<strong>European</strong> CommissionOccasional Paper 60, Volume IThis – admittedly incomplete – evidence suggests that the job-creation effects due to remittancefinancedinvestments tend to be limited, <strong>and</strong> it could be fostered by the adoption of complementarypublic policies aimed at removing the institutional <strong>and</strong> economic disincentives to invest. Such aneffort can hardly be expected to be undertaken by the migrants, as there is limited evidence ofcooperative actions led by migrant associations (Gallina, 2006b). The collective mobilization ofresource for investments in Morocco is scarce, <strong>and</strong> confined to a few cases, like the association ofMoroccan migrants in Catalonia - which invests in agriculture development in Northern Morocco,<strong>and</strong> some social investments from Moroccan migrants to Southern France.Hillal (2007) describes how investments by Palestinian emigrants were extremely important afterthe establishment of the Palestinian Authority. Banks <strong>and</strong> insurance companies opened in WestBank <strong>and</strong> Gaza, <strong>and</strong> a law to encourage foreign investments was passed <strong>and</strong> several activities –which were previously not allowed under the Israeli occupation – were created. In this phase. Therole of expatriate Palestinian businessmen who had made their capital in the Gulf became veryimportant for the country. But, starting with the military occupation of the West Bank in 2002, theuncertainty of investments in Palestine has again become a concern <strong>and</strong> this discourages theinvestments of migrants, providing a telling example of how the job-creation effect due to<strong>migration</strong> is highly dependent on the prevailing economic <strong>and</strong> institutional environment.Zekri (2009) provides data on the number <strong>and</strong> typology of associations of Tunisian emigrants,showing that most of them explicitly pursue some sort of social objectives. The Tunisian governmentacknowledges the importance of these associations abroad to attract the capital of emigrants towardssocial investments in the country. Zekri (2009) also reports data on Tunisian investors residing abroadfrom the Agency of Industry Promotion: from 1988 to 2007, 43,912 jobs have been created thanks toinvestors from abroad, <strong>and</strong> around $385 million have been invested in more than 10,000 projects, inparticular in the service sectors: data comes from the Agency of Industry Promotion. The Tunisiangovernment is aware of the potential benefits for the country from the investments of its emigrants.This is why it offers several advantages (also fiscal advantages) to the migrants who want to invest inTunisia.9.2 Return migrants <strong>and</strong> investmentsAs we observed in the introduction, when <strong>migration</strong> occurs predominantly on a temporary basis, thenwe need to focus on returnees in order to fully underst<strong>and</strong> its impact on the labour <strong>market</strong>; one of themain regularities that is observed for return migrants – <strong>and</strong> AMCs make no exception in this respect, isthat they tend to opt out of salaried jobs. A disproportionate share of return migrants opt for a selfemployedoccupations <strong>and</strong> the MIREM project shows that 27.7 percent of the sampled returnees toAlgeria, Tunisia <strong>and</strong> Morocco became employers or independent workers, while 33.2 percent optedfor a salaried occupation. McCormick <strong>and</strong> Wahba (2001) provide evidence that the duration of the<strong>migration</strong> experience <strong>and</strong> foreign savings increase the probability of becoming an entrepreneur uponreturn to Egypt, though a recent contribution by Wahba <strong>and</strong> Zenou (2008) has cast some doubts on thisconclusion, as the loss of social capital that <strong>migration</strong> entails makes it harder for Egyptian migrants toset up a successful enterprise. Preliminary analysis of the data from the ELMPS 2006 reveals that asignificantly larger share of returnees is engaged in an entrepreneurial activity, <strong>and</strong> – moreinterestingly – that the survival rate of the MSEs run by return migrants between 1998 <strong>and</strong> 2006exceeded by 14 percentage points the corresponding figure for stayers.144
Chapter IIThe impact of <strong>migration</strong> on labour <strong>market</strong>s in Arab Mediterranean countriesTable 8.1. Return <strong>migration</strong> <strong>and</strong> entrepreneurial activitiesreturnees stayers t-test obs.Entrepreneurs in 1998, percent 20.73 5.18 11.88** 17,361Entrepreneurs in 2006, percent 27.37 8.38 11.68** 17,361Survival rate of entrepreneurialactivities, percent84.04 69.93 2.36* 923College graduates among entrepreneurs,percent12.51 8.12 0.97 923Enterprises established after 1980,percent86.89 64.66 4.23** 923Notes: entrepreneurs defined as individuals reporting to be either self-employed or employers, following McCormick <strong>and</strong>Wahba (2001); ** <strong>and</strong> * denotes statistical significance at the 1 <strong>and</strong> 5 percent confidence level respectively.Source: authors’ elaboration on data from ELMPS (2006)As the data from the MIREM project shows, the relationship from return <strong>migration</strong> <strong>and</strong> theoccupational choice upon return depends on the employment status experienced in the countries ofdestination: the number of migrants from Morocco, Algeria <strong>and</strong> Tunisia who were self-employed inItaly was higher than the corresponding figure for migrants to France, who were less likely to optfor an entrepreneurial activity upon return, a choice that is also influenced by the on-the-jobtraining received abroad. Also levels of integration in the host country matter: the more integratedare generally the ones who benefit more from the <strong>migration</strong> experience in terms of savings, but – asevidenced by Hammouda (2008) for Algeria – they are less likely to come back to the origincountries.Clearly, also the economic <strong>and</strong> institutional environment which prevails at home matter, <strong>and</strong> theshare of returnees who carry out some productive investments upon return is substantially lower inAlgeria (17 percent) than in Morocco or Tunisia, where the corresponding share is above 40percent, in line with the arguments described in Section 9.1. They mainly invest in smallenterprises with less than 10 employees – with an ensuing limited job-creation effect. In line withthe arguments by Wahba <strong>and</strong> Zenou (2008), social capital plays a key role: about 80 percent ofinvestors report having received help from family of friends in the origin country. The sectorswhich attract most investments by returnees are: the wholesale <strong>and</strong> retail trade (36.0 percent),hotels <strong>and</strong> restaurants (17.9 percent), agriculture (17.5 percent), manufacturing (11.9 percent) <strong>and</strong>construction (16.3 percent). Trade is also the sector that attracts the majority of returnees from theGulf in Syria (Kawakibi, 2008).Sayre <strong>and</strong> Olmstead (1999) argue that returnees in Palestine after the Oslo accords invested mostlyin the service <strong>and</strong> construction sector, but also, to a lesser extent, in the infrastructures <strong>and</strong> in thelight manufacturing sector; the authors also observe that a large number of skilled migrants havebeen employed in the public administration sector <strong>and</strong> this led to an increase in inequality betweenfamilies with <strong>migration</strong> experience <strong>and</strong> the families without such an experience.9.3 Social remittances <strong>and</strong> investmentsAs far as investments are concerned, the single most relevant cultural effect of <strong>migration</strong> is probablythe development of a banking culture (Schramm, 2009), as a larger share of the population in migrantsendingcountries becomes familiar with financial services through remittance transfers. This, in turn,can create new opportunities to undertake productive investments.145
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