Final Program - Society for Risk Analysis

W4-C.5 Sass J; jsass@nrdc.orgNatural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL (NRDC) PERSPECTIVEON TRANSPARENCY, SPEED AND STAKEHOLDERS’ INVOLVE-MENT IN EPA’S CHEMICAL RISK ASSESSMENTThe EPA has a program for assessing the hazards of industrial chemicals in ourair, water, and soil. These scientific assessments are not regulations themselves, butthey are frequently used by regulators, at EPA, in the states, and around the world,to set the allowable levels of exposure to chemicals from different sources. UnderTSCA - chemicals are considered safe until they are proven to be harmful by regulatoryagencies. In most cases, the agency can’t prove that a chemical is harmful withoutcompleting an assessment. And, unfortunately, under the current law there is noenforceable deadline for EPA to complete its chemical assessment, no ‘harmful untilproven safe’ interim standards to limit chemical exposures, and no consequences forthe industry if EPA fails to (or is prevented from) completing an assessment. Combinedwith the “innocent until proven guilty” approach of the current law, industryhas every incentive to delay the completion of those assessments it thinks may leadto regulatory restrictions or liabilities. The recurring failure to complete risk assessmentsand set new legal limits on chemicals is so severe, that it became the focus ofan investigation and report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2008.This presentation presents three high-profile chemical assessments - formaldehyde,styrene, and TCE - to support regulatory reforms. Reforms should include: enforceabledeadlines for completing chemical assessments, meaningful consequences for thefailure to complete a safety assessment, default interim health-protective standards(such as some protective fraction of the LD50) until the EPA can complete its assessment,restrictions on the expansion or new use of a chemical pending completion ofthe safety assessment, and shifting the burden of proof from the EPA to the chemicalindustry to show that chemicals are safe. EPA needs the authority to take action andprotect the public from unsafe chemicals without waiting for additional years of studyor surmounting endless hurdles thrown up by the regulated industry.M4-D.3 Scanlon KA, McDonald SM; scanlon30@yahoo.comConcurrent Technologies CorporationCLOSING THE LOOP: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE LIFE CYCLE OFBERYLLIUM-CONTAINING MATERIALS IN THE DEPARTMENT OFDEFENSEThe Department of Defense classifies beryllium as a strategic, critical material.It is used in a vast array of defense-related products, such as bearings for landing gear,electronic connectors, mast-mounted sights, hatch springs, and mirrors. Beryllium’sphysicochemical characteristics make it a valued metal for military aerospace applications.Despite these characteristics and its numerous uses beryllium compounds pose168significant human health hazards when the beryllium or the beryllium-containingcomponent is abraded, ground, or otherwise made respirable. Workplace activitiesand processes that generate aerosols are of particular concern. Exposure to aerosols(particulates, fumes, and dusts) of beryllium compounds (metal, alloys, oxide) is associatedwith beryllium sensitization and chronic beryllium disease. The U.S. EnvironmentalProtection Agency (USEPA), the National Toxicology Program, and theInternational Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) support the conclusion thatberyllium is likely a human carcinogen. Because beryllium is a potential occupationalexposure hazard and a strategic, critical material, it is important to know where berylliumis used, how it is used, and how it is managed at end-of life. The main goal ofthis presentation is to provide the results of a life cycle study that tracked specificberyllium-containing materials used in the DoD through production, component fabrication,manufacture, storage, use, maintenance, and end-of-life management. Thepresentation will highlight existing policies, procedures, and practices concerning thesafe use and handling of beryllium, gaps in the life cycle of beryllium-containing materials,and risk management options to address these gaps.M4-E.1 Schaffner DW, Danyluk MD; schaffner@aesop.rutgers.eduRutgers UniversityLESSONS LEARNED FROM A PRELIMINARY QUANTITATIVE MI-CROBIAL RISK ASSESSMENT FOR LEAFY GREENSThis presentation will present findings from a project that was undertaken torelate what is known about the behavior of E. coli O157:H7 under laboratory conditions,and integrate this information to what is known regarding the 2006 E. coliO157:H7 spinach outbreak in the context of a Quantitative Microbial Risk Assessment(QMRA). The QMRA explicitly assumes that all contamination arises fromexposure in the field, but the mechanism is unspecified. What can be specified are theprevalence per serving and the pathogen concentration per gram on product comingout of the field. Extracted data, models and user inputs were entered into an Excelspreadsheet and the modeling software @RISK was used to perform Monte Carlosimulations. The model predicts that cut leafy greens that are temperature abused willsupport the growth of E. coli O157:H7, where concentrations of the organism mayincrease by as much a 1 log CFU per day under optimal temperature conditions. Whenthe risk model used a starting concentration of -1 log CFU/g, with 0.1% of incomingservings contaminated, the predicted cells per serving were within the range of bestavailable estimates of pathogen concentrations during the outbreak. The model predictsthat levels in the field of -1 log CFU/g and 0.1% prevalence could have resultedin an outbreak approximately the size of the 2006 E. coli O157:H7 outbreak. ThisQMRA model represents a preliminary framework that identifies available data andprovides initial risk estimates for pathogenic E. coli in leafy greens. Important datagaps that were identified include retail storage times, correlations between storage