<strong>European</strong> CommissionOccasional Paper 60, Volume IA powerful channel of the transfer of cultural norms which can influence the choice ofentrepreneurial models is represented by migrant associations, whose role in Syria, Morocco <strong>and</strong>Lebanon is discussed by respectively Dumont (2008), de Haas (2007) <strong>and</strong> Labaki (2006). TheLebanese government supports two public programs (TOKTEN, Transfer Of Knowledge ThroughExpatriate Nationals, <strong>and</strong> IDAL, Investment Development Authority of Lebanon) to favor thetransfer of social remittances to migrant destination countries.According to Khelfanoui (2006), the contribution of the North American Diaspora to thedevelopment of Algeria in terms of technological transfer is much more important than thefinancial one. There are a number of initiatives, both in the cultural sector <strong>and</strong> in the scientificsector with the aim of creating a partnership between intellectuals living abroad <strong>and</strong> those whoremained in the origin country. ALASCO is an association for scientific cooperation that was bornwith this specific goal to arrange periodical visits of Algerian scientists working in US to meetAlgerian colleagues. Moreover, partnerships have been created by the Government with the USEmbassy, <strong>and</strong> with a University in Quebec, while in the fields of Information Technology, HumanResources <strong>and</strong> hydrocarbons have already produced cases of beneficial cooperation.The Tunisian Government also shows an interest in the development of contacts with its brainsabroad in order to exp<strong>and</strong> the beneficial effects of skilled <strong>migration</strong> for the country: scientificconferences to establish relationships between the competences abroad <strong>and</strong> Tunisian Universitieshave been organized, <strong>and</strong> a Coordination Unit has been established in order to create a nationalstrategy to use the knowledge of emigrants (Zekri, 2009).10. ConclusionsMigration produces deep <strong>and</strong> far-reaching effects on the labour <strong>market</strong>s of Arab MediterraneanCountries, through an array of different - but closely intertwined - channels, which have been analyzedin this paper both from a theoretical <strong>and</strong> an empirical perspective. The complexity of the effectsinduced by <strong>migration</strong>, <strong>and</strong> the limited empirical evidence which has so far been gathered with respectto AMCs, entails that putting together the pieces of the puzzle that have been separately described inthe previous section is a challenging task, which should not be expected to provide a neat <strong>and</strong>consistent picture. Some knowledge gaps – notably on the impact of <strong>migration</strong> on the level <strong>and</strong> thedistribution of labour earnings – remain, <strong>and</strong> no conclusions can be drawn about them, but this paperhas contributed to filling other gaps, collecting relevant arguments which have been put forward indifferent scientific disciplines.There is no doubt that <strong>migration</strong> reduces the pressure on the labour <strong>market</strong>, thanks to demographicfactors, <strong>and</strong> this is particularly true in small-sized AMCs. Moreover, <strong>migration</strong> can also exert aninfluence on these factors themselves, through the transfer of cultural norms from the countries ofdestination which reshape fertility decisions (Fargues, 2007b). This indirect – <strong>and</strong> admittedlymedium-term – indirect effect can either strengthen or dampen the initial direct effect, depending onthe cultural values that prevails in destination countries. This means that the countries of the Mashreqst<strong>and</strong> to benefit less than the countries of the Maghreb, whose migrants move predominantly towardsthe low-fertility <strong>European</strong> countries, <strong>and</strong> indeed – as the case of Morocco shows – theunemployment-reducing effect of <strong>migration</strong> can also induce a substantial internal mobility towardsmigrant-sending areas.The influence of <strong>migration</strong> is uneven across skill groups, as the data – which also include non-OECD destinations – consistently show that the e<strong>migration</strong> rates from AMCs are higher for highlyeducated individuals. A review of, regrettably indirect, elements suggest that the prospect tomigrate is unlikely to induce substantial increases in the private investments in education in AMCs– with the exception of Lebanon, Jordan <strong>and</strong>, to a lesser extent, Egypt – that would aggravate theproblem of graduate unemployment. This suggests that the brain drain should not rank high among146
Chapter IIThe impact of <strong>migration</strong> on labour <strong>market</strong>s in Arab Mediterranean countriesthe concerns of AMCs, which face notable difficulties in providing adequate employmentopportunities to their most talented workers.The reduction in unemployment is not just mechanically due to the reduction in the labour supply,but also to the influence that <strong>migration</strong> exerts on the behavior of the working-age population.Young individuals from AMCs who have access to <strong>migration</strong> networks have a higher propensity tomigrate than the rest of the population, <strong>and</strong> this reduces their incentives to actively seek a low-paiddomestic occupation. They devote their efforts, instead, to arranging their own <strong>migration</strong> project.The theoretical <strong>and</strong> empirical arguments revised in this paper cast serious doubts on the idea that<strong>migration</strong> can positively influence female participation in the labour <strong>market</strong>, which is notably lowin AMCs. Migration, which is predominantly male, directly increases the dem<strong>and</strong> for female labourin households with family-run economic activities, as this kind of job encounters a weaker culturalresistance – which can also be reinforced through the transfer of social remittances from destinationcountries –than waged female employment (Ennaji <strong>and</strong> Sadiqi, 2008). The dem<strong>and</strong> for femaleemployment within family-run economic activities can also be increased if migrant remittances areused to finance small-scale productive investments, while the effect of remittances on theincentives to seek out waged employment are reduced by the positive income effect they bringabout. Furthermore, the opportunities to work outside the household is also constrained by the needto take care of the children left behind with the wife of the migrant. Though a woman may getsome support for the care of the children from her relatives, this choice could further reduce hersearch for a job which is perceived as being detrimental to the social status of the family. Thismeans that <strong>migration</strong> out of AMCs has, in the short-run, a limited positive – <strong>and</strong> possibly evennegative – effect on female participation on the labour <strong>market</strong>, which is mostly produced withinfamily-run economic activities. Things may change in the medium to long term, provided thatsocial remittances contribute to reduce social resistance towards active female engagement in thelabour <strong>market</strong>.The labour <strong>market</strong>s of AMCs also respond to the effects that <strong>migration</strong> produces on their dem<strong>and</strong>side, <strong>and</strong> the available evidence on the influence of <strong>migration</strong> on the patterns of consumptionsuggests that a non-negligible part of the dem<strong>and</strong> stimulus brought about by migrant remittancesleaks out towards foreign-produced goods – especially for the smaller countries with a limitedmanufacturing sector, while the domestic job-creation effect is predominantly limited to low-skilledoccupations. The dem<strong>and</strong> for real-estate investments systematically experiences a boom in migrantsendingareas, <strong>and</strong> this gives rise to a boom in the construction sector, where new job opportunitiesemerge. Though this partial effect is positive, it should also be considered as revealing of the lack ofopportunities for <strong>migration</strong>-financed productive investments, which could produce a greater <strong>and</strong>longer-lasting effect in term of dem<strong>and</strong> for labour. The evidence on the effects of <strong>migration</strong> – mostlyvia remittances – on investments is limited <strong>and</strong> mostly anecdotal, while evidence on the effect ofreturn <strong>migration</strong> on investments in AMCs, which appeared to be one of the most beneficial effectsof <strong>migration</strong> upon the origin countries, is still limited, <strong>and</strong> controversial. Moreover, return <strong>migration</strong>to the region – <strong>and</strong> most notably to the Mashreq countries – has often been induced by politicalinstability in the countries of destination, so that it has represented a destabilizing factor for thelabour <strong>market</strong> in the origin countries.There are some promising signals that remittances to AMCs are stimulating the deepening of thecredit <strong>and</strong> equity <strong>market</strong>s. This could ease the set-up of new enterprises, which is threatened by anunfavorable institutional <strong>and</strong> economic environment, one of the root causes of <strong>migration</strong>. Wheneconomic <strong>migration</strong> is determined by the scarcity of investment opportunities, rather than by thelack of financial resources to undertake them, then <strong>migration</strong> per se can hardly be expected togenerate these missing opportunities.Though we have been able to advance some tentative conclusions, there are various labour-<strong>market</strong>outcomes that need to be further analyzed before the puzzle of the impact of <strong>migration</strong> on AMCscan be better understood. This paper has laid out a possible analytical framework that could guide147
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