<strong>European</strong> CommissionOccasional Paper 60, Volume Icountries from the Maghreb countries – such as Morocco <strong>and</strong> Tunisia – tend to move to Europe, whichhas not so far performed well in attracting skilled migrants. Migration to Europe occurs mostly throughfamily reunification provisions or through irregular routes, which do not induce a skill-selective patternof <strong>migration</strong>. Clearly, this need not apply to the countries of the Mashreq – such as Egypt, Jordan <strong>and</strong>Lebanon – whose migrants tend to move predominantly towards the Gulf countries <strong>and</strong> the UnitedStates, as these countries are characterized by a higher wage dispersion across skill levels than mostOECD member countries. Egyptian <strong>and</strong> Lebanese would-be migrants can be induced to invest more inhigher education by the prospect to migrate, <strong>and</strong> also to adjust the profile of their education to bettermatch with the labour dem<strong>and</strong> in the countries of destination. Nassar (2005) observes that half ofEgyptian temporary migrants reside in Saudi Arabia, while Libya, Jordan, Kuwait <strong>and</strong> Iraq host the restof the temporary migrant population, which represents the largely prevailing pattern of Egyptian<strong>migration</strong>. Temporary migrants are, on average, better educated than those who remain in the homecountry, <strong>and</strong> since 1985 the composition of the <strong>migration</strong> <strong>flows</strong> has changed towards a larger share ofscientists <strong>and</strong> technicians, who currently represent about 40% of the total.As far as Jordan is concerned, Chatelard (2004) observes that there is still a large dem<strong>and</strong> for highskilled workers in the Gulf, while adequate employment prospects at home are limited for younggraduates, as De Bel-Air (2008) argues. This entails that we can safely assume that <strong>migration</strong> is a wayto improve on these low expectations, <strong>and</strong> to drive up educational investments, which will otherwisebe ill-grounded because of the domestic labour <strong>market</strong> conditions. A similar argument can also beadvanced in the case of Lebanon: the number of young qualified individuals who wish to get a foreignjob has increased, as – after the 2006 war with Israel – “insecurity pushes towards the brain drain”(Hourani <strong>and</strong> Sensening-Dabbous, 2007), <strong>and</strong> 35% of managerial positions in international enterpriseslocated in the Gulf countries are taken up by Lebanese workers (Kasparian, 2008).26These arguments suggest that the common pattern of e<strong>migration</strong> rates across educational groupsthat we observe for AMCs could be driven by different factors: while for Mashreq countries the highere<strong>migration</strong> rate for higher educated individuals may suggest that the conditions for the occurrence of abeneficial brain drain are in place, this is not the case for the Maghreb countries, where the patternobserved in Table 5.2.1 is likely to be due to the correlation between education <strong>and</strong> income.Individuals with a better level of education self-select themselves into <strong>migration</strong> just because they arebetter able to afford <strong>migration</strong> costs, but this does not lead to any beneficial brain drain dynamics.We should also observe that both World Bank (2008a) <strong>and</strong> World Bank (2009) argue that MENAcountries should adopt policies aimed at reducing the mismatch between the qualifications offeredby their educational system <strong>and</strong> those dem<strong>and</strong>ed by the destination countries. Such a policyprescription indirectly suggests that a beneficial brain drain is unlikely to occur at present, as itsuggests that domestic human capital formation does not respond to the features of the labour<strong>market</strong>s at destination.Does <strong>migration</strong> create relevant shortages of workers in some sectors in AMCs? World Bank(2008a) argues that <strong>migration</strong> does not create bottlenecks in the domestic <strong>market</strong> of Middle East <strong>and</strong>North African countries. However, National Background Papers on Tunisia, Morocco <strong>and</strong> Lebanonshow evidence of <strong>migration</strong> of qualified workers with skills for which there is a shortage of supply inthe national labour <strong>market</strong>: evidence is scarce <strong>and</strong> scattered, but this seems to be the case in Tunisia<strong>and</strong> Morocco for engineers, computing specialists, managers <strong>and</strong> doctors 27 , <strong>and</strong> to a lesser extent inLebanon for nurses, medical technicians, agro-food specialists, translators, <strong>and</strong> semi-skilled26 A different argument applies to Syrian migrants: the majority of temporary migrants to the Gulf are young professionals(health professionals, engineers, <strong>and</strong> other qualified workers) who plan to stay at least five years abroad because this is the time they need to be able to be entitled not to serve in the military, inexchange for a monetary payment out of the savings they accumulated abroad (Kawakibi 2008b).27 For the specific case of physicians, see evidece in the literature in the Thematic Background Paper Marchetta (2009 pp. 19-20).72
Chapter IFinal Reportconstruction workers. This could have a negative impact on the prospects for the expansion of highadded-value sectors incorporating new information <strong>and</strong> communication technologies for managingproduction systems. This could, in fact, give rise to a vicious circle: qualified workers migrate becauseof a lack of chances in the local labour <strong>market</strong>, <strong>and</strong> their <strong>migration</strong> becomes a serious obstacle to theemergence of high added-value, high productivity sectors, thus preventing the dem<strong>and</strong> for skilled<strong>migration</strong> to develop (see Section 2.4 on graduate unemployment).In Jordan, Egypt, Syria <strong>and</strong> Algeria, in contrast, there is no evidence for a real brain drain. InEgypt, the evidence suggests that a substantial proportion of Egyptian emigrants to OECD countriesare highly educated, with around 59% of total emigrants from Egypt in 2000 being so classed. Overall,migrants, both returnees <strong>and</strong> current, tend to be more educated than non-migrants (Wahba 2007). Butthe stock is so large that the e<strong>migration</strong> rate among the highly educated is quite low at only 4.6%; thissuggests that Egypt is not experiencing a brain drain problem. From another perspective, given theeducational mix of the migrants, there have not been apparent bottlenecks in the Egyptian labour<strong>market</strong> that persisted. The e<strong>migration</strong> of skilled workers did not have negative impact on the labour<strong>market</strong> since they were either unemployed or worked in the public sector where wages are not flexible<strong>and</strong> as such e<strong>migration</strong> does not affect wages, but might have reduced the public sector wage bill. Ofcourse, although Egypt is not losing an important proportion of its educated workers <strong>and</strong> thereby is notfacing a brain drain, Egypt continues to lose human capital which it has invested in <strong>and</strong> educated,since education is free in Egypt. This may still be an issue of concern. However, this cost may beoutweighed by the potential gains from remittances <strong>and</strong> the reduction in pressure on the labour <strong>market</strong>given the high unemployment rate in Egypt among the educated.In Jordan, despite the high outflow of skilled workers, there remains a significant number of skilledunemployed workers available who hold qualifications relevant to the needs of the labour <strong>market</strong>.Although many employers perceive a lack of skills in the Jordanian labour force, the educationalprofile of the unemployed shows that the problem is often not a lack of relevant qualifications, but alack of appropriate skills among those holding such qualifications. By combining the data from DIOC<strong>and</strong> the US Census Bureau, an estimate of 12,600 Jordanian migrants 28 employed in skilledoccupations in OECD countries can be calculated. 29 This is an extremely small figure compared to the225,000 Jordanians employed in skilled occupations in Jordan 30 <strong>and</strong> thus it can be assumed that<strong>migration</strong> to OECD countries is not leading to a brain drain, especially taking into consideration the40,000 unemployed Jordanians with university degrees in Jordan itself.5.3 Remittances <strong>and</strong> the Prospects to MigrateRemittances can stimulate productive investments (Orozco, 2000; Woodruff <strong>and</strong> Zenteno, 2007), easethe provision of credit <strong>and</strong> the development of financial <strong>and</strong> equity <strong>market</strong>s (Giuliano <strong>and</strong> Ruiz-Arranz,2009; Billmeier <strong>and</strong> Massa, 2009), although these positive developmental contributions are notindependent of the economic <strong>and</strong> institutional frameworks of recipient countries. Giuliano <strong>and</strong> Ruiz-Arranz (2009) use data from approximately one hundred developing countries over the period 1975-2002<strong>and</strong> they show that remittances provide an alternative way to finance investment in countries with poorfinancial systems. Remittances can help to overcome liquidity constraints in countries where credit<strong>market</strong>s are inefficient or non-existent. Aggarwal et al. (2006) use a sample of 99 countries <strong>and</strong> theyargue that remittances promote stock-<strong>market</strong> development, <strong>and</strong> Gupta et al. (2007) reach the same28 For all countries excluding the US, this refers to Jordan-born migrants falling under the ISCO classifications ‘Professionals’ or ‘Legislators, senior officials <strong>and</strong> managers’. For the US, thisrefers to Jordan-born migrants falling under the classification ‘Management, professional <strong>and</strong> related occupations’.29 Excluding Germany, for which the relevant data is not available.30 DoS (2007) Employment Survey 2006 Annual Report.73
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