Final Program - Society for Risk Analysis

providing normative information of how individuals ought to respond, participantswere allowed to generate their own moral conclusions. 60 undergraduate students at auniversity in the Northeastern United States were recruited to participate. Participantswere randomly assigned to either a control group or a stimulus condition. In the controlgroup, participants were given a solicitation for a real donation to an African childdesperately in need of aid. In the stimulus condition, participants were first asked ifthey thought they had an obligation to rescue a drowning child in front of them evenif it would ruin their clothes; they were then given the same appeal for the Africanchild as the control group. Participants in the stimulus condition gave significantlymore money to help the African child in need than participants in the control group.The contrast between this result and that of previous research is discussed in termsof reactance and the potential negative consequences of providing normative conclusionsfor moral arguments instead of allowing message recipients to freely generatetheir own moral responses.T3-H.4 Hartnett E, Schaffner D, Lysak K, Hedberg C, Paoli G; ehartnett@Risk-SciencesInt.comRisk Sciences International, Rutgers, Clarity Healthcare, University of MinnesotaMODELING HEALTH CARE SURGE CAPACITY REQUIREMENTSDURING AN ATTACK ON THE FOOD SUPPLYIntentional attacks on the food supply can potentially have catastrophic impactson the health of the population. In localized events the ability to expand health careto sudden, and potentially prolonged, demand is of great concern. We have developeda simulation-based tool that enables the exploration of current surge capacitydemands under a variety of forms of attack on the food supply. It considers bothtreatment oriented capacity (such as access to treatment facilities, equipment and medicinals)and laboratory capacity (in terms of testing and identification of the agent).The tool is designed such that varying magnitudes of incident can be explored fora range of potential threat agents with differing health outcomes (for example thenumber of people affected, the severity of health outcomes, and their geographicaldensity). The underlying discrete-event simulation considers both the spatial andtemporal aspects of the population affected by an attack and simulates the resultingdemand on the health care system. Use of the tool allows the exploration of the impactof different responses to an incident, for example different protocols addressingthe emergency standard of care, or response strategies such as the implementation oftemporary or mobile care facilities. Such explorations provide insights into the abilityof the health care system to provide the required level of patient care for intentionalattacks. This in turn provides information and data that can be used in the developmentof emergency preparedness plans aimed at minimizing the impact of an attackon the food supply. This presentation will summarise the structure and mathematicalarchitecture of the tool and illustrate the use of the tool through a scenario involvingbotulinum toxin.T2-J.1 Hartz RT, Coles JB, Keisler JM, Zhuang J, Linkov I; rth13@pitt.eduUniversity of Pittsburgh, University at Buffalo, University of Massachusetts, University at Buffalo,US Army Engineer Research and Development CenterTHE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE-BASED DECISIONS: IMPROVINGTERRORISM DEFENSE BY INTEGRATING MULTI-CRITERIA DECI-SION ANALYSIS, GAME THEORY, AND THE VALUE OF INFORMA-TIONDecision-making is a vital component of effective homeland security policymaking. The efficiency of current counterterrorism techniques has been widely questioned.New approaches to risk assessment are needed to combat the evolving threatof terrorism. In this work, we expand on previous contributions of game theoryin counterterrorism. We propose a two-player attacker-defender game, introducingthree new elements to the standard problem. Using Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis(MCDA) techniques, we provide a different perspective on strategy development. Byintroducing a framework that allows for a consistent approach to expert elicitation, weattempt to maximize current data utilization. In addition, we added a feedback loopfor investment of resources towards improving scientific knowledge using the Valueof Information (VoI) framework. This addition makes it possible for the defendingactor to advance the current set of knowledge relating to tactics and countermeasureswhile mounting an active defense. Finally, once the defender’s resources are investedin defense and knowledge advancement, an attacker with perfect information developsand attempts an attack, predicted by maximizing payoff in the game. Game theoryhas been used to effectively model and predict the behavior of entities interacting,with applications in fields as broad as economic policy, military planning, bargainingstructures, and even business planning optimization. By expanding MCDA to incorporategame theory in counterterrorism policy selection, we believe that our approachwill expand a defender’s capability for analysis of unique and robust terrorist actors byadapting these powerful tools in a new integrated application. In this presentation weattempt to show that prioritization of defense policy techniques, using a combinationof MCDA and VoI, could have a profound impact on the efficiency of the decisionmakingprocess.T4-C.1 Hattis D, Lynch M, Greco S, Goble R; dhattis@aol.comClark UniversityTHE “STRAW MAN” SYSTEM FOR REPLACING UNCERTAINTY FAC-TORS WITH EMPIRICAL DISTRIBUTIONS FOR TRADITIONAL SYS-TEMIC TOXICANTS’ EXAMPLES AND USE FOR VALUE OF INFOR-MATION ANALYSIS OF IN VITRO MEASUREMENTSSome key recommendations of the NRC “Science and Decisions” report include(1) specifiying criteria for RfDs in terms of a “Risk Specific Dose” (no morethan X risk of harm with Z confidence) and (2) replacement of the arbitrary single-113