, Sayre <strong>and</strong> Olmstead (1999) analyze the negative impact on thePalestinian labour <strong>market</strong>s of the return of migrants from Iraq <strong>and</strong> Israel when war broke out in1991. When return <strong>migration</strong> is – to say the least – undecided, then the labour <strong>market</strong>s of thecountries of origin face the problem of absorbing this unexpected wave of returnees. The oppositeoccurs when return <strong>migration</strong> is deliberately promoted, as in the case of the so called reverse braindrain to Palestine which took place after the signature of the Oslo Accords, when an estimated40,000 to 100,000 Palestinians returned home, mostly from Tunisia <strong>and</strong> the United States (Sayre<strong>and</strong> Olmested, 1999). These returnees brought back an enriched set of skills – along with theresources to finance productive investments, see Section 9.2 – <strong>and</strong> took up positions in the publicadministration; this in turn gave rise to a latent conflict with other natives, whose chances ofemployment worsened.The political relationships among the Arab countries do not represent the unique factor which cangive rise to undesirable <strong>flows</strong> of returnees to the AMCs; these countries are increasingly attractingmigrants from Asian countries – most notably, India – which are replacing migrants from AMCs inseveral sectors (see Girgis, 2002 <strong>and</strong> Al Ali, 2004). Worsening labour <strong>market</strong> conditions at100 In 2006, 70 percent of Egyptian return migrants were younger than 50 years of age (ELMPS, 2006). See section 8.2.101 Still, it is crucial to observe that returnees self-select themselves among the migrant population, <strong>and</strong> Hourani <strong>and</strong>Sensening-Dabbous (2007) argues that this suggests the downplaying of overtly optimistic expectations about the impact ofreturn <strong>migration</strong> to Lebanon, as “the best <strong>and</strong> the brightest” among Lebanese migrants decide to remain abroad. This entailsthat having a predominantly skilled-migrant population is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the countries of originto benefit from return.134
Chapter IIThe impact of <strong>migration</strong> on labour <strong>market</strong>s in Arab Mediterranean countriesdestination represent a powerful push factor for return <strong>migration</strong>, which could lessen the role of<strong>migration</strong> in alleviating labour-<strong>market</strong> pressure in AMCs, <strong>and</strong> this push factor is most likely tobecome stronger if the current global economic crisis keeps the international price of oil at a lowlevel.The case of Syria represents a telling example of how the labour-<strong>market</strong> effects of return <strong>migration</strong>depend upon the countries of migrant destination. While Syrian migrants to the Gulf are youngprofessionals (see Section 6.2), most migrants to Lebanon are very low-skilled <strong>and</strong> cross the borderin search of a higher wage which they are able to find only in occupations that Lebanese workersare no longer willing to accept, so that – as Kawakibi (2008) argues – a massive return of Syriansfrom Lebanon could produce extremely negative effects in the Syrian labour <strong>market</strong>.6.4 Remittances <strong>and</strong> labour forceMigrants’ remittances represent one of the most important revenue items in the Balance of Paymentsof AMCs, so they can produce far-reaching direct effects on the recipient households, <strong>and</strong> producerelevant macroeconomic effects. 102 Middle East <strong>and</strong> North Africa is the region which received thehighest level of remittances per capita over the 1998-2002 period (Straubhaar <strong>and</strong> Vadean, 2005),while it is the second region – behind South Asia – as far as the share of remittances over GDP isconcerned (Maimbo <strong>and</strong> Ratha, 2005). Remittances amount to 22 percent of GDP in Jordan, 14percent in Lebanon, 8 percent in Morocco <strong>and</strong> 5 percent in Egypt (Crom, 2009). Furthermore, Adams(2006b) evidences that remittances to the Middle East <strong>and</strong> North African countries grew steadily overthe 1990-2004 period, <strong>and</strong> the well-known problems with the reliability of Balance of Paymentsfigures on remittances are unlikely to explain the observed trend. 103Although the educational systems in most AMCs impose limited direct costs upon students <strong>and</strong> theirfamilies (Akkari, 2004; Vosseynstein, 2004), indirect costs can be substantial, <strong>and</strong> the positiveincome effect due to remittances can help households afford them, thus raising the educationalachievement of young members in recipient households. Tables 6.1 <strong>and</strong> 6.2 show that – as far as theMaghreb countries are concerned – the vast majority of current migrants have a low levels ofeducation, so – as low levels of education tend to be transferred across generations (Galor <strong>and</strong> Zeira,1993) – remittances can give an opportunity to break this poverty trap, raising the level of educationof young family members over <strong>and</strong> above the levels of the migrants. Indeed, Table 8.1 below revealsthat school fees represent the second or third most relevant use of remittances in recipient householdsin all the seven AMCs surveyed by EIB (2006). There are a number of studies – such as Berriane(1996), Bencherifa (1996) <strong>and</strong> de Haas (2003), quoted in de Haas (2007) – which argue thatremittances to Morocco contribute to an increase in expenditures in education which benefits youngpupils of both sexes.As van Dalen et al. (2005) show, the transfer of migrants’ remittances increases the propensity tomigrate among Egyptian recipients, <strong>and</strong> this increases the sensitivity of their educational decisions toforeign rather than to domestic labour-<strong>market</strong> factors. Still, as the arguments presented in section 1.1suggests, this need not improve the incentives to invest in education. Remittances can be used todirectly finance the <strong>migration</strong> cost of a young family member rather than to provide him or her with abetter education. Such an adverse effect on human capital formation can be increased by observingthat parental absence due to <strong>migration</strong> increases the chances that a child is engaged in an economic102 The macro-economic role of remittances as a critical source of foreign currency holdings in the Mediterranean countriesis emphasized by Escribano (2002). For Morocco, Al Ali (2003) argues that “remittances have become more <strong>and</strong> morecrucial to the equilibrium of the national trade balance. The crucial economic role played by migrants' remittances renders thepermanence of Moroccans abroad essential not only for the survival of individual households but also for the viability of thenational economy”.103 The current global economic crisis is expected to reverse this trend, with remittances to Middle East <strong>and</strong> North Africancountries predicted to fall by a cumulative 6 percent over 2009 <strong>and</strong> 2010 (Ratha <strong>and</strong> Mohapatra, 2009).135
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