<strong>European</strong> CommissionOccasional Paper 60, Volume Iconclusion for Sub-Saharan Africa. Needless to say, these effects can give rise to a significant indirectimpact on the labour <strong>market</strong> through the ensuing job-creation effect.Macroeconomic impact aside, remittances are often thought to influence the labour <strong>market</strong> byaffecting the behaviour of potential workers. Remittances can exert an influence on recipients’behaviour on the labour <strong>market</strong> through two main channels, namely the income effect that modifiesthe willingness to work in exchange for a wage, be it through higher reservations wages (thusincreasing unemployment) or through a reduction in labour participation rates, or through the impacton the dem<strong>and</strong> for labour in family-run activities which is determined by the use of remittances tofinance small-scale productive investments.The issue of remittance use by migrants has attracted the greatest interest <strong>and</strong> debate. Some argue thatremittances are used primarily for the purchase of l<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> housing <strong>and</strong> general household consumption,rather than “productive investment” <strong>and</strong> conclude that remittances thus do little to stimulate developmentin the home country. Others believe that migrants do save <strong>and</strong> invest, that expenditure on l<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong>housing are rational under prevailing conditions (they frequently offer better rates of return or are a betterstore of value than other available investments) <strong>and</strong> that expenditure on housing <strong>and</strong> consumption havepositive multiplier effects on the whole economy. The stimulus that <strong>migration</strong> – via remittances – bringsto private dem<strong>and</strong> produces substantial effects on the labour <strong>market</strong> only inasmuch it is directed towardsdomestically produced goods <strong>and</strong> services. Regrettably, as Gallina (2006) observes, there is limitedinformation on the pattern of remittance uses in AMC countries. Some information – albeit coming froma survey with a very limited coverage- are provided by EIB (2006), which analyzed the distribution ofremittances across alternative budget items in all AMCs but Palestine. Table 5.3.1 reports the mainfindings from this survey, which evidences that everyday expenses absorb most of the income arisingfrom remittances, while limited resources are devoted to investments. Schramm (2006b) providesevidence – for Tunisia, Morocco <strong>and</strong> Egypt – that suggests that basic consumption needs (food, heat <strong>and</strong>clothing) absorb most of the income from remittances.Table 5.3.1 Use of remittances in AMCs (% of total remittances)DailyexpensesPayment ofschool feesBuildinga houseSetting upa companyInvestmentsOtherNumber ofintervieweesAlgeria 45 13 23 3 5 11 64Egypt 43 12 18 - 15 12 31Jordan 74 16 4 - 6 - 40Lebanon 56 24 5 5 5 5 41Morocco 46 31 16 - 5 2 40Tunisia - 23 34 2 16 25 40Syria 61 11 8 - - 20 49Source: EIB (2006)But remittances <strong>and</strong> the prospect to migrate can also influence the supply side of the labour <strong>market</strong>through a variety of channels. The prospect for <strong>migration</strong> can have an impact on the participation rate<strong>and</strong> on the reservation wages of domestic workers (Fan <strong>and</strong> Stark, 2007). This argument entails that therelationship between unemployment <strong>and</strong> <strong>migration</strong> runs in both directions: on the one h<strong>and</strong>, a high levelof unemployment represents a powerful push factor for <strong>migration</strong>, while, on the other, the prospect tomigrate can exert an upward pressure on the unemployment level itself. In AMCs, this effect is perhapsmost evident in Lebanon, mostly linked to high private educational investments <strong>and</strong> a high cost of living(see National Background Paper, Chaaban 2009), which discourages Lebanese workers from engaging inlow-skilled jobs.74
Chapter IFinal ReportAs far as the supply of labour is concerned, remittances can reduce the work effort of the members ofrecipients households due to the positive income effect they bring about (see the recent empiricalcontribution, related to Mexico, by Cox Edwards <strong>and</strong> Rodríguez-Oreggia 2009). Remittances also loosenthe liquidity constraints that can hinder investments in education (Cox-Edwards <strong>and</strong> Ureta, 2003;Rapoport <strong>and</strong> Docquier, 2006) as young members of recipient households have a higher probability ofmigrating than the rest of the population (Van Dalen et al., 2005). Thus, whether the positive incomeeffects determined by the receipt of migrant remittances feeds into higher investment in educationdepends on whether the prospect to migrate improves or worsens the incentives to make such aninvestment. If the former is the case, then remittances can delay the entrance of young cohorts to thedomestic labour <strong>market</strong>, as they raise the enrolment rates in higher-education institutions. In the mediumrun, this would improve the skill-composition of the labour force. If, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, the prospect tomigrate reduces the incentives to invest in education, remittances could be used to finance the <strong>migration</strong>cost for an additional household member. Observe that in both cases remittances reduce – in the shortrun – the size of the younger cohorts which enter the labour <strong>market</strong>, either through a higher retention ratein the educational system, or through increased <strong>migration</strong>. Remittances can also produce a detrimentalimpact on human capital formation, if they open up opportunities to undertake productive investments infamily-run activities, which represents the use of remittances which is supposed to be the use whichdelivers the greatest developmental contribution for the recipient countries (see Taylor, 1999 for acritique of this position). For evidence for selected Middle Eastern countries, see Bouhga-Hagbe (2006).Although the educational systems in most AMCs impose limited direct costs upon the students <strong>and</strong> theirfamilies (Vossensteyn 2004), indirect costs can be substantial, <strong>and</strong> the positive income effect due toremittances can improve households’ ability to afford them, thus raising the educational achievement ofyoung members in recipient households. Table 5.2.1 shows that – as far as the Maghreb countries areconcerned – the vast majority of current migrants have low levels of education, so remittances can givean opportunity to break this poverty trap, raising the level of education of young family members over<strong>and</strong> above the one of the migrants. Indeed, Table 5.3.1 above reveals that school fees represent thesecond or third most relevant use of remittances in recipient households in all the seven AMCs surveyedby EIB (2006). There are a number of studies – such as Berriane (1996), Bencherifa (1996) <strong>and</strong> de Haas(2003), quoted in de Haas (2007) – which argue that remittances to Morocco contribute to an increase inexpenditures in education which benefits young pupils of both sexes.As far as the impact of remittances on the labour participation rate of women is concerned, a recentbook by Ennaji <strong>and</strong> Sadiqi (2008) analyzes the impact of the – predominantly male – <strong>migration</strong> fromMorocco on the women left behind, <strong>and</strong> it finds that they tend to assume roles in the productionactivities that were formerly covered by the male migrants so their participation rate increases insteadof decreasing. Nevertheless, Ennaji <strong>and</strong> Sadiqi (2008) argue that “most migrant husb<strong>and</strong>s would refuseto allow their wives to work outside the home because this work jeopardizes their social role <strong>and</strong> theimage as household bread-winners”. They also provide evidence that <strong>migration</strong> is associated with arelevant change of family structures, as 26.2% of the sampled women went back to live with theirparents, who can help them in taking care of the children. This is so because AMCs are oftencharacterized by “weak transportation <strong>and</strong> child care infrastructure [that] discourage women fromgoing out to work, as does the lack of social support for children or the aged, the burden of whose carefalls on women” (UNDP 2006), <strong>and</strong> the women left behind do not seek employment because of “theirinability to combine their work outside with duties as mothers <strong>and</strong> housewives”. Such a change infamily structure is clearly connected with the need for greater female engagement in the labour<strong>market</strong>, <strong>and</strong> it suggests that <strong>migration</strong> per se can increase female participation rates on the labour<strong>market</strong>. Nevertheless, such an effect need not materialise: even in Palestine, when the husb<strong>and</strong>migrates, women tend to live with their husb<strong>and</strong>s’ families, but this does not consolidate an active rolein the labour <strong>market</strong> (Hilal 2007). Thus, it is important to stress that increased female participation canbe expected to be mostly confined to self-employment activities – such as family-run agriculture orretail trade – rather than to wage employment, given the persistent <strong>and</strong> high levels of maleunemployment even in migrant-sending areas. Thus, the argument provided by Hijab (1988), who75
- Page 5 and 6:
STUDYLABOUR MARKETS PERFORMANCE AND
- Page 7 and 8:
Table of ContentsLABOUR MARKETS PER
- Page 10:
8.1 Actual migration and consumptio
- Page 15 and 16:
Chapter IFinal Report 15 MILLION NE
- Page 17 and 18:
Chapter IFinal Report …so that MI
- Page 19 and 20:
Chapter IFinal Reportroots). The cu
- Page 21 and 22:
Chapter IFinal Report In AMCs, REMI
- Page 23 and 24:
Chapter IFinal Reportpolicies. This
- Page 25 and 26: Chapter IFinal ReportMediterranean
- Page 27 and 28: Chapter IFinal ReportMore recently,
- Page 29 and 30: Chapter IFinal Reportfor EU employm
- Page 31 and 32: Chapter IFinal Reportchosen, these
- Page 33 and 34: Chapter IFinal Reportexit of women
- Page 35 and 36: Chapter IFinal ReportFigure 1.2.1.
- Page 37 and 38: Chapter IFinal ReportA Declining Em
- Page 39 and 40: Chapter IFinal ReportThe same year,
- Page 41 and 42: Chapter IFinal ReportTable 2.2.1. I
- Page 43 and 44: Chapter IFinal Reportminimum wages
- Page 45 and 46: Chapter IFinal Report2.4 Unemployme
- Page 47 and 48: Chapter IFinal ReportYouth Unemploy
- Page 49 and 50: Chapter IFinal ReportBut one should
- Page 51 and 52: Chapter IFinal Reportmillion) 10 .
- Page 53 and 54: Chapter IFinal Reportmight intensif
- Page 55 and 56: Chapter IFinal Reporttrue labour ma
- Page 57 and 58: Chapter IFinal Reportto reform the
- Page 59 and 60: Chapter IFinal ReportFrom a differe
- Page 61 and 62: Chapter IFinal ReportTable 4.2.1 Ou
- Page 63 and 64: Chapter IFinal ReportSource: Adams
- Page 65 and 66: Chapter IFinal Reportin the destina
- Page 67 and 68: Chapter IFinal ReportIn conclusion,
- Page 69 and 70: Chapter IFinal Reportorganised in B
- Page 71 and 72: Chapter IFinal Reportsecond Intifad
- Page 73 and 74: Chapter IFinal Reportstands at 29.7
- Page 75: Chapter IFinal Reportconstruction w
- Page 79 and 80: Chapter IFinal Reportother cases, l
- Page 81 and 82: Chapter IFinal Reportunemployment a
- Page 83 and 84: Chapter IFinal Reportof Egypt, so f
- Page 85 and 86: Chapter IFinal ReportWhile progress
- Page 87 and 88: Chapter IFinal ReportThese reservat
- Page 89 and 90: Chapter IFinal ReportAs Figure 6.3.
- Page 91 and 92: Chapter IFinal Reportin skill devel
- Page 93 and 94: Chapter IFinal ReportThe Directive
- Page 95 and 96: Chapter IFinal ReportThe need for
- Page 97 and 98: Chapter IFinal Reportobjectives are
- Page 99 and 100: Chapter IFinal Reporttrue Euro-Medi
- Page 101 and 102: Chapter IFinal Report- Putting empl
- Page 103 and 104: Chapter IFinal Report promotion of
- Page 105 and 106: Chapter IFinal ReportOtherADAMS, R.
- Page 107 and 108: Chapter IFinal ReportDE BEL-AIR, F.
- Page 109 and 110: Chapter IFinal ReportGUPTA, S., C.
- Page 111 and 112: Chapter IFinal ReportOECD (2000): M
- Page 113 and 114: Chapter II - Thematic Background Pa
- Page 115 and 116: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 117 and 118: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 119 and 120: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 121 and 122: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 123 and 124: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 125 and 126: Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 127 and 128:
Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 129 and 130:
Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 131 and 132:
Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 133 and 134:
Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 135 and 136:
Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 137 and 138:
Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 139 and 140:
Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 141 and 142:
Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 143 and 144:
Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 145 and 146:
Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 147 and 148:
Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 149 and 150:
Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 151 and 152:
Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 153 and 154:
Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 155 and 156:
Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 157 and 158:
Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 159 and 160:
Chapter IIThe impact of migration o
- Page 161 and 162:
Chapter III - Thematic Background P
- Page 163 and 164:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 165 and 166:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 167 and 168:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 169 and 170:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 171 and 172:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 173 and 174:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 175 and 176:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 177 and 178:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 179 and 180:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 181 and 182:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 183 and 184:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 185 and 186:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 187 and 188:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 189 and 190:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 191 and 192:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 193 and 194:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 195 and 196:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 197 and 198:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 199 and 200:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 201 and 202:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 203 and 204:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 205 and 206:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa
- Page 207:
Chapter IIIEU Migration Policy towa