<strong>European</strong> CommissionOccasional Paper 60, Volume Ithat temporary unemployment should occur for a period exceeding three consecutivemonths or if it occurs more than once, the EU Blue Card is withdrawn. 53- The fact that it gives more privileges in terms of family reunification to the highly-skilledmigrants who have not lived in the EU, as opposed to third-country nationals who areestablished residents of the EU, is controversial.- More importantly, it is not clear whether <strong>and</strong> how the Blue Card is an instrument thatexcludes or paves the way for an EU citizenship <strong>and</strong>, if the Blue Card is to be understoodas a gateway to citizenship, how do divergent citizenship laws in EU member states <strong>and</strong>the Blue Card complement each other?- Although it explicitly targets the necessity of avoiding brain drain <strong>and</strong> of establishingethical recruitment procedures so as to “minimize negative <strong>and</strong> maximize positive impactsof highly skilled im<strong>migration</strong> on developing countries in order to turn ‘brain drain’ into‘brain gain’”, 54 concerns have been raised about whether the Blue Card could negativelyimpact on origin countries as not enough empirical work has been done on the effects ofbrain drain <strong>and</strong> how the latter occurs.- From a broader angle, the Blue Card raises the question of whether future <strong>migration</strong>trends in EU labour im<strong>migration</strong> would be more focused on highly-skilled <strong>and</strong> selective<strong>migration</strong>. In this regard, analysing the Blue Card as an instrument for the implementationof the Global Approach to Migration casts doubt on the globality of the approach itself.This is why it has been argued that Europe needs instead “a common policy for all typesof labour <strong>migration</strong>, be it unskilled, semi-skilled or highly-skilled” (Baldwin-Edwards2009, p. 135) <strong>and</strong> not partial instruments addressing specific <strong>migration</strong> aspects.- Despite the fact that the EU Blue Card Proposal has been adopted as Council directive, theUK, Denmark <strong>and</strong> Irel<strong>and</strong> did not adhere to the proposed approach. Moreover, the UK hasalready a quite efficient point system for skilled labour recruitment. This not only drawsattention to the lack of coordination <strong>and</strong> the difficulties relating to shaping a common<strong>European</strong> labour <strong>migration</strong> policy, but also casts some doubt upon the credibility of theEU Blue Card as a policy instrument capable of pooling all EU actors together. This,combined with the application <strong>and</strong> acceptance procedure for the transfer of the Blue Cardto another <strong>European</strong> country, limit the potential attractiveness of this instrument as an EUwideentitlement).6.4. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership <strong>and</strong> the <strong>European</strong> Neighborhood Policy: AdequateTools for an External Migration Policy?Besides the articulation between EU <strong>migration</strong> policy <strong>and</strong> the needs of its labour <strong>market</strong>s on the oneh<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the development needs of partners (<strong>and</strong> in particular AMCs) on the other h<strong>and</strong>, anotherrelevant field of analysis is the articulation between EU cooperation policy with those countries (inparticular the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership <strong>and</strong> the <strong>European</strong> Neighbourhood Policy) <strong>and</strong> its<strong>migration</strong> policy towards them, <strong>and</strong> more specifically to what extent those cooperation instrumentsincorporate <strong>and</strong> implement the Global Approach to Migration.53 See Chapter IV, Article 13 of the Directive.54 See Preamble Article (22) of the Directive.92
Chapter IFinal ReportThe need for “a comprehensive approach to <strong>migration</strong> addressing political, human rights <strong>and</strong>development issues in countries <strong>and</strong> regions of origin <strong>and</strong> transit” was already stressed in the Tampere<strong>European</strong> Council’s conclusions (1999). Thus, the latter emphasizes that “this requires combatingpoverty, improving living conditions <strong>and</strong> job opportunities, preventing conflicts <strong>and</strong> consolidatingdemocratic states <strong>and</strong> ensuring respect for human rights, in particular rights of minorities, women <strong>and</strong>children”. In many respects, those general objectives, considered as causes of undesirable im<strong>migration</strong>to the EU, match the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’s (EMP) declared aims.However, paradoxically, the consideration of <strong>migration</strong> issues both in the Barcelona Declaration<strong>and</strong> in the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAs) between the EU <strong>and</strong> MediterraneanPartner Countries was quite limited in the first place, except in the field of non-discrimination withregard to legally residing migrant workers (see Appendix of Thematic Background Paper, Venturini,Fakhoury <strong>and</strong> Jouant 2009). Only in the last few years, after the Barcelona Summit marked the firstdecade of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (1995-2005), have <strong>migration</strong> issues come to the fore inEuro-Mediterranean co-operation, with the integration in 2005 of a fully new pillar of cooperation inJustice <strong>and</strong> Home Affairs (first set in place in the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference held inValencia in April 2002).In the Barcelona Declaration establishing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, <strong>migration</strong> was onlymentioned in the chapter on the “Partnership in Social, Cultural <strong>and</strong> Human Affairs”, <strong>and</strong> not at all inthe “Economic <strong>and</strong> Financial Partnership” chapter. As far as <strong>migration</strong> is concerned, the BarcelonaDeclaration’s implicit rationale was that migratory pressures should be tackled through job creation<strong>and</strong> development (which, in turn, would be a indirect result of trade liberalization <strong>and</strong> structuralreform), combating irregular im<strong>migration</strong> <strong>and</strong> protecting the rights of legal immigrants. 55 But nospecific policy with regard to the <strong>migration</strong> challenge <strong>and</strong> its various dimensions was foreseen. Theestablishment of schemes for legal <strong>migration</strong> was certainly the missing link here.In the subsequent Association Agreements, it is clear that <strong>migration</strong> or human mobility at largewas not a priority of the Partnership at the time the EMAAs were drafted. Interestingly, the EC-Algeria Association Agreement is the only noticeable exception in this respect, as article 1.2 amongother objectives includes the “facilitation of human exchanges, particularly in the context ofadministrative procedures”. As the last EMAA to be drafted (its text was agreed in 2002, whereas thefirst one to be agreed, for Tunisia, dated back to 1995), it witnesses the increasing importance of thisissue in Euro-Mediterranean relations.The EMAAs dealt with <strong>migration</strong> issues under chapters dedicated to “Cooperation in Social <strong>and</strong>Cultural matters”. In those chapters, some specific provisions related to <strong>migration</strong> are set out. 56However, it is worth noting that no considerations for labour needs or for the nature <strong>and</strong> quality ofpermit of stay or procedures or conditions for admission were included in the EMAAs.Notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing this, one of the explicit priorities in the field of social cooperation was reducingmigratory pressures (“root cause approach”): “Reducing migratory pressure, in particular by creatingjobs <strong>and</strong> developing training in areas from which emigrants come; resettling those repatriated becauseof their illegal status under the legislation of the state in question”. 57 Each EMAA foresees a regularsocial dialogue which includes <strong>migration</strong> matters; however, the reciprocal minimal commitment in thisrespect targets the social aspects of <strong>migration</strong> <strong>and</strong> does not make an economically- or labour-centred55 References to <strong>migration</strong> in the Barcelona Declaration “acknowledge the importance of the role played by <strong>migration</strong> in their relationships. They agree to strengthen their cooperation toreduce migratory pressures, among other things through vocational training programmes <strong>and</strong> job creation programmes. They undertake to guarantee protection of all the rights recognisedunder existing legislation of migrants legally resident in their respective territories. In the area of illegal im<strong>migration</strong> they decide to establish closer co-operation. In this context, thepartners, aware of their responsibility for readmission, agree to adopt the relevant provisions <strong>and</strong> measures, by means of bilateral agreements or arrangements, in order to readmit theirnationals who are in an illegal situation. To that end, the Member States of the <strong>European</strong> Union take citizens to mean nationals of the Member States, as defined for Community purposes.”56 For an exhaustive overview of those provisions, refer to the Thematic Background Paper (Venturini, Fakhoury <strong>and</strong> Jouant 2009).57 Article 71 of the EMAA EC/Tunisia – same provision in the EMAA EC/Morocco . See also article 73 of the EC/Algeria EMAA which covers a larger scope of priorities related to<strong>migration</strong>. See article 82 of the EMAA EC/Jordan, as well as articles 63 of the EMAA EC/Egypt <strong>and</strong> Lebanon.93
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